Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books). Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses; is that courage?

      LACHES: No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.

      SOCRATES: Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the braver?

      LACHES: I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.

      SOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?

      LACHES: That is true.

      SOCRATES: Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he who endures, having no such knowledge?

      LACHES: So I should say.

      SOCRATES: And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, not having such a knowledge?

      LACHES: True.

      SOCRATES: And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge?

      LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?

      SOCRATES: Nothing, if that be what he thinks.

      LACHES: But that is what I do think.

      SOCRATES: And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do them.

      LACHES: That is true.

      SOCRATES: But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and hurtful to us.

      LACHES: Quite true.

      SOCRATES: Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.

      LACHES: True.

      SOCRATES: And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.

      LACHES: Very true.

      SOCRATES: And are we right in saying so?

      LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

      SOCRATES: Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about courage just now.

      LACHES: That is most true.

      SOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

      LACHES: Quite the reverse.

      SOCRATES: Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are speaking to a certain extent.

      LACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean?

      SOCRATES: The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be endurance.

      LACHES: I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.

      SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?

      LACHES: Certainly, he should.

      SOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say?

      LACHES: I should like that.

      SOCRATES: Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see our extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think about courage.

      NICIAS: I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent saying which I have heard from your own lips.

      SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias?

      NICIAS: I have often heard you say that ‘Every man is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.’

      SOCRATES: That is certainly true, Nicias.

      NICIAS: And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.

      SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches?

      LACHES: Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.

      SOCRATES: I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

      LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates?

      SOCRATES: That is a question which you must ask of himself.

      LACHES: Yes.

      SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?

      NICIAS: Certainly not.

      SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

      NICIAS: No.

      SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

      LACHES: I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.

      NICIAS: I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.

      LACHES: How strangely he is talking, Socrates.

      SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches?

      LACHES: Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.

      SOCRATES: That is just what Nicias denies.

      LACHES: Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly.

      SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?

      NICIAS: СКАЧАТЬ