Promoting Democracy. Manal A. Jamal

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СКАЧАТЬ each of these areas. Area B would consist of 21.8 percent of the West Bank, over which the PA would have civil control over Palestinians and maintain a police force to protect “public order for Palestinians,” and Israel would maintain overall security control. Area C would consist of 60 percent of the territory where Israel would retain full territorial jurisdiction, and the PA would have functional jurisdiction over Palestinians and “only in matters not related to territory.”22 The two sides, however, did not agree on the territorial size of the fourth and final redeployment. Once the Israeli military redeployment from any area was complete, the Israeli government would transfer the civil powers for education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism of that area to the PA. These agreements would come to supersede the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities. On 15 January 1997, the two parties signed the Protocol concerning redeployment from Hebron, which outlined the nature of Israeli withdrawal from this Palestinian town.23

      Formidable Undertakings

      The PA became responsible for public sector functions in the WBGS under substantial adversity in a conflict situation. The body was expected to build public sector institutions and assume responsibility for these functions while promoting good governance, democratic political institutions, a robust civil society, security (both internally and for Israel), and a free market while lacking key requisites such as jurisdiction over the land for whose population it would be responsible, or control over water resources. Moreover, it was expected to build a fiscal administration and guarantee fiscal stability without control over monetary policy or its own currency.24 A substantial portion of the PA’s budget would rely on the value-added tax (VAT) and other fees transferred from Israel. From the onset, it would be confronted with the challenge of Israeli closure policies that disrupted the movement of goods and labor, dealing an immense blow to the economies of the WBGS.25 Israel would retain control over the external borders, airspace, water, and the electromagnetic spheres of the WBGS.26 Despite these challenges, the PA succeeded in establishing functioning state institutions.27 From the onset, however, the founding of these institutions privileged certain groups and political organizations.

      Opposition to the unfolding Oslo Accords was by no means limited to extremists. The implementation agreements would draw mounting criticism, as each stage increasingly appeared to address Israel’s security concerns at the expense of Palestinian nationalist aspirations. The negotiation of these agreements did not expand beyond the initial narrow participation of the DOP,28 further entrenching the noninclusivity of these agreements. The institutions that historically represented all Palestinian political organizations, such as the PNC and the Executive Committee of the PLO, were not included in this process. An overriding criticism revolved around the PA’s lack of control over jurisdiction. The unfolding agreements also did not bring an end to settlement expansion; on the contrary, settlement expansion would continue unabated as negotiations were under way.29 The issue of Israel’s control over almost every land aquifer in the West Bank was also absent from these agreements and postponed to final status negotiations. Moreover, the subsequent agreements of the Oslo Accords did not move beyond the autonomy framework, with no guarantees toward sovereign statehood.30

      The Paris Protocol, Annex IV of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, established the transitional framework that would govern economic relations, including policies related to trade, specifications, taxation, and banking between Israel and the PA for the next five years, until 1999. The agreement extended control to the PA in some areas, such as the authority to collect domestic taxes, set its own industrial policy, and resume limited imports from Arab countries. The agreement also stipulated a gradual elimination of export restrictions on agricultural products, and it allowed for the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian Monetary Authority for the interim period. The Monetary Authority would perform limited central bank tasks, such as financial sector supervision and regulation; this would not include the issuing of a national currency.31 As the permanence of the agreement took hold, and its disadvantages to the Palestinians became increasingly apparent, it would draw damning condemnation from many quarters. One of the overriding criticisms centered on the creation of a “Customs Union,” and the aligning of Palestinian customs tariff rates, procedures, and taxation policies with those of Israel.32 This arrangement reinforced Israel’s economic control over external borders. Moreover, the alignment of the Palestinian economy with a more advanced, industrial outward-looking economy would not help equip the Palestinian economy to become more competitive in international markets. Since Israel would be required to transfer import taxes and VAT pertaining to revenues collected for goods and services sold in Israel and destined for the WBGS, the overdependence on the Israeli economy facilitated fiscal leakage. According to a 2011 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) study, over US$300 million was “leaked” or not transferred to the Palestinian economy, as a result of weak customs control, dated clearance arrangements, and tax avoidance on the part of Israel.33 Control over these transfers also provided Israel with additional political leverage to penalize the PA if it deemed necessary. Initially, proponents rationalized that the arrangements would allow Palestinian labor free access to Israeli markets. Israel, however, unilaterally and gradually limited the entry of Palestinian laborers into its markets.

      The Hebron Agreements of January 1997 divided the city into H1 and H2 zones; H1 was handed over to the Palestinians, and H2, the Old City, where 450 Israeli Jewish settlers would remain, would continue to be under complete Israeli security control. Provisions for H2 were designed to separate Arabs and Jews, dividing the city with barbed wire and privileging the Jewish settlers with bypass roads and extra security arrangements. After the Hebron Protocol was signed, Israel issued a “Cabinet Communique” elaborating on its understanding of the Oslo Accords and declared that “details of the further stages of the redeployment in Judea and Samaria will be determined by the Government of Israel.”34 These gestures were not simply symbolic but reaffirmed Israel’s insistence that it would unilaterally shape the final outcome. Benjamin Netanyahu’s term as prime minister, like his subsequent terms, further pushed Israel’s unilateralism.

      Twenty years after the signing of the DOP, the Israelis and Palestinians were no closer to peace: no progress had been made in terms of final status negotiations. In terms of military presence, the Israeli military had simply redeployed around Palestinian towns and was still very present. According to a number of Western mainstream narratives, the two sides were close to reaching an agreement at the Camp David negotiations of 2000. Palestinian accounts, however, maintained that the negotiating positions of the two sides were unbridgeable. By the close of 2017, Israel’s policies of institutionalized separation between the occupied territories and Israel had created a mental chasm that blinded and prevented the Israeli establishment, and perhaps even the public, from grasping the extent to which Palestinian lives had deteriorated and their circumstances had become unsustainable.

      The Post-Oslo Era and the Reconstitution of Palestinian Political Life

      The noninclusivity of the Oslo Accords and subsequent implementation agreements further polarized the Palestinian political landscape. In general, three political tendencies emerged in relation to the Oslo accords: Fatah and its clientelistic networks, the Opposition, and the Liberal Moderates. These tendencies included the relevant political organization, as well as loosely affiliated individual and groups—affiliations based on various forms of group membership, political beliefs, or sometimes even shared labels, such as “Islamist.”35 They (the tendencies) vis-à-vis the accords remained relatively unchanged over time, albeit with minor shifts in tone or degree in various periods; the changes were often tactical and not fundamental in terms of how they related to the accords. Each of these tendencies initially adopted a different strategy in relation to the peace accords that was often conditioned by their ability to access Western foreign donor funding or other sources of funding. Because of the interests of Western foreign donors, especially state-sponsored donors, they were more likely to fund groups that supported the peace accords and were in a better position to promote a “post–Cold War liberal order.”36 The availability of Western foreign donor assistance, hence, played a critical role in mediating relations between these different groups.

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