An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense. Francis Hutcheson

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СКАЧАТЬ rel="nofollow" href="#litres_trial_promo">SECTION V

       Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit; and be rewardable upon the Supposition that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct,

       SECTION VI

       How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action virtuous,

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TREATISE I

An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions

SECTION I

       A general Account of our several Senses and Desires, Selfish or Publick

      [1/1] The Nature of human Actions cannot be sufficiently understood without considering the Affections and Passions; or those Modifications, or Actions of the Mind consequent upon the Apprehension of certain Objects or Events, in which the Mind generally conceives Good or Evil. [2] In this Inquiry we need little Reasoning, or Argument, since Certainty is only [2] attainable by distinct Attention to what we are conscious happens in our Minds.

      Art. I. “Objects, Actions, or Events obtain the Name of Good, or Evil, according as they are the Causes, or Occasions, mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful Perception to some sensitive Nature.” To understand therefore the several Kinds of Good, or Evil, we must apprehend the several Senses natural to us.

      There seems to be some Sense or other suited to every sort of Objects which occurs to us, by which we receive either Pleasure, or Pain from a great part of them, as well as some Image, or Apprehension of them: Nay, sometimes our only Idea is a Perception of Pleasure, or Pain. The Pleasures or Pains perceived, are sometimes simple, without any other previous Idea, or any Image, or other concomitant Ideas, save those of Extension,

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      or of Duration; one of which accompanies every Perception, whether of Sense, or inward Consciousness. Other Pleasures arise only upon some previous Idea, or Assemblage, or Comparison of Ideas. These Pleasures, presupposing previous Ideas, were called Perceptions of an internal [3] Sense, in a former [3] Treatise.^* Thus Regularity and Uniformity in Figures, are no less grateful than Tastes, or Smells; the Harmony of Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds.^† In [4] like manner, Affections, Tempers, [4] Sentiments, or Actions, reflected upon in our selves, or observed in others, are the constant Occasions of agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, which we call Approbation, or Dislike. These Moral

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      Perceptions arise in us as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can we alter, or stop them, while our previous Opinion or Apprehension of the Affection, Temper, or Intention of the Agent continues the same; any more than we can make the Taste of Wormwood sweet, or that of Honey bitter.

      If we may call every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain, A SENSE, we shall find many other Senses beside those commonly explained. Tho it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will [5] shew that there are such Natural [5] Powers in the human Mind, in whatever Order we place them. In the 1st Class are the External Senses, universally known. In the 2d, the Pleasant Perceptions arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects; as also from Grandeur and Novelty. These we may call, after Mr. ADDISON, the Pleasures of the Imagination; ¹² or we may call the Power of receiving them, an Internal Sense. Whoever dislikes this Name may substitute another. 3. The next Class of Perceptions we may call a Publick Sense, viz. “our Determination to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their Misery.” This is found in some degree in all Men, and was sometimes called Ḱοινονοημοσύνη or Sensus Communis¹³ by some of the Antients. 4. The fourth Class we may call the Moral [6] Sense, by which “we perceive Virtue, or Vice in our selves, or others.” This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon Virtue, or Vice in themselves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in Natural Affection, Compassion, Friendship, or even general Benevolence to Mankind, which connect our

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      Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth [6] Class is a Sense of Honour, “which makes the Approbation, or Gratitude of others, for any good Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of Pleasure; and their Dislike, Condemnation, or Resentment of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called Shame, even when we fear no further evil from them.”

      There are perhaps other Perceptions distinct from all these Classes, such as some Ideas “of Decency, Dignity, Suitableness to human Nature in certain Actions and Circumstances; and of an Indecency, Meanness, and Unworthiness, in the contrary Actions or Circumstances, even without any conception of Moral Good, or Evil.” Thus the Pleasures of Sight, and Hearing, are more esteemed than those of Taste or [7] Touch: The Pursuits of the Pleasures of the Imagination, are more approved than those of simple external Sensations. Plato^* accounts for this difference from a constant Opinion of Innocence in this sort of Pleasures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon their Innocence, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another Class of Sensations.

      A like Division of our Desires.

      [7] II. Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our selves or others the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. 1. The Desire of sensual Pleasure, (by which we mean that of the external Senses); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the Pleasures of Imagination or Internal Sense,^† and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the

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      Pleasures arising from Publick Happiness, and Aversion to the Pains arising [8] from the Misery of others. 4. Desires of Virtue, СКАЧАТЬ