Weapons Of The Rich. Strategic Action Of Private Entrepreneurs In Contemporary China. Thomas Heberer
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Название: Weapons Of The Rich. Strategic Action Of Private Entrepreneurs In Contemporary China

Автор: Thomas Heberer

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Экономика

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isbn: 9789811212819

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СКАЧАТЬ by the 15th Party Congress in 1997 to ‘hold on to the large and let go off the small’ (zhuada fangxiao), some 50,000 small- and medium-sized SOEs were privatized between 2001 and 2006 (Dickson, 2007: 836–837).26

      Since then, the number of officially registered private enterprises has continuously risen. At the end of 2017, there were up to 65,794 million individual enterprises and 27,263 million private enterprises with a combined labor force of 341 million (see also Table 2).27 Though no detailed data are available, according to official and academic sources, private enterprises today contribute more than 50 percent of China’s tax income, more than 60 percent of its GDP, more than 70 percent to innovation, and more than 80 percent to urban and 90 percent to rural employment. More than 90 percent of all enterprises in contemporary China are private (Wang and Yang, 2018).28 A fair number of them have become huge conglomerates and global players, with top positions in the Forbes Global 2000 and 500 lists.29 Over the years, party leaders have consistently argued for a strengthening of both the private and public sector economy in order to underline the importance of a balanced relationship between the two as the foundation of ‘Chinese socialism’. However, the future of the Chinese economy relies on the healthy development of the country’s private entrepreneurship, no matter how much the party state protects and nurtures the public sector and its most important SOEs, which are now labeled ‘national champions’.30

       Table 2: The Development of China’s Private Sector (2005–2017)

      Note: *Excluding individual companies (getihu).

      Source: National Bureau of Statistics, http://data.stats.gov.cn.

       Stages and Models of Private Sector Development

      China’s ‘capitalist transformation’ and private sector development have been through several distinct stages since the start of ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige kaifang) in 1978. Wang and Yang describe these stages as follows: (1) the initial stage stretching from 1978 to 1988; (2) a period of decline from 1989 to 1991 following the suppression of the urban protest movement in June 1989; (3) a period of recovery and adjustment between 1992 and 2001; (4) rapid economic development from 2002 to 2012; (5) a period of sectoral differentiation between 2008 and 2012; and finally (6) a turn to upgrading and innovation since 2013. However, this categorization is rather heuristic. From a regional and local perspective, the time sequence of private sector development differed considerably across the country and is perhaps better defined by distinguishing between different trajectories or models of economic transformation in the reform era (see also Schubert and Heberer, 2015; Shen and Tsai, 2016):

      (1)The Pearl River Delta model (Zhusanjiao moshi) of Guangdong province is characterized by economic growth based on foreign investment. This model stood closest to what Deng Xiaoping had in mind when he ordered the establishment of the first Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian in the early 1980s. Local governments cooperated closely with foreign (including Hong Kong and Taiwanese) enterprises by providing a sound business infrastructure with cheap land and labor and efficient transportation, while foreign investors retained full control of their companies. This model has often been identified with local state entrepreneurialism, which of course also materialized in other parts of China and was not related only to foreign investment.

      (2)The Southern Jiangsu model (Sunan moshi) saw early private sector development based on the privatization of former collectively owned TVEs during the 1990s and early 2000s, and tight connections between local enterprises and governments. Many private entrepreneurs had previously been managers of TVEs and were hence party members in a position to ‘jump into the sea’ (xiahai) by taking over TVE assets and commercializing their operations. Local governments, for their part, delivered policies most favorable for private sector development and protected native enterprises from external competition, leading to what has been called local state developmentalism or even corporatism (Shen and Tsai, 2016; Oi, 1999).

      (3)The Wenzhou model (Wenzhou moshi) refers to Wenzhou municipality, a prefectural-level city in Zhejiang province, where private sector development was originally based on low-tech and labor-intensive export production by native entrepreneurs, informal finance, and tight marketing networks throughout China. In the early years, the Wenzhou government took a laissez-faire approach toward the private sector and did not intervene much in the local economy, other than providing basic public goods financed by a rising tax income. Wenzhou became a model for national emulation in the 1990s, but its private sector ran into serious problems even before 2008/2009, when the global financial crisis set in and Wenzhou’s export economy collapsed. The low quality of many of its products in conjunction with the family-based structure of many of its companies induced the local government to push for industrial restructuring and upgrading — with moderate success thus far.31

      (4)The Jinjiang model (Jinjiang moshi) in Fujian province stands for the rise of native entrepreneurship without the opportunities stemming from the decline and transformation of TVEs like in Southern Jiangsu. Jinjiang’s early generations of private entrepreneurs were not party members but nevertheless worked closely with local governments, relying on kinship ties and ‘localism’, i.e. the invocation of a joint mission to develop the local economy. The local government of this county-level city took responsibility for fostering private sector responsibility early on, making use of Jinjiang’s close proximity to the coast which helped to build up regional trade networks. In that sense, Jinjiang followed the logic of local state entrepreneurialism and corporatism, and many of its enterprises were small and medium sized. However, their economic outreach did not go far beyond the immediate environment in Fujian and hence differed substantially from its Wenzhou counterpart.

      (5)In addition to the four models mentioned thus far, we would also add rural private sector development as a special variant and call it the Enshi model (Enshi moshi), after a county-level city within Enshi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture in Western Hubei Province where we conducted fieldwork in 2013. In places like Enshi, very few industrial enterprises exist and most of them operate in the processing of agricultural products. Tourism is also an important economic sector. Private entrepreneurs have little capital and depend strongly on the support and guidance of the local government for identifying and accessing markets or building a sound management structure within their companies. The local government tries hard to stimulate internal and external investment and clearly steers the building up of a private sector economy. It offers numerous subsidy schemes for that purpose, though its fiscal maneuvering space is limited. Enshi’s lack of qualified cadres who know how to drive forward economic modernization and its isolated geographic location with difficult transport conditions make it an inevitable latecomer in terms of private sector development in China.

      No matter which model best summarizes the specific trajectory of private sector development across China, in most places, local governments have played multiple, critical roles as gatekeepers, enablers, and steering subjects. They have done so by improving the local infrastructure, ensuring access to land, labor, and credit, granting tax rebates and subsidies for product innovation and branding, providing for vocational education and market information, enforcing industrial upgrading and environmental compliance, and empowering business associations to serve as transmission belts for entrepreneurial concerns and demands. It is the objective and obligation of local governments everywhere in China to improve the competitive capacity of private enterprises in their respective jurisdictions in domestic and international markets around the world and to establish a more effective administration system. Private entrepreneurs, for their part, strive to closely cooperate with local governments because of their control of critical resources and information badly needed for market success, and the power of local СКАЧАТЬ