Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, with Selections from Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations. Christian Thomasius

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ one who is extremely peaceful and accepts most criticisms generously.³³

      §29. Usually it is Zoilus and Momus³⁴ who come under attack in prefaces, even where there is no Momus. I too had an excellent opportunity to spit bile at the Zoiluses, if I had not always believed that such invectives were a sign of an unsound, or at least of an undisciplined, mind. Moreover, these calumnies directed against me soon vanished; lies cannot persist for long. They are like snowballs which can grow to an enormous size when they are formed by humans, but which are rapidly reduced to nothing once they are exposed to the rays of the sun. Finally there seemed to be no need for invective, since my Institutes are sold publicly and themselves refute this calumny. I submit these Institutes to the scrutiny of all the learned,

      [print edition page 21]

      but only those who are truly such, for I scorn the censure of the others, who have no learning or know nothing beyond school and the seven liberal arts, even though they are filled to the brim and swollen up with their faith in a false philosophy.

      §30. Yet I believe it to be in your interest, my listeners, that you who are, so to speak, caught between both sides know what responses I would want to be given in these controversies, whenever these matters happen to come up in familiar conversation, as they do. However, I wish you could avoid these occasions as much as is possible and not provide an opportunity for these kinds of quarrels, since nothing is more pedantic and nothing renders humans less suitable for civil life than being a disputatious animal in daily conversation and being unable to tolerate dissenters; just as he on the other hand suffers from the same vice of pedantry who stands at the lectern set up for the sake of public disputation and will not tolerate objections which are put forward according to the rules of the art, but to which he cannot reply, and yet is too embarrassed to admit an error. But as it is not always in our power to avoid quarrels completely, even among those we are familiar with, or to avoid hearing the thoughtless comments of one or the other person, your basic interest and the need to prevent you from being confused about the ideas you received from me demand that I say a little more about this matter.

      §31. Thus, as far as the vice of atheism is concerned, I only ask my adversaries to look at the arguments I list in the first book, chapter 3, §§85ff., where I show that atheism is directly contrary to the principles I demonstrated. Concerning heresy, however, I should be much obliged to that person who will show me a thesis in these Institutes which is contrary to Holy Scripture and the articles of faith we profess. Moreover I appeal to you, who have heard me expound jurisprudence and philosophy on a daily basis, whether I have ever professed any opinion which contradicted the sacred mysteries of our faith and whether I did not rather devote all my efforts to preserve the strict limits which separate sacrosanct theology and human wisdom from each other and to show to you from the history of philosophy in all ages what great unrest the mixture of philosophy with

      [print edition page 22]

      theology has caused within the church. But why do we need long discussions? Do you believe that the venerable theologians of our university, or any others who are entrusted with the inspection of doctrines, be they private or public, will allow that heterodox doctrine to be spread and to corrupt your minds? Far from it. Yet I do not deny, and have demonstrated to you several times, that there are many questions and assertions which theologians commonly use, but which, if you examine them carefully, are properly speaking not theological, but philosophical or juristic. The fact that these matters are generally regarded as part of theology is mainly due to scholastic theology, which has done enormous damage by mixing philosophy with theology contrary to the admonition of Paul, and has created a confused and disorderly mass, in one word, a kind of amorphous chaos. But it is also the fault of philosophers and jurists who neglected letters³⁵ before the Reformation and so gave the papal theologians the chance to seize what was left derelict. That is what happened to natural jurisprudence, as I say in the Institutes themselves, since the law of nature and nations and theology are entirely different. This I prove in book 1, chapter 1, §§163ff., and chapter 2, §§137ff. The news from the capital of Spain has recently brought us an excellent illustration of my opinion: “One suspects that the Dutch extraordinary envoy will receive satisfaction against the Inquisition for the insolent acts committed in his house in the case of Mr. Chares. These acts were condemned without exception by all high-ranking ministers, especially as Mr. De Lyra himself said that the inquisitors were people who understood theology, but not the law of nations, and thus did not know what was due to a public minister.”³⁶ Nor do I conceal my belief that the power to declare a heretic does not pertain to either private persons or the clergy, but is a regalian right and pertains to the prince’s right in sacred affairs, even though this regalian right must be exercised according to the standard of the divine word. I see that this is how it has been observed in the primitive church and in the first ecumenical councils, and the genuine principles of political science teach me the same. I believe also that it belongs to the duty of a good citizen in the Holy

      [print edition page 23]

      Roman Empire, not to speak disparagingly either in public or in private about the religions that are tolerated in the Empire, because this is what the peace treaty of Westphalia teaches me. I believe furthermore that the rules on the duties of the good citizen also apply to the clergy and that this doctrine does not contradict the word of God. I believe that the prince makes proper use of his right if he coerces those with just punishments who are refractory and driven by some intemperate zeal: I believe that gentleness does more to convert adversaries in the church than harsh methods full of verbal abuse, etc. If there is anything heterodox in any of this, I will most willingly suffer correction by those to whom this power belongs.

      §32. I turn to impiety; I hear that the supposed sign of this is that I strongly disagree with my late blessed father. From this someone inferred that I did not care about divine laws, but wanted all of them to be purged from sacred Scripture. This is certainly a cheeky argument, and one that is in many ways contrary to logic. I confess that I sometimes dissent from my father, but the Catechism does teach me that I may do so with a clear conscience and without violating the fourth precept [of the Decalogue]. If someone wanted to extend this to the point of saying that the honor and reverence owed to parents also included some sort of adulatory denial of truth, though truth is guided not by authority, but by right reason, I fear that this person would be hissed and booed even by the catechumens, who are still learning the Catechism. It is not true and even a lie to say that I think harshly of my father. I appeal to all of you to say whether I ever uttered a single little word which could be interpreted as disparaging my father, whenever I indicated to you my disagreement with him. As I have pointed out above, it is possible for me not to mention the name of my father or of others to whom I owe reverence without damaging the reliability of the information. It is true that I did not think highly of some doctrines of the Peripatetics, because I noticed that they did not rest on any firm reason; it is also true, and I acknowledge it, that I sometimes referred to the philosophical writings of my father on this in my lecture, since he was, to my knowledge, the best interpreter of Peripatetic philosophy, whose ideas I developed further. But then there was no more of a disagreement between my father and myself than there is in a court of law between a plaintiff and the lawyer of the accused, especially as my blessed

      [print edition page 24]

      father himself diverged from common opinion in many ways, since he had better reasons, not only in his published writings but also in hitherto unpublished manuscripts (as we will show in an example in the following passages), thus setting a praiseworthy example to me.

      §33. There remains the accusation of being an innovator. The disciples of true wisdom do not take this very seriously, since it is to be considered a matter of pride not to want to see everything with the eyes of others, but to find out something that has been overlooked by others, on the basis of one’s own reasoning powers. And that is the specific characteristic of Eclectic Philosophy, which I have adopted. Its superiority over sectarian philosophy is demonstrated in an erudite dissertation by Johann Christoph СКАЧАТЬ