Elements of Criticism. Henry Home, Lord Kames

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       Influence of Passion with respect to our Perceptions, Opinions, and Belief.

      Considering how intimately our perceptions, passions, and actions, are mutually connected, it would be wonderful if they should have no mutual influence. That our actions are too much influenced by passion, is a known truth; but it is not less certain, tho’ not so well known, that passion hath also an influence upon our perceptions, opinions, and belief. For example, the opinions we form of men and things, are generally directed by affection: an advice given by a man of figure, hath great weight; the same advice from one in a low condition, is despised or neglected: a man of<153> courage under-rates danger; and to the indolent the slightest obstacle appears unsurmountable.

      This doctrine is of great use in logic; and of still greater use in criticism, by serving to explain several principles of the fine arts that will be unfolded in the course of this work. A few general observations shall at present suffice; leaving the subject to be prosecuted more particularly afterward when occasion offers.

      There is no truth more universally known,⁴⁸ than that tranquillity and sedateness are the proper state of mind for accurate perception and cool deliberation; and for that reason, we never regard the opinion even of the wisest man, when we discover prejudice or passion behind the curtain. Passion, as observed above,^* hath such influence over us, as to give a false light to all its objects. Agreeable passions prepossess the mind in favour of their objects, and disagreeable passions, no less against their objects: a woman is all perfection in her lover’s opinion, while in the eye of a rival-beauty she is aukward and disagreeable: when the passion of love is gone, beauty vanishes with it,—nothing left of that genteel motion, that sprightly conversation, those numberless graces, which formerly, in the lover’s opinion, charmed all hearts. To a zealot every one of his own sect is a saint, while the most upright of a different sect are to<154> him children of perdition: the talent of speaking in a friend, is more regarded than prudent conduct in any other. Nor will this surprise one acquainted with the world: our opinions, the result frequently of various and complicated views, are commonly so slight and wavering, as readily to be susceptible of a bias from passion.

      With that natural bias another circumstance concurs, to give passion an undue influence on our opinions and belief; and that is a strong tendency in our nature to justify our passions as well as our actions, not to others only, but even to ourselves. That tendency is peculiarly remarkable with respect to disagreeable passions: by its influence, objects are magnified or lessened, circumstances supplied or suppressed, every thing coloured and disguised, to answer the end of justification. Hence the foundation of self-deceit, where a man imposes upon himself innocently, and even without suspicion of a bias.

      There are subordinate means that contribute to pervert the judgement, and to make us form opinions contrary to truth; of which I shall mention two. First, It was formerly observed,^† that tho’ ideas seldom start up in the mind without connection, yet that ideas suited to the present tone of mind are readily suggested by any slight connection: the arguments for a favourite<155> opinion are always at hand, while we often search in vain for those that cross our inclination. Second, The mind taking delight in agreeable circumstances or arguments, is deeply impressed with them; while those that are disagreeable are hurried over so as scarce to make any impression: the same argument, by being relished or not relished, weighs so differently, as in truth to make conviction depend more on passion than on reasoning. This observation is fully justified by experience: to confine myself to a single instance, the numberless absurd religious tenets that at different times have pestered the world, would be altogether unaccountable but for that irregular bias of passion.

      We proceed to a more pleasant task, which is, to illustrate the foregoing observations by proper examples. Gratitude, when warm, is often exerted upon the children of the benefactor; especially where he is removed out of reach by death or absence.^* The passion in this case being exerted for the sake of the benefactor, requires no peculiar excellence in his children: but the practice of doing good to these children produces affection for them, which never fails to advance them in our esteem. By such means, strong connections of affection are often formed among in-<156>dividuals, upon the slight foundation now mentioned.

      Envy is a passion, which, being altogether unjustifiable, cannot be excused but by disguising it under some plausible name. At the same time, no passion is more eager than envy, to give its object a disagreeable appearance: it magnifies every bad quality, and fixes on the most humbling circumstances:

      Cassius. I cannot tell what you and other men

      Think of this life; but for my single self,

      I had as lief not be, as live to be

      In awe of such a thing as I myself.

      I was born free as Caesar, so were you;

      We both have fed as well; and we can both

      Endure the winter’s cold as well as he.

      For once, upon a raw and gusty day,

      The troubled Tyber chafing with his shores,

      Caesar says to me, Dar’st thou, Cassius, now

      Leap in with me into this angry flood,

      And swim to yonder point?—Upon the word,

      Accoutred as I was, I plunged in,

      And bid him follow; so indeed he did.

      The torrent roar’d, and we did buffet it

      With lusty sinews; throwing it aside,

      And stemming it with hearts of controversy.

      But ere we could arrive the point propos’d,

      Caesar cry’d, Help me, Cassius, or I sink.

      I, as Aeneas, our great ancestor,

      Did from the flames of Troy upon his shoulder

      The old Anchises bear; so from the waves of Tyber<157>

      Did I the tired Caesar: and this man

      Is now become a god, and Cassius is

      A wretched creature; and must bend his body,

      If Caesar carelessly but nod on him.

      He had a fever when he was in Spain,

      And when the fit was on him, I did mark

      How he did shake. ’Tis true, this god did shake;

      His coward lips did from their colour fly,

      And that same eye whose bend doth awe the world,

      Did lose its lustre; I did hear him grone;

      Ay, and that tongue of his, that bade the Romans

      Mark him, and write his speeches in their books,

      Alas! it cry’d—Give me some drink, Titinius,—

      As a sick girl. Ye gods, it doth amaze me,

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