The Nature of Conspiracy Theories. Michael Butter
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Название: The Nature of Conspiracy Theories

Автор: Michael Butter

Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited

Жанр: Зарубежная публицистика

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isbn: 9781509540839

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СКАЧАТЬ who allegedly also built the pyramids.16 The conspiracist tendency to link together disparate phenomena leads to assumptions that defy all probability.

      Another example often cited in support of the claim that many conspiracy theories later turn out to be true is Watergate. Before the first arrests were made in that case, however, there were no suspicions at all, that is to say, no theories, surrounding Nixon or his staff. And once the inquiry was underway, all parties – from the members of the Senate Committee investigating the affair to the investigative journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein – were extremely careful not to voice suspicions that could not be proven. The well-documented revelations concerning this scandal are therefore a world apart from the still unproven claims of conspiracy theorists that the official version of events was either just the tip of the iceberg or a clever diversionary tactic. They connected Nixon with the mafia, saw him as the victim of a CIA plot, and regarded the whole thing as just one piece in a superconspiracy puzzle encompassing practically every event in recent American history.17

      The Watergate affair thus provides further confirmation that the extensive scenarios put forward by conspiracy theorists are inconsistent with reality. If the American president – commonly dubbed the most powerful man in the world – cannot even spy on his political opponents at their party offices without it becoming public and leading to his eventual resignation, how can anyone be supposed capable of faking the moon landing, 9/11 or the refugee crisis and keeping it secret for years or even decades? Hence, conspiracy theories are indeed usually wrong. Any account of events that deems everything to be planned and leaves no room for chance, contingency and structural effects cannot adequately comprehend reality. Thus, as Quassim Cassam puts it, ‘Conspiracy Theories are implausible by design.’18

      Similarly, the authors and commentators on the right-wing populist American website breitbart.com, whose former editor-in-chief Steve Bannon was one of President Trump’s top advisers for a time, have attempted ever since Trump’s election to dismiss as a conspiracy theory the well-founded suspicion that the Kremlin sought to influence the polls. At the same time, however, the site produces an endless stream of accusations of its own which others would call conspiracy theories. Users commenting on, for instance, an article of 12 December 2016 about the Russia affair agreed with the author that the whole thing was a conspiracy theory put about by the Democrats, yet many of them promptly went on to make counter-accusations – naturally without applying the term to their own case. Comments included an urgent call for Trump to investigate the billionaire George Soros, accusing him of undermining democracy in the USA with his ‘187 radical organizations’.22

      Even if the term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not invented in order to discredit undesirable alternative versions of events, there is nevertheless no doubt that this is one of its main functions in everyday speech. In his book Conspiracy Panics (Conspiracy Theory Panics would have been a more appropriate title), Jack Bratich therefore rejects the rationale of most academics – which I too espouse in this book – and calls for an alternative approach. For Bratich, the concept of the conspiracy theory is not characterized by the duality between definable characteristics that allow a neutral use of the term, and stigmatization, which stands in the way of such a use. To him, it is purely and simply a means of stigmatization and thus delegitimization.24

      Bratich is strongly influenced by Michel Foucault’s idea that power generates knowledge and not vice versa, since it is ultimately those in positions of power who determine what does or does not constitute knowledge. Therefore, Bratich argues, it is impossible to determine on the basis of identifying characteristics – a group acting in secret, an evil plan, etc. – what a conspiracy theory is or is not. Rather, the term is used in common parlance as a way of discrediting a certain idea: ‘In other words, the question is no longer, “what is a conspiracy theory?” but “what counts as a conspiracy theory?”’ According to Bratich, the term is a weapon used to denounce certain views as illegitimate and false. No more, but also no less.25