Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books). Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ that being the only one which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the very art which we were seeking—the art which is the source of good government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, and utilizing them.

      CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates?

      SOCRATES: You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the same?

      CRITO: Yes, I should.

      SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say—it produces health?

      CRITO: I should.

      SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts—what does that do? Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth?

      CRITO: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer?

      CRITO: Indeed I am not, Socrates.

      SOCRATES: No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful.

      CRITO: Certainly.

      SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good?

      CRITO: Certainly, Socrates.

      SOCRATES: And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge of some kind is the only good.

      CRITO: Yes, that was what you were saying.

      SOCRATES: All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good, and make us happy.

      CRITO: Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according to your report of the conversation.

      SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good?

      CRITO: Why not, Socrates?

      SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the arts,—carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them?

      CRITO: I think not, Socrates.

      SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor evil, and gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can it be, and what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?

      CRITO: By all means.

      SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that they will make others good, and that these others will make others again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have put aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, old song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther, from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.

      CRITO: Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great perplexity.

      SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; they were our Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.

      CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?

      SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you already have it?

      What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?

      Indeed I am.

      Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to learn.

      Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?

      Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance.

      That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?

      Certainly not.

      And did you not say that you knew something?

      I did.

      If you know, you are knowing.

      Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.

      That makes no difference;—and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?

      Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not know.

      And if you do not know, you are not knowing.

      Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.

      Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to the same things.

      A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have the knowledge for which we are seeking—May I assume this to be your ingenious notion?

      Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said.

      Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I am only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others?

      Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.

      What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing?

      Nay, he replied, we do know something.

      Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything?

      Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as of us.

      O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And do all other men know all things or nothing?

      Certainly, he replied; they cannot know some things, and not know others, and be at the same time knowing and not knowing.

      Then what is the inference? I said.

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