Weapons Of The Rich. Strategic Action Of Private Entrepreneurs In Contemporary China. Thomas Heberer

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      ¹The ‘National Bourgeoisie’ consisted of indigenous entrepreneurs not allied with foreign investors, multinational corporations, foreign banks, or the military.

      ²For the situation of private entrepreneurship in the Maoist era, see Solinger (1984) and Heberer (1989). For more recent historical accounts of the rise of the private economy in post-Mao China, see, e.g. Zheng and Yang (2011), Coase and Wang (2013), Chen (2015), Wu and Ma (2016), and Lin (2017). See also Chen and Naughton (2017), who have proposed a sequence of three generations of a ‘China model’ of economic development.

      ³Since undisguised resistance would have been laden with risk, the peasants developed a strategy of permanent though limited fence-breaking by, for instance, ignoring legal restrictions of private economic activities, something James C. Scott has classified as ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ (Scott, 1985, 1989, see Chapter 3).

      ⁴The process of de-collectivization in agriculture was typical for later developments in the industrial and service sectors as well: Limited transgressions of laws or regulations which were tolerated by the regime induced copycat effects leading to an extensive practice of ‘fence-breaking’, first at the grassroots and soon across all administrative tiers (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996: 1). The success of the private shadow economy in solving supply-side shortages and creating jobs discouraged suppression by party leaders, once again inducing new transgressions of the law, to the extent that reforms in areas other than the economy were soon brought about as well.

      ⁵This was a somewhat arbitrary limit taken from a comment of Karl Marx made in Chapter 9 of the third volume of Capital according to which a capitalist enterprise with eight and more employees would appropriate the workers’ surplus value, hence committing capitalist exploitation.

      ⁶In 1988, the Chinese State Council enacted the ‘Provisional Regulations for Private Enterprises of the PR of China’ (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo siying qiye zanxing tiaoli), see Heberer (1989: 400–412) and, for the full text in Chinese, Renmin Ribao, 29 June 1988.

      ⁷The state constitution, which was amended in December 1982, stated in Article 11 that the individual economy was a supplement to the socialist public economy and was protected by the state.

      ⁸‘Let some become rich first’ (Rang yi bufen ren xian fuqilai), statement made by Deng Xiaoping on 23 October 1985, when meeting a delegation of U.S. entrepreneurs. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/34136/2569304.html (accessed 30 March 2018).

      ⁹The full text of the interview conducted by Thomas Heberer (in German) in Die Welt, 17 November 1986. Hu Deping’s book contains its Chinese part on private sector development.

      ¹⁰Article 11 of the 1982 constitution was revised as follows: ‘The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a supplement to the socialist public economy. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision, and control over the private sector of the economy.’

      ¹¹It was then replaced by the ‘Ordinance of Urban and Rural Industrial and Commercial Self-Employment’ (Lin, 2017: 32).

      ¹²The extent to which the 1989 protest movement was supported by private entrepreneurs is estimated as low by most scholars. There was financial and material support by a number of them, but in general private entrepreneurs abstained from becoming entangled in the protests and displayed much ambivalence in taking a stance on them (Wank, 1995).

      ¹³‘Dual-track’ means the pursuance of market reforms under the auspices of a command economy protected by the state.

      ¹⁴One of the most comprehensive and telling studies on the rise of the private sector in post-Mao China is Nee and Opper’s Capitalism from Below (2012), which meticulously traces the interplay of state institutions and informal agency on the part of entrepreneurial actors which resulted in institutional adaptation and change by shifts in market competition, entrepreneurial action bringing about institutional innovation, mutual monitoring and enforcement in cross-cutting networks and mimicking, i.e. copying effects caused by successful private entrepreneurs which led to increasing collective action for further changes in the overall institutional setup of the Chinese economy.

      ¹⁵However, Deng’s ideological ‘victory’ remained contested in the party throughout the 1990s and it was only thanks to his personal authority that the ‘reform and opening up’ was not attacked with more serious consequences as market reforms went into rough water periodically during that decade.

      ¹⁶During roughly the same time frame, there was a complete restructuring of the public sector economy (see below).

      ¹⁷Jiang Zemin, СКАЧАТЬ