Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books). Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?

      Yes.

      This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am inclined to think so: I assume that there are three principles—the good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. You would agree—would you not?

      I agree.

      And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil, nor the good of the evil;—these alternatives are excluded by the previous argument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad.

      True.

      But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying.

      True.

      And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is neither good nor evil.

      Clearly not.

      Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor evil.

      That may be assumed to be certain.

      And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid, but is well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician, because he is in health.

      He has none.

      But the sick loves him, because he is sick?

      Certainly.

      And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?

      Yes.

      But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?

      True.

      And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine?

      Yes.

      Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil?

      So we may infer.

      And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil—if itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for, as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good.

      Impossible.

      Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated: take, for example, the case of an ointment or colour which is put on another substance.

      Very good.

      In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour or ointment?

      What do you mean? he said.

      This is what I mean: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be white?

      They would only appear to be white, he replied.

      And yet whiteness would be present in them?

      True.

      But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the presence of white in them—they would not be white any more than black?

      No.

      But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become assimilated, and are white by the presence of white.

      Certainly.

      Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a peculiar sort?

      The latter, he said.

      Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?

      Yes.

      And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil, the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has now become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship with the evil?

      None.

      And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the good; for, as we have already seen, neither is unlike the friend of unlike, nor like of like. You remember that?

      Yes, they both said.

      And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of friendship— there can be no doubt of it: Friendship is the love which by reason of the presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the good, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.

      They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey. But then a most unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that the conclusion was untrue. I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and Menexenus, I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only.

      Why do you say so? said Menexenus.

      I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false: arguments, like men, are often pretenders.

      How do you mean? he asked.

      Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of some one; is he not?

      Certainly he is.

      And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and object?

      He has a motive and object.

      And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him?

      I do not quite follow you, he said.

      I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend of the physician—is he not?

      Yes.

      And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake of health?

      Yes.

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