The Free Sea. Hugo Grotius

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СКАЧАТЬ is my proper place which I possessed.”¹⁰ Hereupon Quintilian saith it is natural to all that there should be a reward of industry and Tully that things by ancient occupation became theirs who in times past succeeded into the goods of the dead.¹¹ But this occupation in those things which resist possession, as wild beasts, ought to be perpetual; in other things it sufficeth that a corporal possession begun be retained in the mind. Occupation or possession in movables is apprehension; in immovables, instruction and limitation. Whereupon when Hermogenianus saith they were distinct dominions he added that the fields were bounded and houses built.¹² This state of things is declared of poets:

       tum laqueis captare feras, et fallere visco

       inventum; ¹³

       tum primum subiere domos; ¹⁴

       communemque prius, ceu lumina solis et aurae

       cautus humum longo signavit limite messor. ¹⁵

      After these things, intercourse of merchandise began to come in use, for which cause,

       fluctibus ignotis insultavere carinae. ¹⁶

      The same time commonwealths began to be instituted and established. And so of those which were divided or separated from the first common two kinds are made, for some things are public, to wit, proper to the people (which is the double signification of this word), some things mere private, to wit, proper to every particular man. But occupation is made public after the same manner that it is made private. Seneca saith, “we call those the bounds of the Athenians or Campanians which afterward the borderers divide among themselves by private bounds.”¹⁷ For every nation,

       partita fines regna constituit, novas

       extruxit urbes. ¹⁸

      After this manner Cicero saith, “the territory of the Arpinates is called Arpinatum, of the Tusculans, Tusculanum; the like description,” saith he, “is of private possessions, whereupon because every man’s own consisteth of those things which by nature were common, let every man hold that which fell to his share.”¹⁹ But contrariwise Thucydides calleth that land which fell to no people in division ἀοριστον, to wit, indefinite.²⁰

      Of these things which hitherto have been spoken two things may be gathered. The first is that those things which cannot be occupied or were never occupied can be proper to none because all propriety hath his beginning from occupation.²¹ The other is that all those things which are so ordained by nature that anyone using them they may nevertheless suffice others whomsoever for the common use are at this day (and perpetually ought to be) of the same condition whereof they were when nature first discovered them. Cicero meaneth this when he saith, “This society among all showeth itself far to all men among themselves, in the which a community of all those things which nature brought forth for the common use is to be preserved.”²² But all things are of this kind, wherein without the damage of one another may be pleasured. Hence, saith Cicero, is that “not to forbid running water.”²³ For running water as it is such, not as it is a river, is acknowledged of the civilians to be in the number of those things which are common to all; and of the poet,

       quid prohibetis aquas? usus communis aquarum est.

       nec solem proprium natura, nec aera fecit,

       nec tenues undas: in publica munera veni. ²⁴

      He affirmeth these things not to be proper by nature—as Ulpian saith, they lie open to all by nature²⁵—both because they were first discovered by nature and never came as yet into the dominion of any (as Neratius speaketh),²⁶ and also because (as Cicero saith) they seem to be brought forth of nature for the common use.²⁷ But he calleth those things public by a translated signification, not which appertain to any one country and people but to the whole society of mankind, which in the laws are called publica juris gentium: that is, common to all and proper to none.²⁸ Of this kind the air is for a double reason, both because it cannot be possessed and also because it oweth a common use to men. And for the same cause the element of the sea is common to all, to wit, so infinite that it cannot be possessed and applied to all uses, whether we respect navigation or fishing.²⁹ Whose ever the sea is, theirs also are those things which the sea, taking away from others’ uses, hath made for own, as the sands of the sea, part whereof joining to the land is called the shore. Cicero therefore saith well, “what is so common as the sea to them that float thereon and the shore for them that are cast out.”³⁰ Virgil also saith that the air, the water and the shore lie open unto all.³¹

      These things therefore are those which the Romans call common unto all by the laws of nature, or which are said to be the same publica juris gentium, as also they call the use of them sometimes common and sometimes public.³² But although even those things are rightly said to be no man’s as touching the property, yet they differ much from those things which are no man’s and are not attributed to common use, as wild beasts, fishes and birds. For if any man possess these they may become his proper right, but those things by the consent of all mankind are perpetually exempted from propriety for use which, seeing it belongeth to all, it can no more be taken away by one from all than you may take away that from me which is mine. This is that which Cicero saith, that it is among the first or chief duties of justice to use common things for common things.³³ The Schoolmen would say that some things are common affirmatively and some privatively. This distinction is not only very common among the civilians but also it expresseth the confession of the common people, whereupon the master of the feast in Athenaeus saith the sea was common but the fishes theirs that could take them. And in Plautina, to one that said unto him, keeping his cable,³⁴ “The sea was common for all,” the fisherman consented, but when he added, “It was found in the sea; it is common,” it came well to hand: “That which my net and hooks have gotten is principally mine.”³⁵

      The sea therefore cannot be altogether proper unto any because nature doth not permit but commandeth it should be common, no nor so much as the shore,³⁶ but that this interpretation is to be added: that if any of those things by nature may be occupied, that may so far forth become the occupant’s as by such occupation the common use be not hindered. Which is worthily received and approved, for seeing it is so, both exceptions cease whereby we said it came to pass that all things should not be transferred to proper right.

      Because therefore building is a kind of occupation, it is lawful to build upon the shore if it may be without the hurt of the rest, as Pomponius speaketh, which we will expound out of Scaevola, unless the public, that is to say, the common use should be hindered.³⁷ And he which hath built shall become lord of the soil because that ground was proper to none nor necessary for the common use; it is therefore the occupant’s, but no longer than the occupation continueth, because the sea seemeth to resist possession, by the example of a wild beast which, if it betake itself to the natural liberty, is no longer his who was the taker; so also the shore, which afterward giveth place unto the sea again.³⁸

      But whatsoever may become private by occupation we have declared that the same may also become public, that is to say, proper to the people. So Celsus thinketh that the shore enclosed within the bounds of the empire of Rome appertaineth to the people of Rome;³⁹ which, if it be so, it is no marvel that the same people could grant a means (by their prince or praetor) to their subjects how to possess the shore.⁴⁰ But even this occupation, no less than private, is so to be restrained that it stretch no further than that the public use may be preserved. No man therefore may be forbidden by the people of Rome to СКАЧАТЬ