A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Richard Cumberland
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Название: A Treatise of the Laws of Nature

Автор: Richard Cumberland

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Философия

Серия: Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics

isbn: 9781614871859

isbn:

СКАЧАТЬ to a human Body; such as are, 1. Some Particulars which assist the Fancy and Memory, and consequently, Prudence. Here is consider’d, that Man has a Brain, in proportion to his Bulk, much greater than other Animals; a greater Quantity, Purity, and Vigour, of Blood and Animal Spirits; and a longer Life. 2. Those Circumstances, which either enable Man better to regulate his Affections, such as the Plexus Nervosus, peculiar to Man; or make his Government of them more necessary to him, as the Pericardium’s being continued with the Diaphragm; and those other Causes, which expose him to greater Hazards than other Animals, in violent Passions, to the end of § 27. The Propension is observ’d to be greater in Man than in other Animals, towards propagating his Species, and rearing his Off-spring, § 28. Lastly, is consider’d the Aptness of the Disposition of the Parts in the whole Man for Society, especially in his Hands and Countenance; and that the Advantages of Society and convenient Subordination, and consequently of Government, may be deduc’d from the natural Union of the Mind with, and Dominion over, the Body.

       Chapter III

      In the 3d Chapter, §1. Natural Good is defin’d, and divided into Good, proper to one, and Good, common to many. Such Acts and Habits as promote the common natural Good of All, are enforc’d by Laws, and are call’d Morally Good, upon account of their Agreement with those Laws or moral Rules. §. 2. The Opinion of Mr. Hobbes, computing Good in the State of Nature,1 solely from the Sentiments of the Speaker, is laid open and confuted, as well from the Principles of Reason, as from his own Writings. It is shewn, that he does not only contradict others here, but himself also.

       Chapter IV

      In the three first Sections of the fourth Chapter, Practical Rules are defin’d to be Practical Propositions, declaring the Consequences of human Actions; and it is shewn, that such Propositions, when they point out the proper and necessary Cause of the design’d Effect, do, without further Trouble, shew the sufficient and necessary means to obtain that End. The various Forms, to which those Propositions may be reduc’d, are compar’d with one another; among which that is preferr’d, which considers human Actions as Causes, and all things depending on them as certain Effects; and that the other Forms may be all finally reduc’d to this; all which is easily learn’d from Observation. In §4. this whole Matter is illustrated by a Comparison with Mathematical Practice.

       Chapter V

      In the 5th Chapter, §1. the Law of Nature is thus defin’d: It is a Proposition, whose Knowledge we come at by the Light of Nature, declaring those Actions which promote the publick Good; the Performance of which is naturally attended with Rewards, their Neglect with Punishments. The first Part points out the Precept, which is the principal end or effect of the Law; the latter Part the Sanction, which is the subordinate Effect of the Law. In §. 2. a Reason is assign’d, why the Law of Nature is here defin’d otherwise than by the Civilians. In the 3d §, the Law of Nature, according to our Definition, is shewn to have those Powers, which in the Pandects is ascribed to Laws. §4. Publick natural Good, the Effect of human Actions, is farther explain’d. §5. The Stoicks are reprehended, for denying what we call natural Good, to be at all Good, in order to support their Assertion, that Virtue was the only Good. Hobbes also is shewn to contradict himself; who contends, that Civil Laws are the only Rules, by which we can distinguish between Good and Evil: and the difference between natural Good and Evil is farther explain’d, to the end of § 9. § 10. The Sanction is briefly handled, as far as is necessary to explain the foregoing Definition. § 11. Justinian’s Definition of Obligation is examin’d, and resolv’d into the Will of the Legislator, annexing Rewards and Punishments to his Laws. Therefore in § 12. are traced the Rewards, that are naturally connected with a Pursuit of the publick Good; and, in the first place, those which are contain’d in the Happiness of the human Mind. Here it is prov’d by many Arguments, that the greatest Happiness of our Mind consists in the Exercise and inward Sense of universal Benevolence, to the end of § 17. It is afterwards prov’d, that this End is agreeable to the Will of God, and that he will reward those who co-operate with him, and punish those who oppose him: and Epicurus’s Assertion, that the World is not govern’d by Providence, is confuted from Principles known by the Light of Nature, and often acknowledg’d by the Epicureans themselves, to the end of § 23. It is also prov’d, that Penalties, besides those inflicted by the Society, await those who attempt any thing against the common Good, to the end of § 31. In § 32. these Conclusions are illustrated from opposite Cases. In § 33, 34. from Parallel Cases. In §. 35. it is prov’d, that God and Men are the chief, and in a manner the general, Causes of that Happiness, which each Individual necessarily desires; and that therefore they can never be safely neglected. In § 36. two Objections are propos’d. 1. That the Punishments and Rewards seem uncertain, which we have affirm’d to be the Sanctions of that Law, which enjoins the promoting the common Good. Plain Proofs of these Punishments are produc’d to the end of § 39. In these Sections, the difference of our Method, from that of Mr. Hobbes, is made apparent; and it is prov’d, that no Man can have a right to claim any thing as his Property, unless it be first granted, that the Laws of Nature do, in a State of Nature, oblige to the performance of external Actions conformable to them; and that therefore Hobbes does expressly contradict himself, whilst he contends, that in a State of Nature there are natural Rights binding, with respect to external Actions, and yet denies that the Laws of Nature do in that State oblige to the performance of external Actions. In § 40. it is prov’d, that Rewards or positive Advantages are necessary Consequences of promoting the publick Good; particularly, that Peace amongst Rationals does not necessarily presuppose War, as Mr. Hobbes asserts; and that it is a Continuation only of that Concord which is natural among Rationals, agreeing in the same Means to obtain the same End; but that War is to be defin’d from its Absence, in opposition to Hobbes. In § 41. greater Rewards are enumerated, and the Principles of Epicurus’s Natural Philosophy, by which he endeavours to disprove the Providence of God, are briefly refuted. In § 43. is prov’d, that a Desire of promoting the publick Good is the Foundation of all civil Societies; and that therefore all the Advantages of living under civil Government are to be reckon’d among the natural Rewards of this Desire. Hence is shewn, § 44. that it may be prov’d, that God designs to oblige Men to the performance of such Actions; the whole Argument being reduc’d to a Syllogism. In § 45. the second Objection is answer’d; and it is prov’d, that our Method of deducing the Sanction of the Laws of Nature, from the Connexion of our Happiness with such actions as promote the common Good, does not suppose, that we prefer our selves before all others. The End or adequate Effect of the Law is in all equitable Judgment to be preferr’d to the Sanction, as it respects only particular Persons; this is explain’d to the end of § 49. § 50. Examines Hobbes’s Reason for denying, that the Laws of Nature do oblige, in a State of Nature, to the performance of external Actions, namely, for want of Security. It is prov’d, that in order to make an Obligation valid, a perfect Security from all Fear is not necessary, and that Societies themselves do not afford such a Security: But it is prov’d, that even the State of Nature affords a comparative Security, which is greater than what arises from Hobbes’s State of War. It is shewn, that its being presum’d by Civil Laws, that Men are good, till the contrary appears, overthrows Hobbes’s Doctrine, to the end of § 52. In § 53. it is prov’d, that Hobbes acknowledges, that every Man has a Right to commit Treason, in this, that he affirms it not to be a Transgression of the Law of the State, but of the Law of Nature. § 54. Proves, that by such Doctrine is taken away all Obligation, and consequently all use, of Leagues between different Empires, as being in a State of Nature and of War, with respect to one another. § 55. Hobbes destroys the Security of Ambassadors, and of all Commerce. In § 56. is shewn, that a Commonwealth cannot be fram’d or preserv’d by such Men, as Hobbes contends, that all Men are. In § 57. it is СКАЧАТЬ