Collected Political Writings of James Otis. Otis James

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      long acquaintance with our ancient records, must have furnished him with many curious annecdotes, unknown to most others.

      I entirely agree with his Honor, that our standard for silver has ever been the same with sterling. I could never see any necessity of altering the denomination, and have often wondered at such alteration taking place; and am more fully convinced since his Honor’s opinion, that it was a very ill judged thing, tending only to confusion and disorder. It is a thousand pities that so fair an opportunity as offered itself in 1749, for rectifying this error should not have been embraced.

      His Honor observes, that “in democratical governments, generally, there will be a biass in the legislature, to the number rather than to the weight of the inhabitants.” It is presumed that this may be true in speculation, but it cannot well be examined in practice: because strictly speaking, there never were many democratical governments in the world. I don’t at present recollect one such government existing upon the face of the earth. The English government is by some indeed considered as democratical, others have not scrupled to call it an anarchy; but the best opinion is, that the true British constitution, as settled by the glorious revolution, is a mixed monarchy, or a composite of the three famous kinds, viz. of monarchy, supplied by the King, aristocracy, supplied by the lords, and of democracy, supplied by the commons. This when the checks and ballances are preserved, is perhaps the most perfect form of government, that in its present depraved state, human nature is capable of. It is a fundamental maxim in such a government, to keep the legislative, and executive powers, separate. When these powers are in the same hands, such a government is hastening fast to its ruin, and the mischiefs and miseries that must happen before that fatal period, will be as bad as those felt in the most absolute monarchy.

      It may happen in governments formed after this model, that in consequence of art and corruption, half a dozen, or half a score men will form an oligarchy, in favour of themselves; and an aristocracy in favour of their families and friends. Instances may be found, where a man of abilities, shall monopolize a power proportionate to all those of lord chief baron of the exchequer, lord chief justice of both benches, lord high treasurer, and lord high chancellor of Great Britain, united in one single person. There is no axiom in the mathematicks clearer than that no man ought to be sole legislator of his country, and supreme judge of his fellow citizens. Should it be objected, that in making these political reflections, I have wandered; my apology is, I went out of the way, for the sake of his Honor’s company, whose observation upon the democratical byass, led me astray if I have erred. By analogy it seems probable, that in an aristocratical government, the byass will

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      be in favour of the weight rather than the number of the inhabitants. But the more equitable way in all governments, is to set quantity against quality, and to keep as exact a balance between debtor and creditor, as the nature of the thing will admit. If it is possible that his Honor should intend, a distant light delicate suggestion, that I am in the least warped by either of these byasses, he is very much mistaken. I desire neither poverty nor riches, and thank God heartily that I have neither. Mediocritate mea contentus sum.⁴ My argument in more respects than one, runs counter to what the wise of this world call interest. This will not lie, and when a man speaks against it, there is little reason to suspect his sincerity, however lightly we may think of his understanding. Restituit Rem,⁵ is a pompous motto, that I never expect to be complimented with, and I certainly will never assume it, but this, Non populi fasces, non purpura Regum flexit,⁶ is what every man should take care to deserve, before he pretends to any degree of philosophy or patriotism.

      For the sake of the unlettered reader, let it be noted, that Monarchy is the government of a single person, whether King, Emperor, or perpetual Dictator. Aristocracy is a government administred by a few Nobles or Grandees. A Democracy is that government where the supreme power is in the Hands of the people. An Oligarchy, is the government of a few, sometimes justly termed a Junto. Anarchy denotes a mobb or no government at all.

      There can’t be a more severe satire upon many modern governments, than what Mons. Secondat is supposed gravely to assert, as the principle of Monarchal governments: “In Monarchies (says he) policy makes people do great things with as little virtue as she can. The state subsists independently of the love of one’s country, of the thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the ancients, and which to us are known only by Story.”

      The same author, speaking of the British Constitution, observes that, “the political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind, arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted, as one man need not be afraid of another. When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, (or nearly so) there can be no liberty, because (just and great) apprehensions may arise lest the same Monarch or Senate (or Junto) should enact tyrannical laws to execute them

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      in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul: for the judge would be then the legislator: were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the insolence of an oppressor. There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise the powers of enacting laws, of executing the public resolutions, and of judging the crimes and differences of individuals. Most kingdoms of Europe enjoy a moderate government, (i.e. in comparison of Turkey) because the Prince, who is invested with the two first powers, leaves the third to his subjects.

      “In Turkey, where these three powers are united in the Sultan’s person the subjects groan under the weight of a most frightful oppression.

      “In the republics of Italy, where the three powers are united, there is less liberty than in our monarchies (in which the French is included). Hence their government is obliged to have recourse to as violent methods for its support, as even that of the Turks. Witness the State Inquisitors, and the Lion’s Mouth, into which every (rascally) informer, may at all hours throw his written accusations.

      “What a situation must the poor subject be in, under those Republics! The same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themselves, as legislators. They may plunder and plague the state by their general (ignorant, vague, random and arbitrary) determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions. The whole power is here united in one body; and tho’ there is no external pomp that indicates an arbitrary sway, yet people (unless they are more stupid than stocks and stones) feel the effects of it every moment.

      “Hence it is that many princes in Europe, whose (sole) aim has been levelled at arbitrary power, have constantly set out, with uniting in their own persons, all the (material) branches of magistracy, and all the great offices of state.” Spirit of Laws, V. I. B. X. C. vi.

      O Secondat! thou wast surely inspired, or you could never have so exactly described the state of provinces, perhaps unpeopled, and of people unborn, when you first felt their miseries. Had France have had many Montesquieus, Canada might never have been conquered: Should Great Britain play it away, when another Pitt appears, she may conquer it again.

      JAMES OTIS, Junr.

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