A Republic No More. Jay Cost
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Название: A Republic No More
Автор: Jay Cost
Издательство: Ingram
Жанр: Историческая литература
isbn: 9781594038686
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Place three individuals in a situation wherein the interest of each depends on the voice of the others, and give to two of them an interest opposed to the rights of the third? Will the latter be secure? The prudence of every man would shun the danger. . . . Will two thousand in a like situation be less likely to encroach on the rights of one thousand? The contrary is witnessed by the notorious factions & oppressions which take place in corporate towns limited as the opportunities are, and in little republics when uncontrouled by apprehensions of external danger. If an enlargement of the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights, it is not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is less predominant in this case with the majority; but because a common interest or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combinations less easy to be formed by a great than by a small number.18
Having abandoned this core principle of classical republicanism, Madison went on to modify another. An institution like the House of Lords had served the purpose of guaranteeing the rights of some sort of aristocratic estate, and indeed the general view of theorists was that a bicameral legislature should protect the “better” class of people. Madison turned that notion on its head: the purpose of a Senate would not be to carve out protections for the wealthy minority, but rather to create purely artificial distinctions within the government among the whole populace, so as to facilitate the combat of interests. This is not to say that Madison had no expectations for the role of a natural aristocracy; instead, he hoped that a better sort of leader would emerge in the national government, in particular the Senate.19 The point, however, is that all power would flow from the people, and only the people, but it would flow in different ways in different intervals to different points of concentration, thus facilitating what Madison anticipated would be a grand clash of interests and factions. As he argues in Federalist #51:
Whilst all authority in (the government) will be derived from, and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.20
Thus, Madison believes that a “well-constructed union” covering a large geographical sphere could “break and control the violence of faction.”21 In fact, the two pieces fit together: as long as the government is designed appropriately, a proliferation of factions would actually be beneficial. The structure of government would channel their fights properly, and a multiplicity of groups would ensure that nobody gains the upper hand for long.
The implications of these innovations are profound, for Madison premises republican government not on virtue—a common theme dating back more than a millennium—but on a decided lack thereof.22 That is not to say that Madison expects men to be the villainous brigands that Thomas Hobbes envisions in the state of nature, but rather that civic virtue—generally defined by theorists as the capacity to put the good of the community ahead of one’s selfish interests—is an unreliable safeguard. Writing at the end of the 1780s—a decade when state after state, faction after faction, and person after person put their own interests ahead of the common good—this was less an assumption than a sad acknowledgement of reality.23 But Madison brushes this aside: let there be a congeries of competing, parochial interests; the more the merrier, in fact. Madison’s separation of powers—or, rather, the separation of powers that emerged in the Constitution after all the compromises had been made—would balance these interests, ensuring that the final product would advance the public good and respect private rights.24
Madison was not completely satisfied with the final draft of the Constitution, but considered it a major improvement over the Articles of Confederation, and he committed himself to its defense. Largely absent during the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton joined the fray with characteristic vigor. He and Madison joined with John Jay, the architect of the Treaty of Paris, to pen the Federalist Papers, anonymous essays published in New York to promote adoption of the Constitution.
It has often been remarked that the subsequent break between Hamilton and Madison was peculiar, given their collaboration on the essays. Indeed, before historians were taking up this puzzle, contemporary observers—and even the principals themselves—pondered the nature of the divide. Often, the blame is placed upon Madison, in no small part because he became a critic of many Hamiltonian provisions that he had previously supported. Some have claimed that Madison’s change of heart was due to the spell that Jefferson had over him; when the former returned from his diplomatic duties in Paris, the latter (so the claim goes) shifted from a staunch nationalist to a skeptic of central power. Others have speculated that it was due to Madison’s Anglophobia; similarly, Hamilton once remarked that his former ally had a “womanly attachment” to France.25 Still others have suggested that regional concerns were in play; Hamilton’s economic program favored the Northeast and Madison, a member of the House during the first three Congresses, was sensitive to the worries of his Virginia constituents.
Madison, however, had a very different answer. Late in his life, in conversation with Nicholas Trist, he said:
As to (whether) I deserted Colonel Hamilton, or rather Colonel H. deserted me; in a word, the divergence between us took place—from his wishing . . . to administer the government . . . into what he thought it ought to be; while, on my part, I endeavored to make it conform to the Constitution as understood by the Convention that produced and recommended it, and particularly by the State conventions that adopted it.26
This view has gained less purchase among popular and academic writers, but it does much to squash the idea that Madison changed his mind. From his perspective, it is irrelevant that he supported certain policies before the government came into being; as long as he believed those policies violated the new governing charter, he was obliged to oppose them.
So, perhaps neither deserted the other. Perhaps instead the two were allied with one another on the first question (is the Constitution preferable to the Articles of Confederation?) but diverged on the next (what shape should federal policy take in light of this new Constitution?). This conclusion runs contrary to the conventional wisdom, which holds that Madison had flip-flopped on his attitude about the government between the time of the Federalist Papers and the inauguration of the new government. Even so, a careful reading of those famous documents supports the idea that, deep down, the two agreed less than they may once have thought.27 We have already looked closely at Madison’s thinking, so it is time to turn to Hamilton’s.
Hamilton’s contributions to the Federalist Papers are likely greater in number than Madison’s, but none is remembered in the same way as Madison’s efforts in #10 and #51. These are broad-based, largely philosophical arguments for the utility of the proposed union. Hamilton, on the other hand, was at his best in the early part of the series, with powerful jeremiads about the inevitable troubles that would befall the nation if it rejected the Constitution. Then, in the final third of the essays, he offered persuasive entries defending the new executive and judiciary. Even so, Federalist #11 comes as close as anything to outlining Hamilton’s core convictions about the potentials of the new American government, à la Madison’s ideas in #10 and #51. Read at the time of its publication, Federalist #11 may not have been as illuminating, but considered in the context of his economic program, it is perhaps his most foundational work.
In that essay, Hamilton opens with a point that reflects his cosmopolitan worldview: “The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion. . . . This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as well as each other.” He goes on to assert that the “adventurous spirit” of America has “already excited uneasy sensations . . . in the maritime powers of СКАЧАТЬ