Just Deserts. Daniel C. Dennett
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Название: Just Deserts

Автор: Daniel C. Dennett

Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited

Жанр: Афоризмы и цитаты

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isbn: 9781509545773

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СКАЧАТЬ – it’s the claim that at some time more than one future is physically possible. The traditional problem of free will and determinism therefore comes in trying to reconcile our intuitive sense of free will with the idea that our choices and actions may be causally determined by factors over which we have no ultimate control, that is, the past before we were born and the laws of nature.

      Historically, libertarians and compatibilists have reacted to this problem in different ways. Libertarians (not to be confused with the political view) acknowledge that if determinism is true, and all of our actions are causally determined by antecedent circumstances, we would lack free will and moral responsibility. Yet they further maintain that at least some of our choices and actions must be free in the sense that they are not causally determined. Libertarians therefore reject determinism and defend an indeterminist conception of free will in order to save what they maintain are necessary conditions for free will – the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same set of conditions and/or the idea that we remain, in some important sense, the ultimate source/originator of action. Compatibilists, on the other hand, set out to defend a conception of free will that can be reconciled with determinism. They hold that what is of utmost importance is not the absence of causal determination, but that our actions are voluntary, free from constraint and compulsion, and caused in the appropriate way. Different compatibilist accounts spell out requirements for free will differently but widely endorsed views single out responsiveness to reasons, self-control, or connection of action to what one would reflectively endorse.

      Many contemporary free will skeptics, for instance, maintain that while determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, so too is indeterminism, especially if it is limited to the sort posited by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics. Others argue that regardless of the causal structure of the universe, we lack free will and moral responsibility because free will is incompatible with the pervasiveness of luck. Others still, argue that free will and ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent concepts, since to be free in the sense required for ultimate moral responsibility, we would have to be causa sui (or “cause of oneself”) and this is impossible. Here, for example, is Nietzsche on the causa sui:

      The one thing, however, that all these skeptical arguments have in common, and what they share with classical hard determinism, is the belief that our choices, actions, and constitutive characters are ultimately the result of factors beyond our control – whether that be determinism, chance, or luck – and because of this we lack the kind of free will needed to hold agents morally responsible in the relevant sense.

      Determinism: The thesis that facts about the remote past in conjunction with the laws of nature entail that there is only one unique future.

      Compatibilism: The thesis that free will can be reconciled with the truth of determinism – i.e. it is possible for determinism to be true and for agents to be free and morally responsible in the relevant sense.

      Incompatibilism: The thesis that free will cannot be reconciled with determinism – i.e. if determinism is true, free will is not possible.

      Free Will Skepticism: The thesis that no one has free will, or at the very least, that we lack sufficient reason for believing that anyone has free will.

      Hard Determinism: The thesis that incompatibilism is true, that determinism is true, and therefore no person has free will.

      Hard Incompatibilism: The thesis that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism – i.e. that free will is incompatible with both causal determination by factors beyond the agent’s control and with the kind of indeterminacy in action required by the most plausible versions of libertarianism.

      Hard Luck: The thesis that regardless of the causal structure of the universe, we lack free will and moral responsibility because free will is incompatible with the pervasiveness of luck.

      Basic-Desert Moral Responsibility: For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this sense is for it to be theirs in such a way that they would deserve to be blamed if they understood that it was morally wrong, and they would deserve to be praised if they understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve to be blamed or praised just because they have performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations (Pereboom 2014: 2).

      Contractualism: The thesis that moral norms and/or political authority derive their normative force from the idea of a contract or mutual agreement.

      Deontology: The view that the morality of an action should be based on whether the action itself is right or wrong under a clear set of rules, rather than based on the consequences of the action.

      Caruso: Dan, you have famously argued that freedom evolves and that humans, alone among the animals, have evolved minds that give us free will and moral СКАЧАТЬ