Return to Winter. Douglas E. Schoen

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ “The Sino-Soviet rift that brought the two countries to the brink of nuclear war in the ’60s has been healed rather dramatically.”

      —STROBE TALBOTT³

       “The echoes of the non-aggression pacts of the 1930s get louder in this age of American retreat.”

      —WALL STREET JOURNAL⁴

       “If not letting America have its own way is Mr. Obama’s objective, he is an unparalleled foreign-policy success.”

      —JOHN BOLTON⁵

      “This will be the biggest construction project in the world for the next four years, without exaggeration,” Vladimir Putin said in Shanghai in May 2014, as he raised a glass to drink a toast with Chinese president Xi Jinping.⁶

      The two leaders were celebrating the signing of a 30-year, $400 billion natural-gas deal between their countries—the biggest in the history of the natural-gas industry. Under the terms of the deal, Russia would supply the Chinese with natural gas for the first time—38 billion cubic meters of gas per year, through pipelines and other massive infrastructure investments. The Chinese would gain a major new source of energy, and a cleaner-burning fuel, in a country facing major pollution problems. Russia would acquire a massive new customer base for its gas, at a time when Europe seeks to diversify from Russian sources. The deal, Putin said, was “an epochal event” in the relationship between the two nations. For his part, President Xi, always the less voluble of the two leaders, spoke of expanding commerce with Russia. “We are determined that trade between our countries will reach $100 billion by 2015,” he said. Moscow hopes to double that figure by 2020.

      The agreement had been in the works for a decade, but some commentators saw it solely in the context of a current crisis: the Western reaction against Russia after its illegal annexation of Crimea in Ukraine, and the threat that war might break out between Russia and Ukraine. “The crisis in relations with the West over Ukraine has made ties to Asia, and particularly relations with its economic engine, China, a key strategic priority,” the New York Times asserted, discussing Putin’s interest in China.⁷

      That sounded perfectly logical. It was also perfectly wrong.

      The truth is, Putin’s trip to Shanghai was only the latest evidence of an unfolding alliance between Russia and China that most observers are only now starting to acknowledge. The gas deal was so momentous that it would have been impossible to ignore; but the signs of Russian and Chinese collaboration are everywhere, and they have been mounting for more than a decade.

      “Russia-China cooperation is advancing to a new stage of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction,” Putin said on the eve of his visit to Shanghai. “It would not be wrong to say that it has reached the highest level in all its centuries-long history.”⁸ He was preparing to sign “a record package of documents” and agreements between the two countries, covering trade, investment, energy, infrastructure development, Asia-Pacific cooperation, and cultural exchange.⁹ “We are aiming at the creation of special areas of advanced economic development with an investment-friendly environment,” Putin said.¹⁰ Indeed, Putin has turned to China for financing, trying to roll back limits on Chinese investment in the Russian economy in the hope of luring cash into industries from housing to infrastructure to natural resources. Russia seeks China’s help to build a bridge to the Crimean peninsula.

      This expanding trade is part of a larger story: Russia and China, once Communist adversaries during the Cold War, now increasingly act in concert. Beijing tacitly supported Russian moves in Crimea by abstaining from a vote in the United Nations, even though Moscow’s actions violated a stated core principle of Beijing’s foreign policy: noninterference. The two countries also lined up on the same side at the UN regarding the Syrian civil war.

      Militarily, the two nations are cooperating and collaborating like never before. In May 2014, the Russian and Chinese navies held large-scale joint drills in the East China Sea—sending a message, most experts felt, to Japan, which has found itself in increasing tension with Beijing. “Moscow and Beijing have found advantages in working together to diminish U.S. influence and create greater room for them to pursue international economic and strategic interests,” Brian Spegele and Wayne Ma noted in the Wall Street Journal. “Mr. Putin is widely depicted in Chinese official media as a powerful leader unafraid to take on the West.”¹¹

      That’s not how the Chinese view American leaders, to put it mildly.

      In spring 2014, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, on an official visit to Beijing that included a tour of China’s first aircraft carrier, stood at a press conference with his counterpart, Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan. With the media looking on, Wanquan made sure the Pentagon chief understood that the Chinese military had no fear of American power. “With the latest developments in China,” Wanquan told Hagel, “it can never be contained.”¹²

      In different ways, Russia and China also effectively tolerate, and even facilitate, the interests and goals of rogue nations—Iran, North Korea, Syria, and others. They use their political influence to assist these nations’ efforts to procure nuclear power or weaponry, to avoid international punishment for egregious human-rights abuses, and to prop up anti-Western dictators and even terrorist groups. Despite lingering differences and suspicions, Russia and China have become both newly aggressive in their own spheres and newly cooperative as partners and allies. They have forged a powerful new alliance that marks, as Charles Krauthammer rightly suggests, “the first emergence of a global coalition against American hegemony since the fall of the Berlin Wall.”¹³

      Put simply, this coalition has the potential to permanently and fundamentally alter international relations. It was envisioned as, and it has functioned as, a counterweight to liberal democracy generally and the United States specifically. “The unipolar model of the world order has failed,” Putin says, referring to what he sees as American hegemony. “Today this is obvious to everyone.”¹⁴ The Russia-China alliance—we call it a new Axis—already possesses extraordinary power, as is clear not just with new economic and trade agreements and military cooperation but also in the areas of nuclear proliferation and cyber warfare. Individually and together, Russia and China seek to undermine the social, economic, and political framework of democratic societies and our alliances in a way that has yet to be fully understood.

      Their efforts to do so are emboldened immeasurably by a United States that is losing the confidence and trust of its allies and partners around the world. From Europe to the Middle East to the Far East, American policy is muddled, irresolute, and even feckless—as was powerfully symbolized in June 2014 when the Obama administration stood by as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the al-Qaeda offshoot, quickly overran cities in Iraq. Our allies doubt American commitment and resolve, question or outright oppose our policies, and are increasingly looking elsewhere—or within—for sustenance and support. Even nations historically aligned with us are making tentative outreach elsewhere. The United States has no clear strategy other than retrenchment and the minimization of genuine threats. We seem unwilling to acknowledge what our adversaries our doing. Unless we fundamentally change the foreign-policy approach we have followed under President Obama, we will continue to lose ground—as will the cause of democracy and freedom around the world.

      These, then, are the subjects of the book you are about to read: the Russia-China alliance, the dangers that it poses, and the desperate need for a cogent and committed American response. Without unduly flattering ourselves, let us be frank: We tried to sell the idea of this book for years before we found a taker. We’d rather have been wrong than right. Now that more Americans are paying attention, there might yet be a chance to reverse the tide.

      ON СКАЧАТЬ