Название: Engine of Inequality
Автор: Karen Petrou
Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited
Жанр: Банковское дело
isbn: 9781119730057
isbn:
To make matters even worse, wealth gains at the top 1 and 10 percent came largely at the expense of what we once quaintly called the middle class. Homes are supposed to be the bedrock of middle-class wealth, but they in fact do far less for wealth than owning stocks and bonds. As we'll see, house-price appreciation and equity free of debt is principally a rich household's reward.40
And the Fed did more than stoke stock-market booms by stripping the financial market of trillions of dollars of assets once held by private investors. It also drove real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates below zero. Interest rates close to and sometimes even below zero on either a real or nominal (i.e., the rate on the posted sign) basis reverse the normal relationship between debtors and creditors. When rates fall below zero, the depositor pays the bank for the privilege of holding his or her money. Conversely, a borrower will actually owe less than he or she borrowed when paying back a loan with a negative interest rate.
When the Fed began to raise rates in 2015, these were still at or below real positive territory, with interest rates ever since hovering at just about a sliver above or below inflation. Rich investors can borrow cheaply at rates such as these and then invest in rising markets to make their returns still greater (if also riskier due to all this leverage). Average households don't play in the complex “carry-trade” or high-leverage arenas that benefit from ultra-low rates. They also often lack access to mutual funds or other investment vehicles that beat the Fed's low rates.
Instead, these households put whatever money they may have – and as we've seen it's not much – in the bank. Interest rates of 0.25 percent – not counting fees for bounced checks and other costs – made money in the bank a losing proposition for anyone without $10,000 or so to put aside.
A simple example shows why. Assume a parent saving for a child's education puts $2,000 a year in a savings account paying a 5 percent compound rate of interest for 20 years. At the end of 20 thrifty years, he or she has $69,438 to show for this in nominal terms. After accounting for 2 percent annual inflation, he or she has $49,598. As a result, $40,000 has earned an additional $9,598, or 24 percent. Now take that same $2,000 for the same 20 years – $40,000 – and the same 2 percent inflation. But instead of a 5 percent interest rate, the parent earns only the half of one percent interest rate paid on small savings since the financial crisis. Instead of $69,438, this parent has only $42,168. After accounting for inflation, that is only $30,120, almost 25 percent less.
Clearly, the Fed's long-term, low rates quashed the chances that an average household can save for a financial cushion against adversity, to fund a mortgage down payment, or to secure their retirement. A generation ago, it took only three years for a young family to fund a mortgage down payment. Before COVID set younger households still farther back, it took at least nineteen years, due in part to very low interest rates.41
After 2008, the Fed expected that low interest rates would make low-cost loans available to lower-income households, but Fed policy instead made the rich a lot richer and left everyone else still farther behind. One study estimated a total loss across the US economy of $2.4 trillion in savings accounts due to the very low interest rates that prevailed from 2008 through mid-2017.42 The longer there are low rates, the farther most families fall behind.
Had the Fed “normalized” rates – that is, brought them closer to a rate with a sizeable positive edge over inflation – the dynamics of high-risk markets and hard-pressed families would have begun to correct to a more stable, equitable economy before COVID hit in 2020. Further, if rates had been higher, the Fed would have had more tools with which to confront renewed crisis. Since they weren't, it didn't, and the Fed threw still more trillions into the financial market, leading to record gains even as US unemployment ravaged one in four working households.43 Monetary policy after 2008 directly contributed to post-crisis inequality; post-COVID policy made the inequality engine hurtle over average Americans in a race to save financial markets.
Regulatory Wreckage
Financial policy subsumes more than monetary policy. It also includes all of the tough new rules bank regulators imposed since the crisis. It makes a lot of sense to make banks safer. But the inexorable nature of profit-maximization means that, when rules make lending to lower-income families unprofitable, banks don't make loans to lower-income families. Only higher-income Americans with stellar credit histories need apply.
Post-crisis rules may well have made US banks safer, but they have also changed the bank business model to one focused on wealth management, corporate and commercial real-estate lending, and other activities with little equality impact. Given the depth of the great financial crisis in 2008 and how close we then came to another Great Depression, it's easy to say that banks deserve every rule they got. But no matter how justified all of this regulatory retribution, quashing the capacity of banks to take deposits, make loans, and to operate the overall financial system leaves America with two choices: do without banks and the economic growth that depends on them, or rely instead on nonbanks, including giant technology companies such as Facebook and Amazon.
These tech giants are quickly filling the vacuum left behind by departing banks. They do a great job handling our demand for next-day sneakers and getting us messages from the boy next door in what seems like a nanosecond, but this doesn't necessarily mean that tech companies should be allowed to use the huge troves of personal data amassed in these businesses to provide equality-essential financial services. In the absence of safety-and-soundness rules and in light of all the privacy, conflict, and security problems at giant tech companies, a bank-free consumer-finance system could be a very high-risk consumer-finance system.
One doesn't have to look far to see the grand ambitions tech companies harbor in the financial-services arena. These huge companies already derive 11 percent of their revenue from financial services,44 but many want to do more – lots more. For example, Facebook announced “Libra” in June 2019.45 Libra combines the 2.6 billion or more users Facebook counts on its social-media platform with a “crypto-asset”-based currency. Libra touts all the lower-income households it would include in the financial-services marketplace. Yet crypto-assets are not just secret, but also very high risk. Who bears this risk? In Facebook's plan, customers – not Facebook – take the fall.
The ability of tech companies to know where you live, with whom, and so much else about us may encourage them to make you a loan a bank wouldn't touch. But all of this personal information also gives these companies the power to price financial services based on data stockpiles that differentiate the rich from everyone else. Given that these companies are at least as profit-hungry as banks, will they still make loans to lower-income people once they are sure which of their customers buys high-markup products? Will financing costs go up for even essential financial services because the big-tech company has enough data to charge higher-risk customers instead of cross-subsidizing transactions across the entire customer base? Will artificial intelligence really secure fair lending when it still can't even read the faces of people of color? How will tech companies cross-sell checking accounts and sneakers? That is, might we get a loan from a tech company, but only if we buy the products it produces at prices it demands under terms no federal regulator can control? One former US regulator has observed:
Today's economic activity is built on digital code. Digital СКАЧАТЬ