The Economic Policies of Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton Alexander

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ oath here directed to be taken by importers is not always in their power. There may be no invoice, nor any other accurate account of the quantity, quality, or cost of articles. A qualification in this respect is indispensable. Entries, without specifying particulars, must, of necessity, be admitted; parties swearing that they have received no account of them, and that they are unknown. An eye is had to this in the sixteenth section, but something is wanting to reconcile the two sections, and define a more accurate course of proceeding in the case.

      Section 15. Inspectors are to be put on board vessels, who are to remain on board until they are discharged. This implies during the night as well as the day; which, if practised, would multiply the number of inspectors to a very expensive extent. A power of securing the hatches and other communications with the holds of vessels, during the night, would give greater security, where inspectors were kept constantly on board, and would, in many instances, obviate the necessity of doing it.

      The unloading of a vessel is here limited to fifteen working days after she begins to unload. But the commencement of the business may be postponed as long as the parties interested think fit. If there should be considerable delay, either an inspector must remain on board the whole time, in which case the expense may exhaust the duty, or there must be great opportunity for fraud. It seems proper, either to fix an ultimate limit for unloading, to be computed from the time of arrival, or of the master's report; or a period, after which, the expense of an inspector shall be borne by the party. The first appears to the Secretary most advisable, and he conceives that twenty working days, after the master's report, would suffice.

      Section 19. The payment or securing of the duties is here made a preliminary to their being landed. This, in a strict sense, is impracticable, as certain articles must first be landed, weighed, gauged, or measured, before the duties can be ascertained. The object, however, of the provision is proper, and it must be construed to admit a gross estimate of the sum in the first instance, subject to after-revision. It would, however, be desirable, that a discretion of this sort should be expressed. The collector, together with the naval officer, where there is one, or alone, where there is none, may be authorized to determine the amount of the duties to be paid, by an estimate of the same, according to the best of their or his judgment, and the collector may be empowered, in case of an over-estimate, either to return the excess, if the money has been paid, or to endorse a credit for it on the bond.

      A discount of ten per cent. is here allowed for prompt payment, on the excess of any sum of duties beyond fifty dollars. The policy of this discount is questionable. Experience shows that, in most of the States, transient persons chiefly avail themselves of it, who would in most cases pay the money without the discount, to avoid the inconvenience of suretyship.

      But even if the discount ought to be continued, the rate seems to be too high. It exceeds the rate of interest at which the Government may borrow, more than is equivalent for the insurance of the risk of non-payment. Seven per cent. would, in the judgment of the Secretary, be the extent of a proper allowance. The confining the discount to the excess beyond fifty dollars counteracts the provision wherever that excess is not considerable.

      It is provided by the last clause of this section, that no person, whose bond is unsatisfied after it becomes due, shall have a future credit with the collector until it shall be discharged. The words “the collector,” having been supposed to confine the non-allowance of credit to the particular collector to whom the bond was given; in which sense, a further credit may be had in another district; which would considerably lessen the utility of the regulation. The removal of this ambiguity, so as to render the exclusion general, may add to the efficacy of the provision.

      Section 29. The compensations to the officers established by this section require revision; they are, in many instances, inadequate; in some, disproportionate. Resignations in consequence of it have taken place, and others are suspended on the expectation of a favorable alteration during the present session. It is certain that competent allowances are essential to the idea of having the service performed by characters worthy of trust. And how much the security of the revenue depends on this is evident. There are many ports where the officers receive next to nothing for their services. It were superfluous to comment on the inexpediency of such a state of things.

      The Secretary for the sake of brevity, begs leave to reserve the details on this head for the committee before alluded to.

      It has been inferred from this section, that the collector and naval officer are, necessarily, to transact their business in separate apartments. This (if it be the design of the provision from which the inference is drawn) was, probably, founded upon the idea, that the separation would lessen the danger of collusion between those officers. But it does not seem likely that a circumstance of this sort could have much effect in that way, while the separation leaves a good deal more in the power of the collector, and renders the naval officer far less a check upon him, than if he were made an immediate witness to his transactions. The Secretary is of opinion that it would be preferable to require them to act in conjunction, and in the presence of each other, among other things, jointly administering and certifying all oaths required to be taken at the custom-houses.

      Section 30. This section provides for the receipt of the duties in gold and silver coin only. The Secretary has considered this provision as having for object, the exclusion of payments in the paper emissions of the particular States, and the securing the immediate or ultimate collection of the duties in specie, as intended to prohibit to individuals the right of paying in any thing except gold or silver coin; but not to hinder the treasury from making such arrangements as its exigencies, the speedy command of the public resources, and the convenience of the community might dictate; those arrangements being compatible with the eventual receipt of the duties in specie. For instance, the Secretary did not imagine that the provision ought to be so understood as to prevent, if necessary, an anticipation of the duties, by treasury drafts, receivable at the several custom-houses. And, if it ought not to be understood in this sense, it appeared to him that the principle of a different construction would extend to the permitting the receipt of the notes of public banks, issued on a specie fund. Unless it can be supposed, that the exchanging of specie, after it has been received for bank notes, to be remitted to the treasury, is also interdicted, it seems difficult to conclude that the receipt of them, in the first instance, is forbidden.

      Such were the reflections of the Secretary with regard to the authority to permit bank notes to be taken in payment of the duties. The expediency of doing it appeared to him to be still less questionable. The extension of their circulation, by the measure, is calculated to increase both the ability and the inclination of the banks to aid the Government. It also accelerates the command of the product of the revenues for the public service, and it facilitates the payment of the duties. It has the first effect, because the course of business occasions the notes to be sent beforehand to distant places; and being ready on the spot, either for payment or exchange, the first post, after the duties become payable, or are received, conveys them to the treasury. The substitution of treasury drafts, anticipating the duties, could hardly be made without some sacrifice on the part of the public. As they would be drawn upon time, and upon the expectation of funds to be collected, and, of course, contingent, it is not probable that they would obtain a ready sale, but at a discount, or upon long credit. As they would also be more or less liable to accident, from the failure of expected payments, there would be continually a degree of hazard to public credit. And, to other considerations, it may be added, that the practice of anticipations of this kind is, in its nature, so capable of abuse as to render it an ineligible instrument of administration in ordinary cases, and fit only for times of necessity.

      If the idea of anticipation should be excluded, then the relying wholly upon treasury drafts would be productive of considerable delay. The knowledge that the funds were in hand must precede the issuing of them. Here would of course be some loss of time. And as the moment of demand, created by the course of business, would frequently elapse, there would as frequently be a further loss of time in waiting for a new demand. In such intervals, the public СКАЧАТЬ