Promoting Democracy. Manal A. Jamal

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СКАЧАТЬ the political settlements determine the amounts of funding and types of programs donors are more likely to promote. Donors, especially state-sponsored donors, will likely be more involved and commit higher amounts of funding where settlements are more fragile and their geostrategic interests figure more prominently. Geostrategic considerations may influence which programs are implemented, and donors may not prioritize a stronger civil society or democratic development. Where donors become more involved and commit higher amounts of funding, their impact is greater. Higher amounts of funding also often require more stringent professionalization criteria. As I will explain in more detail in chapter 4, foreign donors prioritized aid to civil society development in the Palestinian territories in contrast to El Salvador, where they were more likely to prioritize economic development programs in the post-accord period. Along these same lines, the United States was more heavily involved supporting right-wing groups in El Salvador during the Cold War. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, it had appeared that liberal market-democracy had nearly triumphed in Latin America in contrast to the Middle East. All Latin American countries had adopted neo-liberal economic reform policies.50

      Inclusivity and Institutionalization—Articulated versus Disarticulated Spaces

      Third, in addition to determining suffrage and equal opportunity to formulate preferences and have preferences equally considered by the state,51 the political settlement will impact political institutionalization at the local and national levels of government in a given context,52 as well as electoral institutional design, and, in turn, shape citizen participation. These two levels of government are of particular relevance to this study because they facilitate relations between the state and civil society, and hence shape citizen participation. Through electoral laws and the frequency of elections, dominant groups influence the ability of opposition groups to participate in elections and prevail at certain levels of government. In turn, electoral outcomes influence how much and what type of access opposition groups (and affiliated NGOs) will have to council or assembly representatives in local government and the national legislative bodies.53 As I will elaborate in chapter 3, because of the noninclusivity of the political settlement in the Palestinian territories, Fatah, the leadership party of the PA, has repeatedly postponed elections.

      In noninclusive contexts, opposition groups and individuals will either not have access to these institutions (in this case, national legislative bodies or municipalities) or will remain a step removed from them compared to included groups. Western donors are less likely to fund programs and projects that will require cooperation or interaction with these institutions if “unfavored” groups may become represented in them, or the donors will simply avoid them altogether. Under these circumstances, CSOs are more constrained by the institutional setting since they are limited in terms of both their access to the state and their ability to make demands on it. Given the noninclusivity of these institutions and the lack of Western donor programs to encourage citizen participation between civil society and state institutions, what I refer to as “disarticulated spaces” pervade. In these spaces, institutions that should provide connecting channels between civil society and the state are lacking or discriminate against certain groups by not allowing them the same access.

      Conversely, in politically inclusive contexts, if all major political groups are involved, ruling groups are more likely to design and endorse more inclusive political institutionalization at both levels. More representative national and local government bodies will also provide civil society with more institutional openings. Moreover, Western donor-promoted civil society development will not necessarily play a discriminating role favoring certain groups over others, and will likely promote programs that encourage more regular citizen engagement with the state, leading to more “articulated spaces,” and hence to a more effective civil society.

      In the post–Cold War era of liberal market-democracy consensus, the interests of key Western state-sponsored donors and dominant political groups often align to exclude certain political groups; this has had important implications for civil society and democratic development. In transition contexts, Western donors pay significant attention to civil society’s promise to promote and entrench political settlements and promote what I refer to as a “post–Cold War liberal order.” This political-economic order is committed to market-democracy and the advancement of civil and political rights, with lesser regard for economic rights and economic well-being. It is also more Western and liberal in its social orientation.54 Given the priorities of Western geostrategic interests in the immediate post–Cold War period, these dynamics were most pronounced in the Middle East. It is important, however, not to reduce this state of affairs to the incompatibility between the West and Islam; rather, Western state-sponsored donors have worked to exclude parties that do not support Western-endorsed status quos. Hence, those excluded often not only oppose dominant political settlements but also are not well positioned to promote a “post–Cold War liberal order.” This category includes Islamists, as well as leftists who refuse to embrace this status quo. What is remarkable about this state of play is that the West and many dominant political groups embrace the notion of democratic governance that is based on exclusion.

      Civil Society

      Before proceeding, it is important to clarify what exactly is meant by civil society and how it relates to this study.55 Scholars generally agree that civil society is “a sphere of activity in which private citizens first constitute a public.”56 It speaks to the conditions of citizenship in a given polity, including both the virtues and dispositions of individual citizens.57 Of specific concern to this study, however, are those organizations and social collectivities that facilitate political participation and influence and make demands on the state.58 Civil society facilitates political participation by aggregating and representing citizen interests, countering state power, and furthering the struggle for citizenship rights. This study does not subscribe to the notion that all NGOs are part of civil society.59 Rather, NGOs that seek to influence state policy or demand greater inclusion in national political structures are CSOs. Local NGOs that are part of civil society should be able to organize various constituencies, drawing on their needs and demands, and not simply implement the agendas of foreign donors or external actors. Civil society can contribute to the delivery of humanitarian relief, support the reintegration of former combatants, facilitate refugee return, improve the performance of political and economic institutions, and cultivate greater trust between different parties through civic engagement.60 However, unless a service-provider NGO is simultaneously concerned with influencing and shaping broader political processes, including state policies, it should not be considered part of civil society. Social movements are involved in conflictual relations with clear opponents, are linked by dense networks, and have a collective identity, but they are not necessarily facilitating political participation and making demands on the state.

      For civil society to accomplish these tasks, certain characteristics and contextual factors must obtain.61 A more dense and plural civil society that is inclusive of broad social sectors will better contribute to the development of democracy; in such contexts, citizens from all walks of life, not only the elite or certain political groups, are afforded greater opportunities to participate in civic life.

      Horizontal versus Vertical Networks

      CSOs should also be rooted in society and be able to forge horizontal linkages with other CSOs and with grassroots constituencies.62 Horizontal linkages are necessary for the strengthening of civil society and the longer term prospects for democratic development, because, as Robert Putnam explained, “a vertical network, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and co-operation.”63 Furthermore, vertical networks are not likely to generate citizen participation or engagement because they reinforce existing hierarchy and polarization and decrease the likelihood of cooperation.64 A cross-cutting, horizontally organized civil society will incorporate grassroots constituencies beyond simply providing services to them. More effective incorporation will contribute to the better organization of interests and, in turn, to the growth of cooperative СКАЧАТЬ