National Identity and State Formation in Africa. Группа авторов
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СКАЧАТЬ case in previously colonized countries who see themselves obliged to operate under the label of modern nation-states, post-colonialism.

      The existence of nations without states is widely acknowledged as a result of the diversity of the historical process. The most often cited examples are Scotland, Wales, Quebec, Catalonia, Euskadi, Kurdistan, Palestine (still without a state), Tibet and multiple quasi-national communities still entangled in struggles, violent or not, in their aspiration to statehood. The boundaries between nationhood and statehood are fluid and often change over time. Moreover, nations tend to persevere longer than states, the most important examples being the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

      The role of identity in both founding and dissolving the institutions of the state can be better understood by differentiating three major types of national identities: resistance identity, legitimizing identity and project identity.

      Resistance identity occurs when a materially produced, culturally experienced collective identity is not recognized in the institutions of the state, when states are formed on different constellations of culture and power. Then, social movements and political projects emerge in what could be a protracted confrontation that results in a new institutional system. However, when the force of the existing states prevails, resistance identity becomes the source of multiple forms of negation of the dominant state institutions, sometimes for centuries. Pluri-national states based on consensus (such as Switzerland or Canada) become stable institutions that weave a new political actor by sharing in the construction of meaning. States that include various nations without recognition of national rights are periodically torn by confrontations, often intensified by ethnic or religious conflicts.

      Legitimizing identity is the collective identity produced by the state on the basis of a period of sharing the building of common institutions, usually under the predominance of one particular identity, and a given set of interests. Most of the nation-states created in the last three centuries follow this pattern, so that national identities are constructed by the state, with the education system being primordial in this construction. The school of the French Third Republic epitomizes this cultural hegemonic development.

      The nature of this relationship between nations and states is variegated. The nation-state, historically produced by the formation of states as an expression of cultural identities that became national by becoming embedded in the state, is under stress in our time because of the use of the state by globalizing forces, to enhance their power and interests, in increasing conflict with the identity and interests rooted in the national community. The opposition between globalizers and nationals, between cosmopolitans and locals, is evident everywhere. Ultimately these trends lead to the separation between the nation and the state in the course of history.

      It would seem paradoxical that at the time of universal globalization, and networking of states, the old issues of nationalism and nationalistic politics have emerged at the forefront of current affairs. In fact, it is precisely because of the political projects aiming at superseding the largely obsolete sovereign nation-states that national cultural constructions emerge as a powerful alternative to the dissolution of meaning in instrumental networks of power without identity roots. ‘Citizens of the world’ is only fitting for the masters of the world, that is the financial, technological and cultural powers that do not need cultural roots to assert their power.

      However, we want to focus this major issue on the interplay between nations, states and nation-states in Africa, a continent in which the identities of colonizers and colonized have been woven for centuries without necessarily finding a stable institutional construction that could reflect this human diversity. Africa is characterized by high levels of diversity related to a range of issues like race, ethnicity, language, culture, history, territory, colonialism, power struggles and wars. Congruence between the political and national as envisaged by Gellner (1983: 1) is therefore the exception rather than the rule. Accordingly, the need for nation-building (in the sense of making the boundaries of the state and the nation coincide; cf. Mylonas 2017: xx) and ways to achieve this are pervasive themes and a priority on many a national agenda.

      Despite this diversity on the level of individual states, there are some common, meta-level forces that shape the interplay between global networks and local responses in a less visible way. In his contribution, Francis Nyamnjoh highlights the importance of mobility which characterizes both global forces and local responses. He reaches into the ‘deep past’ before the advent of modern tools of communication and of containing human mobility to remind us of the ‘primordial’ forms of border crossing when waves of migration moved out of Africa. But the ‘nimble-footedness’ does not pertain to humans alone – it is equally true of things and ideas.

      Nyamnjoh links the ancient past to present-day protest movements via the intermediate figure of Cecil John Rhodes. This dominant nineteenth-century personage embodies in one person the contradictory roles of imperialist and makwerekwere/Uitlander, of outsider and insider, of settler and native, thereby illustrating the interchangeability of these positions, but also the underlying ability of mobility which they all share. What was not interchangeable for Rhodes was his whiteness and his superiority, something that resonates with present-day populism across Europe and in the United States under President Donald Trump.

      At the same time, mobility is ambiguous. It can imply freedom of movement and thought, but it can also be used to invade, conquer and possess. It fuels social mobility – either ‘upwards’ into the middle class or as ‘whitening up’, or to retreat into right-wing movements or fundamentalism of all kinds.

      But mobility is not restricted to movement within existing social categories or frameworks. For Nyamnjoh its real significance lies in its ability to cross borders and to rupture the restrictive frameworks of the status quo – be it the frameworks of identities or of state formations. Nonetheless, rupture is not a goal in itself, but rather the first step towards repair. Hence his plea for conviviality as a necessary precondition for the processes of social renewal, reconstruction and regeneration – and even for a new kind of scholarship for African universities.

      Finally, what kind of African citizenship is emerging out of the present turmoil on the continent? Against the background of these ‘visible and invisible mobilities’, Nyamnjoh (p. 11 below) pursues specific questions: