Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, with Selections from Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations. Christian Thomasius

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      §45. The prior faculty retains the title of intellect, while the other is commonly described as intellective memory. We will call the former the first operation of the intellect, the latter the second, which can, however, be varied in infinite ways depending on whether it does more or less. If you want to call the first operation reason and the second ratiocination, we will not object either.

      §46. Thus, we do not need to agonize over the widespread controversy whether there are three, four, or however many operations of the mind, especially as the first operation of the mind that is taught in the schools does not exist, and our division is more useful, about which I will say more soon.

      §47. Therefore, among the internal senses the one which is called basic pertains to the first operation of the intellect; imagination and memory pertain to the second.

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      §48. It is common to divide the intellect into theoretical and practical. But apart from the fact that this division seems to have been invented once upon a time in order to show the difference between the reason of brutes and that of humans, and that there is the same snake in the grass which we detected above when we were discussing theoretical and practical faculties, I also do not know whether this distinction would be of much use to us, even though we may tolerate it with respect to the object of intellectual activity.

      §49. But just as the intellect judges on the nature of things and their relationship to man, so the will determines what is to be done by man. And this decision of the will follows immediately from either the first operation of the intellect or the second. The first of these desires directly; the latter chooses. You could thus describe the former as appetite, the latter as choice or as will in the strict sense.

      §50. The first motions in the sensitive appetite, as it is commonly described, concern the simple appetite, while the other motions of the sensitive appetite, as well as the whole rational appetite, pertain to choice by the will.

      §51. The ordinary process of reasoning and of the actions of man is therefore as follows. After external objects have affected the external senses, there follows the first operation of the intellect. This is received by the appetite, which either directly commands the locomotive power or passes the matter on to the second operation of the intellect to be considered, and after that chooses and impels the locomotive force, etc. From this it is clear that the axiom “Nothing is in the intellect which was not in the senses” is true without limitations, as is the following: “There is no desire for something that is unknown.”

      §52. Since, therefore, man lives, is nourished, grows, moves from one place to another, feels, understands, and wills, it must be determined which human actions are subject to a law. In sum, those that are subject to the decision of man. But these are not the actions usually attributed to the vegetative soul, nor are they the passions of the external senses, the first

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      operation of the intellect, or the first motions of the appetite. The remaining actions, therefore, which are controlled by the decision of man are the passing on of a decision to the second operation of the intellect, in some sense the second operation of the mind itself, and the choice following it, as well as the locomotive powers.

      §53. Yet the common statement that “the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of the will” does not hold true for its first motions, just as the common argument that the locomotive power always depends on the decision of man is not true. The exception here is the locomotive force which man uses instinctively to ward off imminent harm to the body, although the locomotive power of brutes also differs from this, since it is devoid of thought!

      §54. But just as it is certain that in our intellect and especially in its second operation there is a natural rectitude which, given the requisite attention, will not allow us to be deceived in moral matters, so man’s will in the strict sense is entirely free. It is also a true axiom that the will cannot be coerced, although it always desires what is good in general and often is inclined by a peculiar disposition of character, the temperament of the humors, the nature of the climate and soil, the semen, age, diet, health, occupation, etc., as well as by the shape of the organs of the body, habits, passions, and some diseases, and also by the external actions of others; but he must always be guided by the obligation imposed on him by his superior.

      §55. Because of this liberty of the will, actions are imputed to man; that is, man is rightly held to be their author and is required to be answerable for them, and the effects of these actions are attributed to him. Therefore, we like the opinion of the illustrious Rachel very much, that there is one beginning of human actions—namely, choice—not four, as is commonly argued—namely, conscience, volition strictly speaking, deliberation, and choice.⁹

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      §56. Furthermore, just as human actions are called moral in relation to a law, so the judgment on these actions by an intellect imbued with the knowledge of the laws is called conscience. This is either antecedent to human actions or subsequent.

      §57. The antecedent conscience judges either correctly according to the law or erroneously. Therefore, another division of the conscience is into right and erroneous.

      §58. Right conscience either knows how to demonstrate its judgment from certain and undoubted principles or draws on commonplace arguments. Therefore, right conscience (for erroneous conscience can only be probable) is generally subdivided into right conscience properly speaking (we will call this demonstrative) and probable right conscience.

      §59. The Scholastics added the notion of a doubtful conscience, that is, when the judgment of the intellect is undecided and cannot discern whether something is good or bad and so whether it is to be done or omitted. But this is not a form of judgment. It is the suspension of judgment and therefore not a form of conscience.

      §60. More relevant here would be the scrupulous conscience, which is close to doubt, [namely] when the judgment of the intellect is accompanied by anxious fear that the thing which somebody considered good might be bad, and vice versa. This belongs more frequently to the erroneous conscience than to the right conscience.

      §61. The rules, however, which the learned have formulated as guidance for the states of conscience we have talked about either follow automatically from what has been said above or else they are obscure and doubtful.

      §62. Subsequent conscience, insofar as it approves correctly what has been done or condemns wrongdoing, is subdivided into tranquil and restless, or, as we say in German, a good and a bad conscience.

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      §63. Opposed to the voluntary actions of man, which are also called spontaneous, are the actions performed against his will. These are so partly because of a deficiency of the understanding, partly because of a defect of the will.

      §64. To the understanding are opposed ignorance and error. Either of these defects is vincible or invincible, and it is either efficient or concomitant. All these points are clear from the standard books on ethics.

      §65. Opposed to the will are coercion and fear. Fear is described in various ways, depending in part on the person causing it (whether he has the rightful power to instill fear or not) or on the person suffering fear (whether he is a constant man or not).

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