Selections from Three Works. Francisco Suárez

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СКАЧАТЬ law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls: the testimony of the Lord is faithful, giving wisdom to little ones.’ For this last phrase contains the first reason, since it is through wisdom that man is ordered to his supernatural end. The last reason, indeed, is comprehended in the third or penultimate property; for the law in question depends upon God’s truth; it cannot be subject to error; more than that, it is able to correct and repress the errors of nature. Again, the third reason enters into the second property; for the divine law is justly said to convert the soul, in that it directs interior acts.14 Lastly, this law is called unspotted, because it permits no evil.

      All of these reasons furnish proof chiefly with respect to the divine law as it is connatural to grace. This is especially true of the first and second reasons, a point which I have also touched upon above. For the third and the fourth have application even to the purely natural law, since that law also prescribes internal acts that are good, and forbids those which are evil, while it does not actually permit of any act that is wrong. The divine positive law, as we are now speaking of it, is on the contrary concerned ordinarily with external acts.15 This fact is evident in the case of the Old Law, and also in that of the New, in so far as the latter deals with the Sacraments and the Ecclesiastical hierarchy. Furthermore, God does not forbid all evils through positive law; rather does this prohibition pertain to the divine natural law of both orders, as has been explained above.16

      16. The divine [positive] law is necessary not in an absolute sense but on the basis of a presupposition. From the foregoing, we conclude that the divine positive law was necessary, not in an absolute sense, relatively to

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      [man’s] supernatural end but on the presupposition of the institution of the Synagogue or of the Church. Relatively to such institution, the said law may be considered as an absolute necessity; although, with respect to the end itself, it serves rather for the better state and the greater instruction of mankind, either that men may be restrained in their excessive blindness and depraved morals, or for the sake of [their] greater perfection and enlightenment, that perfect virtue and holiness may be attained [by them]. The rational basis of the foregoing statements is as follows: even though some supernatural law, as well as some supernatural knowledge, may have been necessary, that law which was connatural to grace itself would have been able to suffice; therefore, the need to add another and positive law sprang from the particular institution of the mystical spiritual body, so to speak. The existence of this institution being granted, the reasons adduced by St. Thomas may very well be applied, in due proportion, to this positive divine law.

      The said law is wont to be further subdivided into the Old and the New Laws, a division which we shall explain more fully in Books Nine and Ten.17

      17. It remains to discuss positive human law, which is so named because of the proximate source from which it flows.

      For this law is called human, not because it was imposed by men, nor because it exists in them as in those persons who are to be governed by it; since these facts, although they do apply to the law in question, are not characteristics peculiar to it, but are shared in common with all [the divisions of] law of which we treat, whether divine or natural. Thus, according to such a derivation, human law would be distinguished rather from angelic law, that is, from the law imposed on the angels, with which we are not dealing. Again, the said law is not called human from its subject-matter; that is to say, it is not so called on the ground that it is established with regard to human, and not to divine affairs. For although this derivation may perhaps be suitable with reference to the law which the philosophers have called ‘human’, nevertheless, it does not actually

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      represent their meaning nor is it adequate, since human law covers a wider field, as we shall see.

      What is human law; and why is it so called? This law, then, is called human for the reason that it was devised and established proximately by men. But I say ‘proximately’, because the original derivation of every human law is in a certain sense traced back to the eternal law, according to the Scriptural passage (Proverbs, Chap. viii [, v. 16]): ‘By me princes rule, and the mighty decree justice’; and furthermore, as to the binding force18 [of such law], that flows from the power given by God, since, ‘There is no power but from God’ (Romans, Chap. xiii [, v. 1]). However, that law itself which is called human is an act of man, and accordingly, it is proximately established by him; for which reason it is given this epithet of ‘human’. Thus Plutarch (Comment. [Ad Principem Ineruditum]) said that learning was a requisite in the prince. For, ‘justice is the end of law; law is the work of the prince; and the prince is the image of God governing the universe.’ Augustine, too (On the True Religion, Chap. xxxi), says: ‘The founder of temporal laws, if he is a good and wise man, consults the eternal law in order to discern […] in accordance with its immutable rules, what temporal commands and prohibitions should be laid down.’ Elsewhere (On the Gospel of John, Treatise VI [, chap. i, no. 25]), Augustine says that God has apportioned human laws to mankind through its rulers.

      Human law is therefore the work of man, derived proximately from his power and wisdom, and ordained for its subjects as a rule and measure of their actions.

      18. What is the necessity for human law? From the preceding statements, the necessity, or the utility, of this human law is also readily to be seen. For as St. Thomas ([I.–II,] qu. 91, art. 3) has noted, its necessity springs from the fact that the natural, or the divine law, is of a general nature, and includes only certain self-evident principles of conduct, extending, at most, to those points which follow necessarily and by a process of obvious inference from the said principles; whereas, in addition to such points, many others are necessarily involved in the case of a human commonwealth in

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      order that it may be preserved and rightly governed, so that it was necessary for human reason to determine more particularly certain points relating to those matters which cannot be defined through the natural reason alone, a determination that is effected by means of human law; and therefore, such law was most necessary. Accordingly, Plato (Laws, Bk. IX, not far from the end [875]) says: ‘It is necessary for men to lay down laws in order that they may live accordingly; for if they lived without laws, they would in nowise differ from the most savage beasts.’ Similarly, Aristotle (Politics, Bk. I, chap. ii [chap. i, no. 12, 1253 A]) has declared: ‘Even as man, when perfected, is the best of all animals, so, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all.’19

      19. Moreover, relying upon both authors, it is possible to explain more fully the necessity involved. For that necessity is founded on the fact that man is a social animal, requiring by his very nature a civil life and intercourse with other men; therefore, it is necessary that he should live rightly, not only as a private person, but also as a part of a community; and this is a matter which depends to a large extent upon the laws of the individual community. It is furthermore necessary that each person should take counsel not only for himself, but also for others, preserving peace and justice, a condition that could not be brought about in the absence of appropriate laws. Again, it is necessary that those points which relate to the common good of men, or of the state, should be accorded particular care and observance; yet, men as individuals have difficulty in ascertaining what is expedient for the common good, and moreover, rarely strive for that good as a primary object; so that, in consequence, there was a necessity for human laws that would have regard for the common good by pointing out what should be done for its sake and by compelling the performance of such acts. Accordingly, Aristotle ([Ethics,] Bk. X, chap. ix [, no. 14]) says: ‘Public regulations and provisions must clearly be established by law, and the good ones are established by laws zealous20 of good.’ Wherefore Cyril (Against Julian, Bk. III, not far from the beginning [Migne, Patrologia Graeca, loc. cit., no. 81]) remarks: ‘Nor is there

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      any doubt but that laws direct one toward what СКАЧАТЬ