A Constitution of the People and How to Achieve It. Aarif Abraham

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СКАЧАТЬ lessons for two disparate constitutional reform debates—that in Britain where codification is being increasingly talked about, and that in Bosnia where any hope of reform is marred by the actions of ethno-nationalist elite spoilers who benefit greatly from the current constitutional status quo. The Chapter sets out the mechanics of how a revolving constitution for Bosnia might operate and the careful calibration that is required to ensure safeguards for minority groups, human rights and stability. The Chapter also looks at how Britain may address current and future constitutional crises that clearly require redress. A model for greater deliberation and participation of the public is proposed which is in true keeping with British political culture and tradition.

      The concluding remarks suggest how best to characterise a constitution and draws together the wide scholarship consulted in writing this book. The remarks identify the main lessons learned in comparing Bosnian and British constitution-making and design; some practical policy suggestions are provided on possible reform of the British and Bosnian constitutions. General lessons are drawn from the comparison made between Bosnia and Britain for both post-conflict and pre-conflict States.

      Technical Methodology

      This book makes use of two research methods to answer the primary research questions: (a) quantitative research to understand political culture, political apathy and political division in Bosnia and Britain; and (b) the use of rational choice models (game theory and veto player theory) and behavioural economics (prospect theory) to analyse the behaviour of political elites and the people (together ‘players’) in the current constitutional framework.

The quantitative analysis uses value-based surveys produced by the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS) to make operational the terms ‘political culture’, ‘political participation’ and ‘political apathy’. Croatia is used as a comparative case study.24 The dataset produced by WVS and EVS conducted seven waves of studies with four each of Bosnia, Croatia and Britain in the period from 1990—2020 (Bosnia 1998 (N=800), 2001 (N=1200), 2008 (N=1512), 2019 (N=1735), Croatia (1996 (N=1196), 1999 (N=1003), 2008 (N=1525), 2017 (N=1493) and Britain (1990 (N=1484), 1999 (N= 994), 2008 (N=1561), 2018 (N=1794).25 WVS and EVS are used as they are the only dataset that collated time-series data cross-nationally on issues concerning political participation over a significant period of time. Given the lack of any other serious time-series data, and gaps in the datasets which exist, the analysis is supplemented by data obtained from other local studies where available and relevant.

      The quantitative analysis forms the basis for the rest of the study. The quantitative data together with the case study on Bosnia’s institutional failure (Chapter 4) is necessary to form some of the assumptions about players’ substantive preferences and institutional structures in the rational choice analysis that follows (Chapter 5). These assumptions give empirical content to the theory and hence make it testable (Ganghof 2009). Rational choice models have explanatory power and predictive potential: in Bosnia they serve to elucidate why substantive proposals for constitutional reform are failing and suggest possible ways to break the reform impasse. The Bosnian case study allows a clearer comparison with constitutional reforms suggested for Britain. The game theory approach helps to explain complex political behaviour in a systematic way; why the behaviour of political actors is an optimal response to conditions of their political environment and the behaviour of others. Changing the context or institutions (the ‘rules of the game’) leads to changes in preferences and, therefore, outcomes. The models, therefore, provide theoretical clarity and strong explanatory power by eliminating chance or ad hoc explanations whilst acknowledging that the model is only an approximation of reality although a relatively good approximation (Tsebelis 1990, 40-47). They also explain why certain conditions and behaviour prevail, as equilibria, in a State such as Bosnia. The veto player approach, in particular, can integrate a number of approaches to institutional analyses by focusing on actors within institutions that actually matter—those that can set, alter and veto legislation (Tsebelis 1999; 2002; Ganghof 2009; Hallerberg 2010, 21).

      The game theory and veto player approaches are used to model the game played by the elites in the parliamentary arena in Bosnia. The preferences of elites, however, are influenced in another important space: the electoral arena where interaction with the people (or the electorate) can alter preferences and, therefore, outcomes. The objective of the study is not to discuss the shortcomings and benefits of various institutional structures generally for Bosnia but to compare all of these structures consistently with respect to one particular objective (Tsebelis 1995): the capacity for meaningful constitutional change.

      Given that the use of such models has been neglected in the study of Bosnia’s political paralysis, this book aims to add to existing work by identifying the precise causes of failure in the institutional structures in Bosnia inhibiting meaningful constitutional reform and civic participation in politics. That would go some way to creating a Bosnia based on individual rights and equality rather than the presumed collective equality of ethnic groups. For Britain, this book seeks to draw together disparate thinking on suggestions for constitutional reform and attempts to reconcile competing models. The analytical models deployed allow a pathway out of constitutional paralysis, contestation and crises. Practical proposals are provided as to how States can enjoy higher civic participation in politics, fairer bargains between groups and increased democratic legitimacy. Britain and Bosnia may benefit, but so might others. ۞

“And when we saw this script we’d never seen before In front of our very eyes from far-off times of yore A long silence Fell between Us	And half Amazed
This stillness was broken by a voice that was calm but outspoken – No scribe wrote this text for sure It looks like someone Was trying to Draw	Look it’s a secret text from the darkest days of old Rising it seems from the depths of our murkiest Dreams Its signs are like writing Seen in a mirror— Mutters A mouth Calm and Cold
And then a second says racking his brains— Look at the right that might be where it begins And it’s merrily flowing leftwards Widdershins Who was such writing Written for	The fifth with clenched fists and trembling fingers tries to hold This mirror of clear redeeming grace But it slips To the Floor
Those who insist on reading from right to left Are wrong all along— A third one says half crazed	For in it that instant he recognises His own Ancient Forgotten Face.”

      —Mak Dizdar, The Stone Sleeper 26

1 An extract of a poem called “BBBB” by Mak Dizdar [1917-1971] (2009, 50).

2 These, possibly apocryphal, remarks were widely reported to have been made by the Queen at a lecture being delivered by Prof. Peter Hennessy at Queen Mary College, London. See further, Hennessy’s (1995) own account of the event. Bogdanor (2009) gives an account of another incident. The Queen attended an event at University College London where she came upon a book called The Changing Constitution, edited by Prof. Jeffrey Jowell. She reportedly said to Jowell, who was standing nearby, “Changing, Professor Jowell, what changes? I haven't noticed any changes!” Jowell replied, “Well, evolving, Ma’am, evolving.” She responded, “Yes, but in what direction?”

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