Complete Works. Hamilton Alexander

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СКАЧАТЬ but to have the sole direction of all military operations, and to send ambassadors, and appoint all military officers; and to pardon all offenders, treason excepted, unless by advice of the Senate. On his death or removal, the President of the Senate to officiate, with the same powers, until another is elected. Supreme judicial officers to be appointed by the Executive and the Senate. The Legislature to appoint courts in each State, so as to make the State governments unnecessary to it. All State laws which contravene the general laws to be absolutely void. An officer to be appointed in each State, to have a negative on all State laws. All the militia, and the appointment of officers, to be under the national government. I confess that this plan and that from Virginia are very remote from the idea of the people. Perhaps the Jersey plan is nearest their expectation. But the people are gradually ripening in their opinions of government; they begin to be tired of an excess of democracy; and what even is the Virginia plan, but “pork still, with a little change of sauce.”—Yates, “Secret Proceedings,” etc.

      June 19th, Colonel Hamilton said: I agree to the proposition. I did not intend, yesterday, a total extinguishment of State governments; but my meaning was, that a national government ought to be able to support itself without aid or interference of the State governments, and that therefore it was necessary to have full sovereignty. Even with corporate rights, the States will be dangerous to the national government, and ought to be extinguished, new modified, or reduced to a smaller scale.—Yates.

      June 19th, Colonel Hamilton said: That he coincided with the proposition as it stood in the report. He had not been understood yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he meant that no boundary could be drawn between the National and State Legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. If it were limited at all the rivalship of the States would gradually subvert it. Even as corporations, the extent of some of them, as Virginia, Massachusetts, etc., would be formidable. As States, he thought they ought to be abolished. But he admitted the necessity, of leaving in them subordinate jurisdictions. The examples of Persia and the Roman empire, cited by Mr. Wilson, were, he thought, in favor of his doctrine, the great powers delegated to the satraps and proconsuls having frequently produced revolts and schemes of independence.—Madison Papers.

      June 19th, Colonel Hamilton said: I agree to Mr. Wilson's remark. Establish a weak government and you must at times overleap the bounds. Rome was obliged to create dictators. Cannot you make propositions to the people because we before confederated on other principles? The people can yield to them if they will. The three great objects of government—agriculture, commerce, and revenue—can only be secured by a general government.—Yates.

      June 19th, Colonel Hamilton said: That he assented to the doctrine of Mr. Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States were thrown into a state of nature. He was not yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy could be dissolved by partial infractions of it. He admitted that the States met now on an equal footing, but could see no inference from that against concerting a change of the system in this particular. He took this occasion of observing, for the purpose of appeasing the fear of the small States, that two circumstances would render them secure under a national government in which they might lose the equality of rank which they now held: one was the local situation of the three largest States, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. They were separated from each other by distance of place, and equally so by all the peculiarities which distinguish the interests of one State from those of another. No combination, therefore, could be dreaded. In the second place, as there was a gradation in the States, from Virginia, the largest, down to Delaware, the smallest, it would always happen that ambitious combinations among a few States might and would be counteracted by defensive combinations of greater extent among the rest. No combination has been seen among the large counties, merely as such, against lesser counties. The more close the union of the States, and the more complete the authority of the whole, the less opportunity will be allowed to the stronger States to injure the weaker.—Madison Papers.

      June 21st, Col. Hamilton said: It is essential to the democratic rights of the community, that this branch be directly elected by the people. Let us look forward to probable events. There may be a time when State legislation will cease, and such an event ought not to embarrass the national government.—Yates.

      June 21st: Col. Hamilton considered the motion as intended manifestly to transfer the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence which could not be too watchfully guarded against. All, too, must admit the possibility, in case the general government should maintain itself, that the State governments might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system, therefore, should not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.—Madison Papers.

      June 21st, Col. Hamilton said: There is a medium in every thing. I confess three years is not too long. A representative ought to have full freedom of deliberation and ought to exert an opinion of his own. I am convinced the public mind will adopt a solid plan. In the government of New York, although higher-toned than that of any other State, still we find great listlessness and indifference in the electors; nor do they, in general, bring forward the first characters to the Legislature. The public mind is perhaps not now ready to receive the best plan of government, but certain circumstances are now progressing which will give a different complexion to it.—Yates.

      June 21st: Col. Hamilton urged the necessity of three years. . There ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence on the popular sentiments. The checks in the other branches of the government would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of the constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them, and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virginia it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance and voting of the people by severe regulations.—Madison Papers.

      June 22d, Col. Hamilton said: I do not think the States ought to pay the members, nor am I for a fixed sum. It is a general remark, that he who pays is the master. If each State pays its own members, the burden would be disproportionate, according to the distance of the States from the seat of government. If a national government can exist, members will make it a desirable object to attend, without accepting any stipend; and it ought to be so organized as to be efficient.

      It has been often asserted, that the interests of the general and of the State Legislatures are precisely the same. This cannot be true. The views of the governed are often materially different from those who govern. The science of policy is the knowledge of human nature. A State government will ever be the rival power of the general government. It is therefore highly improper that the State Legislatures should be the paymasters of the members of the national government. All political bodies love power, and it will often be improperly attained.—Yates.

      June 22d, Col. Hamilton said; In all general questions which become the subjects of discussion, there are always some truths mixed with falsehoods. I confess, there is danger where men are capable of holding two offices. Take mankind in general, they are vicious, their passions may be operated upon. We have been taught to reprobate the danger of influence in the British government, without duly reflecting how far it was necessary to support a good government. We have taken up many ideas upon trust, and at last, pleased with our own opinions, establish them as undoubted truths. Hume's opinion of the British constitution confirms the remark, that there is always a body of firm patriots, who often shake a corrupt administration. Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of the passions, in order to make them subservient to the public good; for these ever induce us to action. Perhaps a few men in a State may, from patriotic motives, or to display their talents, or to reap the advantage of public applause, step forward; but, if we adopt the clause, СКАЧАТЬ