Название: India
Автор: Craig Jeffrey
Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited
Жанр: Зарубежная публицистика
isbn: 9781509539727
isbn:
3.4 Durable Inequalities in Indian Society, Mobility and the Missing Middle Class
We drew attention earlier to the findings from recent research that higher levels of education, urban residence, being engaged in wage work, and belonging to social groups other than Dalit, adivasi or OBC are positively associated with higher-than-average chances of upward mobility. These observations point to the significance in India of what the social historian Charles Tilly (1998) refers to as ‘durable inequalities’ – inequalities, that is, across groups of people defined by relatively rigid social discriminators. This is the case, without question, of distinctions relating to caste, tribe and religion.
The economist K. P. Kannan was a member of the National Commission on Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS), appointed by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government, in 2004, to examine problems faced by the unorganized, or informal sector of the economy, and by the 92 per cent of Indian workers who are informally employed. The Commission distinguished different groups in regard to poverty: (a) the ‘poor and marginally poor’, comparable with those distinguished by the $1.25 per capita per day international poverty line of the World Bank; (b) the ‘poor and vulnerable’, comparable with the international poverty line of $2 per capita per day; and (c) those who are not poor, classified as ‘middle and high income’. Kannan (2018) presents data on the incidence of poverty in terms of these three groups, and across social categories, showing that in every poverty group the highest incidence of poverty is among Dalits and adivasis, followed by Muslims, then OBCs, and finally Others (see table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Percentage Distribution of Population by Poverty Status and Social Groups, 2004–05 and 2009–10
SOURCES: NCEUS (2007) for 2004–05; computed from unit level data from National Sample Survey 61st Round. Reproduced from Kannan 2018, table 2.1
Evidence presented by other scholars shows up big differences also between Dalits and adivasis. Radhakrishna (2015) offers the data presented in table 3.2.
The slower rate of decline among Scheduled Tribes (ST) by comparison with others, shown in Radhakrishna’s data, is to be matched with Alkire and Seth’s finding, referred to above, that the MPI declined least among STs between 1999 and 2006. Kannan’s calculations (2018: 35–8) of the rate of reduction of poverty across groups shows that between 1999–2000 and 2004–05 it was lowest among Dalits/adivasis and Muslims. In the ‘poor and marginal’ category, they did somewhat better than ‘others’ in the period 2004–05 to 2009–10, and about the same as the OBCs; but they did less well again in the ‘poor and vulnerable’ category, in comparison with OBCs and ‘others’, over this second period. Among Dalits and adivasis, 82 per cent were still ‘poor and vulnerable in 2009–10, after those years of ‘superfast growth’. ‘Inclusive growth’ really hasn’t happened.
Table 3.2 Incidence of Poverty and the Rate of Decline During 1993–94 to 2010–11, Rural and Urban, All-India
SOURCE: Radhakrishna (2015)
Kannan’s conclusion, ‘It is clear that the burden of poverty is concentrated among the socially disadvantaged groups – Dalits/Adivasis and Muslims – to a very significant degree’ (2018: 35), is unquestionably correct, and reflects ‘durable inequalities’. These are illuminated by the ethnographic research, in five sites, spread across India, reported by Alpa Shah, Jens Lerche and their co-workers in the book Ground Down by Growth: Tribe, Caste and Inequality in Twenty-First Century India (2018). The anthropologists found that the casual labour supplied especially by Dalits and adivasis, some of it by Dalits and adivasis from eastern India who have travelled across the country for work, is a significant factor in the processes of accumulation that are going on. Shah and Lerche argue that ‘the entrenchment of social difference in the expansion of capitalism takes place through at least three inter-related processes: inherited inequalities of power; super-exploitation based on casual migrant labour; and conjugated oppression (that is the intertwined multiple oppressions based on caste, tribe, class, gender, and region)’ (Shah and Lerche 2018: 2, emphasis in the original). Here they are referring to inequalities of power between people that are inherited from local caste hierarchies and from historic class differences related to landholding and occupations in the rural economy; to the kind of exploitation of migrant casual labour that is richly documented in their ethnographies, and that sees employers using a range of tactics to ensure that labour remains insecure and dependent; and to the ways in which ideologies of caste and patriarchy intersect with class exploitation to produce oppression. These three processes produce durable inequality (and see chapter 11).
The significance of these enduring inequalities, grounded in rigid social discrimination – that is to be equated with racism – is shown up, as well, in research on social and economic mobility in India. Between 2009 and 2012, Anirudh Krishna and a team of researchers interviewed more than 2,000 people who had gained admission to one of five engineering colleges, or eight business schools, or to one of three different classes of government employees. He was interested in the social backgrounds of those who are able to gain admission to the kinds of institutions from which it is possible to enter into the most sought-after careers. One conclusion was outstanding: people brought up in rural areas are at severe disadvantage in gaining entry. The chances of gaining admission for individuals who are poor, rural, Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (75 per cent of whom in the case of SCs and more than 90 per cent in the case of STs are rural, according to any definition), and who are women, are virtually zero (although women from relatively privileged urban backgrounds are now doing quite well). Very few SCs and STs are able to gain entry, and the numbers of Muslims are less than half, in proportion to their share in the population of India. The parents of new entrants to these prestigious institutions tend to be highly educated themselves, and in professional positions. More than 90 per cent had fathers with college degrees and mothers with at least high school education – when, in 2005 (according to data from the India Human Development Survey), in only 7 per cent of rural and 15 per cent of urban СКАЧАТЬ