Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind. Francis Hutcheson

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СКАЧАТЬ analogous idea, but he does still have some kind of useful notion of this faculty.

      3. Ideas are either simple or complex; a simple idea is a kind of uniform representation not made up of parts that are different from each other.

      A complex idea is one “which is made up of dissimilar parts into which it can also be resolved.”

      The idea of being is the simplest [idea]; ideas of secondary qualities are also mostly simple, as well as abstract ideas of certain modes of thinking.

      4. In respect of their names, ideas are either distinct or confused. A distinct idea is one “which is easily told apart from others.” A confused idea is one “which is not easily told apart from others from which it is thought to be different.”

      But perhaps more correctly the name itself or the term which denotes the idea is said to be distinct “when a known and certain complex of ideas is bound together by a name which cannot be altered without our being aware of it”; it is confused when “that complex is not sufficiently certain, so that something may at some point be added or removed [from it] without our noticing.”

      5. In respect of their objects, ideas are either of substances or of modes, or of substances together with their modes. A substance is “a being subsisting in itself.” A mode is “a being which inheres in another [being].”

      6. Ideas likewise may be real (or true), or they may be fictitious. Real ideas are “ideas which have corresponding objects,” or [ideas] which arise from natural causes following the order of nature. Fictitious [ideas] are “arbitrary conjunctions of ideas not drawn from true things.”

      7. Ideas are either adequate or inadequate. Adequate ideas are those “which represent the whole nature of an object,” or at least all of it that we want to conceive in our minds. Such are the complex or combined ideas of modes which the mind assembles in an arbitrary fashion without referring them to an external model; also ideas of modes of thinking or of states of mind. Our ideas of substances are all inadequate.

      CHAPTER 3

      Abstraction is “the act of the mind by which it directs itself to one or some of the ideas which are contained in a complex [idea] and ignores the rest.” Abstract ideas are ideas which are denoted by names or symbols that signify several things that are similar to each other but which also have some evident differences.⁶

      After the mind has observed a variety of things that give rise to various complex ideas, and has seen that they are alike in certain qualities and unlike in others, it forms a universal idea by abstracting itself from the points in which they differ, while retaining the ideas of the points in which they are alike, and by denoting them with a specific name. This is how the eighth distinction between ideas arises, that some are universal and others singular.

      A singular idea is an idea “which is intended to represent one thing alone” and is denoted either by a proper noun, like Alexander the Great, or by a common noun applied to one man, for example, this man or that man.

      A universal idea is an idea “which is suitable for representing several things individually” whose sign (which is a common noun) can be predicated distributively of individuals, as man [can be predicated] of Peter, Paul, etc.

      Nouns which denote a collection [of things], or one thing which is an aggregate of several things, are not properly predicated of individuals and often denote singular complex ideas. Examples are the city of Rome, Alexander’s army, the human race, the world.

      Complex ideas are said to have comprehension, which “is a collection of all the simpler ideas which are combined in the complex,” for example, in animal [are contained the ideas of] body, living, and sentient.

      Universal ideas are said to have extension, or quantity, which is “a collection of objects which an idea can represent, or [objects] the word for which is predicable individually.”

      From what has been said about abstraction, it will be clear that the greater the extension, the less the comprehension, and vice versa.

      CHAPTER 4⁷

      A universal idea or predicable word has five species: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident.⁸ They are defined with regard either to ideas or to terms as follows:

With respect to ideas	With respect to terms
1. A genus is a universal idea representing an object as a thing, which extends to other universal ideas.	1. A genus is a [word] predicable of several things which differ in kind (specie) in some respect (in quid) “or as a material part of the essence, as animal of man and brute.”
2. A species is “a universal idea representing a thing, which is subordinate to a more general idea,” or [an idea] which applies only to individual things.	2. A species is “a [word] predicable of several things which are numerically different in some respect (in quid ),” or as the total essence, as man [is predicable] of Peter and Paul.
The highest genus is [the genus] “which does not have a more general genus above it,” for example, being. A subaltern is one “which can be a species with respect to a more general [genus].”
The lowest species is [the species] “which covers individuals alone”; a subaltern species can be a genus.
3. A differentia is “a universal idea which represents a thing modified by an essential primary attribute,” i.e., [an idea] which divides a genus into species, and combines with a genus to constitute a species.	3. A differentia is “a [word] predicable of several things that differ in species or number, in respect of some quality (in Quale Quid )” or as a formal part of the essence; for when it is added to a genus it completes the essence of a species and its definition.
4. A property is the “universal idea of a thing modified by an essential secondary attribute,” that is, [an attribute] which is contained in the idea of the thing not formally but as a consequence; for instance, being subject to law is a property of man.	4. A property is “a [word] predicable of several things in respect of a quality necessarily” (in Quale necessario), that is, [an attribute] which belongs to this species, and only this species, and the whole of this species, at all times, or as bound up with its essence.
5. An accident is “the universal idea of a thing modified by a true/true mode,” that is, [a mode] which may be either present or absent.	5. An accident is “a [word] predicable of several things in respect of a quality contingently” (in Quale contingenter).

      CHAPTER 5

      A genus is said to be a logical whole or universal with respect to its species which are logical parts in the division of it. On the other hand a species is said to be a metaphysical whole, with respect to its genus and its differentia, which are metaphysical parts of its essence, but is said to be a physical whole with respect to its integrating parts. For example, (1) animal is the logical whole with respect to man and the brutes; (2) man is the metaphysical whole, or formal [whole], with respect to that which is animal and rational; (3) man is the physical or integral whole with respect to body and soul. The human body is also the integral whole with respect to head, chest, abdomen, limbs, etc., which are the integrating parts.⁹

      N.B. Abstract, absolute, or denominating names of true modes, as well as abstract ideas themselves, may be either genera or species when they represent objects as things, without any distinct or direct idea of the subject, for instance, justice, virtue, and their opposites; true substances regarded as appendices of other things, and their concrete and connotative names, may be differentiae, properties, or accidents, for example, golden, silvery, clothed, shod.

      CHAPTER 6

      A logical whole, or the СКАЧАТЬ