Название: Observations upon Liberal Education
Автор: George Turnbull
Издательство: Ingram
Жанр: Философия
Серия: Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics
isbn: 9781614872382
isbn:
“’Tis ridiculous, said they, 36 not to suit education to the form of government established in the state. For if the manner of education be not congruous to it, the state builds with one hand and pulls down with the other.” And accordingly from the schools throughout Greece, the youth went early into the world, fit not only to manage their private affairs, but qualified for the highest trusts and employments in the public service: well acquainted with the constitution and laws of their country, and highly enamoured of the liberty and happiness, which, whatever civil government hath not for its aim, is not government, but tyranny and oppression. Under tyrannies education was ever neglected, not merely because the more ignorant and dissolute men are, they are the better, i.e. the tamer and more submissive slaves; but because, as Alcaeus was wont to say, tyranny is sagacious enough to know, that arguments are nowise its proper weapons: You may subject minds to it, but you can never persuade into the love and approbation of what is so directly repugnant to virtue and human happiness. The picture of it may please by its likeness, as the images of the deceitful crocodile, or the savage tyger do. But the better drawn such pictures are, the more will they raise our abhorrence of the original monsters themselves. The liberty and general good aimed at by the constitutions of Sparta and Athens, however different these constitutions were, made pleasing representations. It was no difficult matter to breed an early liking to them in a breast where there were any seeds of public spirit. But the tutors of youth in those days did not satisfy themselves with making general panegyrics upon this or the other form of free government, but taught their pupils to attend carefully to the various changes different forms of government had passed through, and to distinguish the internal and the external causes of such revolutions. From such masters had Polybius learned to do more than pass right judgments upon the past, that is, to foresee changes and revolutions yet hid in their causes, and to foretel them, as, you know, he did with respect to Rome, at a very considerable distance of time before the causes, whence the fatal change of government sprung, began to develop themselves, and shew their direful prognostics, or were, so to speak, yet come to a head. This foresight into distant times has nature granted to us, i.e. put within our power to acquire, if we will apply ourselves to get it by looking carefully into history. For perhaps the moon and planets are not more regular in their motions, to the eyes of an astronomer, than human affairs are to those, who being conversant in ancient history, know how to discern futurity in the past, in consequence of the likeness of man to man, and of the sameness of human nature in all ages, i.e. the sameness or likeness of causes in moral productions and events. This is true political wisdom. And this wisdom were youth early taught how to learn from history, and the comparison of times and events.—“Such circumstances happened at a certain period, and such was the successful expedient or cure, or such was the fatal mistake and misapplication, and such were its direful consequences; and when these or the like circumstances shall again concur, the effects will be nearly the same.” This was a lesson duly37 inculcated by ancient preceptors upon their pupils from history and experience, so soon as they had imbibed just notions of the end of government, the design of magistracy and laws, and of the true grandeur and happiness of man, and of society, which is but a greater one; and by this means a clear idea of internal security in a civil constitution against mal-administration, by a just division and balance of power.
Now that I am upon this subject, I can’t choose but tell you; for at this moment the amiable, venerable sage is full in my view.—I cannot, I say, forbear telling you, how my own tutor, who had survived several revolutions in the Roman state, and was throughly acquainted with all that history hath preserved to us, concerning ancient republicks or monarchies, and their struggles, commotions and vicissitudes—how he used to talk to his pupils on matters of government, which we observed to warm him more than any other subject.
“I know, said he, all that happened to Sparta, to Athens, to Carthage, to Syracuse, to Rome in particular. I have studied their respective constitutions, I will explain them all to you, and impartially compare them with you in the course of my lectures. And let me tell you, I do not wonder men were so long of understanding, or being able to find out the best model of civil society. For how can men, how indeed can any creatures, learn causes and the effects of causes, but from observation and experience? As costly as the teacher is, there is, there can be no other. And tho’ the more complex the lesson be, the more danger there is in mistaking and judging wrong, yet a complex lesson must be as difficult as it is complex, and therefore it must require long and various experience to teach, i.e. to illustrate and confirm it. The happiness38 of mankind depends greatly upon their falling into rightly modelled society or good government. Men can do very little singly, or without confederacy and union. Yet if civil union be not rightly constituted, it were better to live disunitedly, or without any other links but the links of humanity or pure nature. But the best form of social union is the most complex and difficult of all lessons. It is a lesson which many dismal catastrophes in human affairs alone can teach. As many revolutions of the moon are requisite in order to learn such a knowledge of that planet’s motions as men can render subservient to their uses, in navigation and otherwise, so many vicissitudes and revolutions of various kinds in different states, are absolutely necessary to shew men to men, and to develop fully to them the nature and operations of moral causes. The lesson is in itself difficult, setting aside all other considerations, as how, for instance, the passions of men blind them or shut their eyes, and hinder them from discerning truths, again and again confirmed to them by the most evident and indisputable experiments.—But as complex and difficult as it is, yet the sagacious penetrating Aristotle,39 tho’ born and bred up in a republic, was able, by his skill in political history and theory, to see there was another form of government, the world had not yet seen, which alone can stand firm and unshaken, and which when once rightly poised and fixed on its basis, will never totter.—A government compounded of democracy and monarchy, so as to make a perfect equilibre. And, said he, raising his voice, and with a warmth like one inspired, surely after long experience of the changes in ancient republics, and of the dismal consequences of absolute monarchy, there shall at last arise, in some happy country well situated for extending with commerce, the knowledge of liberty, and of all the blessings that attend it, over the world.—Surely the true mixture of popular and regal government, shall at last be found and settled in some fortunate isle. And the happy constitution is in itself eternal. It will not, it cannot in the nature of things arrive any where at compleat perfection all at once, but the idea being once formed, and the rudiments, as it were, of this glorious work laid, various struggles between king and people, and between the different ranks and degrees of subjects, will gradually justle the blessed composition into durable tranquillity and fixedness. But when I say tranquillity, I mean only as great tranquillity as is compatible with human passions and mortal affairs. For even after this happy government is fairly settled, as it were, upon its centre of gravity, the noble spirit of liberty, which is the soul that must preserve and actuate this whole, will not seldom boil, and produce very violent effervescences and commotions. Contests about power in the administration, the natural effects of abounding genius and capacity for rule, and perhaps necessary to keep the СКАЧАТЬ