The Philosophy of Fine Art. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

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СКАЧАТЬ who do generally what their neighbours think the right thing. The word moralität and moralisch, which I have only been able to translate by a paraphrase, is the morality of the standpoint discussed, which is very much that of Kant or "Duty for duty's sake" in Bradley's "Ethical Studies."

104. That is the contingency of the world of Nature as contrasted with the essential stability of mind or spirit.

105. Lit., "To satisfy itself in its real or independent self (für sich)." It cannot identify itself with either side as its wholly real self made therein explicit. It is neither fish nor fowl.

106. Bestimmüngen may here be a reference to man's broadest spiritual characterizations as one of the human family, the race, the nation, and so forth, or, as I think, a reference to his vocation, future destiny, general welfare.

107. An und für sich Wahre.

108. Unbefangenen, i.e., the naïve outlook of ordinary life.

109. Professor Bosanquet merely translates are not and are in italic as in the text, which of course, except that he adds a comma after are, is a literal translation. But the sense, as I understand it, is that the writer says it is not in the sense that these two contradictories do not exist at all (i.e., as relative reality), but rather in the sense that in philosophical thought which grasps their essence they are not only present but present as reconciled factors of one truth. Professor Bosanquet's translation appears to me to amount to this: that all Hegel maintains is that the sense he means is not that such contradictory elements are not reconciled, but in the sense that they are reconciled. Perhaps this is his view. But if so, I fail to see the importance of the antithesis, which appears to me between gar nicht sind and in Versöhnung sind. Hegel before had expressly said that such contradictory sides were reconciled in philosophy, so I do not see why he should so emphatically repeat himself. The comma, of course, may be a misprint.

110. Begriff. Notion, or concrete Idea of it.

111. Of that world in its opposition to reason.

112. Der Mensch als er geht und steht. The man in ordinary conditions—-the average man, however, rather than the natural man, which carries slightly different associations.

113. The difference between a material instrument, which is a mere means to an end conceived by the craftsman, such as a plough for ploughing, a rake for raking, and a purpose inseparable from the organic whole as a mouth for eating, for without life the organism collapses.

114. Für sich.

115. In his history of Aesthetic in Germany Lötze disputes this. It seems to some extent a question of definition. In Hegel's view a dead body is not a human body in the full sense, but the corpse of a man. A hand separated from the body, whether we call it a hand or not, is no longer, whatever it may be, a living member, its essential significance as a hand has disappeared. It was only a hand in its coherence as part of a larger whole. It may still for a time preserve the semblance of its life, but it is cut off as the withered leaf. These are facts at least that are undeniable, and the objection appears to me based on a misunderstanding. A hand is only an und für sich human when it is part of a living man. What is the organic reality in the complete sense is the man as a whole. The hand is merely the extremity of one of his arms. You may call a dead hand a hand if you like. The point is what was implied in the fact that you called it a hand at all whether alive or dead.

116. That is, by Kant, of course.

117. By Verwicklung I understand the general evolution of ideal philosophy which the defects of the Kantian Critique stimulated. Professor Bosanquet apparently limits it to a perplexity personal to Schiller. I doubt whether the word will bear this.

118. That is, the concrete idea of humanity as a collective aggregate.

119. That is, intelligence as asserted by a society of human beings as public opinion, etc.

120. Die Ineinsbildung.

121. "Grace and Dignity."

122. Gesinnungen. "Sentimental views" is probably what is implied.

123. Alle Sache.

124. Professor Bosanquet is clearly right in his view that the order of the words here should be reversed. The words an und für sich are obviously the wider explication of in sick selbst, the auxiliary, as not unfrequently in Hegel, being almost equivalent to nämlich. Whether a misprint or an oversight I have translated subject to this correction.

125. I presume the revelation is not merely that of visible shape or even mainly.

126. Das alles aus sich setzende und auflösende Ich. The three points emphasized by Hegel in Fichte's "Philosophy" are: (a) The Ego is abstract; (b) Everything is a show for it; (c) Its own acts are a semblance.

127. Hegel uses the word Eitelkeit and eitle in their double sense of empty-nothingness—futility and vain or conceited. This cannot be readily reproduced in English.

128. Schönseligkeit. Borrowed no doubt from Goethe's notion of a "fair soul."

129. Like the "vaulting ambition" of Shakespeare which falls on the other side, is über sich selbst.

130. Haltung. Professor Bosanquet translates this "conduct." I rather think it refers to "bearing, demeanour." They are, as we say, "featureless, flaccid figures."

131. Läppische. I am not quite sure what is exactly meant. Professor Bosanquet translates it "grotesque." But the word is a provincial form of Schlaff apparently—loose, flaccid and so childish, trifling.

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