Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books). Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me.

      I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless remarkable for their courage.

      Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?

      Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are afraid to approach.

      In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher.

      Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right mind.

      And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?

      Wholly good, and in the highest degree.

      Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?

      I should say, the divers.

      And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?

      Yes, that is the reason.

      And who have confidence when fighting on horseback—the skilled horseman or the unskilled?

      The skilled.

      And who when fighting with light shields—the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?

      The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than before.

      And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them?

      Yes, he said, I have seen such persons far too confident.

      And are not these confident persons also courageous?

      In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of whom we are speaking are surely madmen.

      Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?

      Yes, he said; to that statement I adhere.

      And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that view again wisdom will be courage.

      Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous are the confident; but I was never asked whether the confident are the courageous; if you had asked me, I should have answered ‘Not all of them’: and what I did answer you have not proved to be false, although you proceeded to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than others who have no knowledge, and were then led on to think that courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking whether the strong are able, and I should say ‘Yes’; and then whether those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong, although I have admitted that the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul.

      I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?

      He assented.

      And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?

      He does not.

      But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case have lived well?

      He will.

      Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?

      Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.

      And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad.

      I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the whole of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil.

      And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?

      Certainly, he said.

      Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.

      According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, ‘Let us reflect about this,’ he said; and if the reflection is to the point, and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree; but if not, then we will argue.

      And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said; or shall I begin?

      You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the discussion.

      May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of another:—he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better view:—that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say СКАЧАТЬ