Название: The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature
Автор: Samuel Pufendorf
Издательство: Ingram
Жанр: Философия
Серия: Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics
isbn: 9781614872078
isbn:
IX. Power of Dispensing. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 6 §17.
But though a Law does strictly include all the Subjects of the Legislator who are concern’d in the Matter of the same, and whom the same Legislator at first intended not to be exempted: yet sometimes it happens that particular persons may be clear’d of any obligation to such Law: and this is call’d Dispensing. But as he only may dispense, in whose Power it is to make and abrogate the Law; *so great Care is to be taken, lest by too frequent Dispensations, and such as are granted without very weighty Reasons, the Authority of the Law be shaken, and occasion be given of Envy and Animosities among Subjects.
X. Equity. L. N. N. l. 5. c. 2. §21.
Yet there is a great Difference between Equity and Dispensing: Equity being a Correction of that in which the Law, by reason of its General Comprehension, was deficient: or an apt Interpretation of the Law, by which it is demonstrated, that there may be some peculiar Case which is not compriz’d in the Universal Law, because if it were, some Absurdity would follow. For it being impossible that all Cases, by Reason of their infinite Variety, should be either foreseen or explicitly provided for; therefore the Judges, whose Office it is to apply the general Rules of the Laws to special Cases, ought to except such from the Influence of them, *as the Lawgiver himself would have excepted if he were present, or had foreseen such Cases.
XI. Actions allowable, good and bad. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §1.
Now the Actions of Men obtain certain Qualities and Denominations from their relation to and agreement with the Law of Morality. And all those Actions, concerning which the Law has determin’d nothing on either side, are call’d allowable, [indifferent] or permitted. Here we may observe, that in Civil Life, where it is impossible to come to perfect Exactness in all points, even †those things are said to be allowable, upon which the Law has not assign’d some Punishment, though they are in themselves repugnant to Natural Honesty. We call those Actions which are consonant to the Law good, and those that are contrary to it bad: But that any Action should be good, ’tis requisite, that it be exactly agreeable in every ‡point to the Law; whereas it may be evil if it be deficient in one Point only.
XII. Justice of Persons. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §6.
As for Justice, it is sometimes the Attribute of Actions, sometimes of Persons. When it is attributed to Persons, ’tis usually defin’d to be, A constant and perpetual Desire of giving every one their own.8 For he is called a just Man, who is delighted in doing righteous Things, who studies Justice, and in all his Actions endeavours to do that which is right. On the other side, the unjust Man is he that neglects the giving every Man his own, or, if he does, ’tis not because ’tis due, but from expectation of Advantage to himself. So that a just Man may sometimes do unjust Things, and an unjust Man that which is just. But the Just does that which is right, because he is so commanded by the Law; and never commits any unjust Acts but only through Infirmity; whereas the wicked Man does a just Thing for fear of the Punishment which is the Sanction of the Command, but such unjust Acts as he commits proceed from the Naughtiness of his Heart.
XIII. Of Actions. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §7.
But the Justice of Actions not only consists in their due Conformity to Law, but it includes in it likewise a right Application of them to those Persons to whom the Action is perform’d: So that we apprehend that Action to be just, which, with full Design and Intention, is apply’d to the Person to whom it is due. Herein therefore, the Justice of Actions differs from their Goodness chiefly, that the latter simply denotes an Agreement with the Law; whereas Justice also includes the Regard they have to those *Persons upon whom they are exercised. Upon which Account Justice is call’d a Relative Virtue.
XIV. Division of Justice. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §8.
Men do not generally agree about the Division of Justice. The most receiv’d Distinction is, into Universal and Particular. The first is, when every Duty is practised and all right done to others, *even that which could not have been extorted by Force, or by the Rigor of Law. The latter is, when that Justice only is done a Man, which in his own right he could have demanded; and this is wont to be again divided into †Distributive and Commutative. The Distributive takes place in Contracts made between Partners in Fellowship, concerning fair Partition of Loss and Gain according to a rate. *The Commutative is mostly in Bargains made upon even hand about Things and Doings relating to Traffick and Dealing.
XV. Injustice what. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §14.
Knowing thus, what Justice is, ’tis easie to collect what is Injustice. Where it is to be observ’d, that such an unjust Action is call’d Wrong-doing, which is premeditately undertaken, and by which a Violence is done upon somewhat which of absolute Right was another Man’s due, or, which by like Right he one way or other stood possess’d of. And this Wrong may be done after a threefold Manner: 1. If that be deny’d to another which in his own right he might demand (not accounting that which from Courtesie or the like Virtue may be another’s due): Or, 2. If that be taken away from another, of which by the same right, then valid against the Invader, he was in full possession: Or, 3. If any Damage be done to another, which we had not Authority to do to him. Beside which, that a Man may be charged with Injustice, it is requisite that there be a naughty Mind and an evil Design in him that acts it. For if there be nothing of these in it, then ’tis only call’d Misfortune, or an Error; and that is so much slighter or more grievous, as the Sloth and Negligence which occasion’d it was greater or less.
XVI. Laws distinguisht. Natural and Positive L. N. N. l. 1. c. 6. §18.
Laws, with respect to their Authors, are distinguished into Divine and Humane; that proceeds from God, and this from Men. But if Laws be considered, as they have a necessary and universal Congruity with Mankind, they are then distinguisht into Natural and Positive.*Natural Law is that which is so agreeable with the rational and sociable Nature of Man, that honest and peaceable Society could not be kept up amongst Mankind without it, Hence it is, that this may be sought out, and the knowledge of it acquired by the light of that Reason, which is born with every Man, and by a consideration of Human Nature in general. Positive Law is that which takes not its rise from the common condition of Human Nature, but only from the good pleasure of the Legislator: This likewise ought to have its Foundation in Reason, and its End ought to be some Advantage to those Men, or that Society, for which it is designed. Now the Law Divine, is either Natural or Positive; but all Human Laws, strictly taken, are Positive.
Of the Law of Nature in general
I. Law Natural obvious. L. N. N. l. 2. c. 3.
That Man, who has thoroughly examined the Nature and Disposition of Mankind, may plainly understand what the Law Natural is, the Necessity thereof, and which are the Precepts it proposes and enjoyns to Mankind. For, as it much conduces to him who would know exactly the Polity of any Community, that he first well understand the Condition thereof, and the Manners and Humours of the Members who constitute it: So to him who has well studied the common Nature and Condition of Man, it will be easie to discover those Laws which are necessary for the Safety and common Benefit of Mankind.
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