India. Craig Jeffrey

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СКАЧАТЬ leadership of prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru sought to implement the design of the Constitution, with greater success in some areas than in others. But over time India has been subject to a process of reinvention, as Corbridge and Harriss (2000) described it. This, a third ‘moment’ in the making of twenty-first-century India, reached a point of culmination with the election of Narendra Modi as prime minister in 2014. Modi’s party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which won a large majority, is the party-political wing of a ‘family’ of organizations centred on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, which has long been dedicated to making India a ‘Hindu rashtra’, or Hindu state. It is committed, therefore, to redesigning India, and as we will explain in this book, it has gone a long way towards achieving this goal. Indeed, with the crushing victory of the BJP, led again by Narendra Modi, in the national elections of 2019, it appears to many that the goal has been achieved (see tables 1.3–1.5). The Editorial of The Hindu newspaper on 24 May 2019 argued, for example, ‘The definitive nature of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s victory in the 17th general election marks an unmistakable inflection point in the journey of the Republic … The outcome must be understood as an electoral endorsement of Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism’. Whereas the mainstream of Indian political life and culture was committed to liberal values, it has now been taken over by majoritarian Hindu nationalism. Liberal democracy is in retreat.

1.3 The Impact of Colonialism in India

There is a rich and ever growing literature about the impact of colonial rule in India, and we can only highlight certain themes that seem to us to be particularly significant in regard to India today, and its regional diversity. As we have been writing this chapter, the one hundredth anniversary has passed (on 13 April 2019) of the terrible events in the Jallianwala Bagh, in Amritsar, in Punjab, when Imperial troops fired without warning into a large and peaceful crowd, killing 379 (according to the official enquiry) and injuring more than a thousand. This is a powerful reminder, no matter how reluctant many English people still are to recognize this, that the British, as well as the other European colonial empires, were based on violence, and on racism. A recent study of British rule in India that makes this point most emphatically is by Wilson, who argues that the reliance on force was, at least in part, a reflection of the weakness of colonial rule, and of the failure of the British to establish long-term relationships in Indian society. ‘In practice’, he concludes, controversially, ‘British actions prolonged and fostered chaos far more than they cultivated security and prosperity’ (2016: 498).

      Wilson’s conclusions can certainly be disputed, and there are other historians who emphasize positive aspects of colonial rule. The economic historian Tirthanka Roy, for example, though he is not an apologist for empire, thinks that openness and integration into the world economy in the nineteenth century helped Indian business to overcome constraints to which it was subject: ‘By bringing in knowledge and capital from Britain to India, the open economy enabled huge growth in trade and an off-beat industrialization in the 19th century’ (Roy 2018: 261). Roy is critical of the long-established argument that the British effectively ‘underdeveloped’ India, through the open economy that they encouraged. This was the thesis of Indian economic nationalists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (whose arguments actually influenced the formulation of the idea of ‘underdevelopment’ by its foremost exponent, A. G. Frank, in the 1960s–70s – see Frank 1967). They emphasized the ‘drain’ of wealth from India to Britain, through onerous taxation, especially of agriculture, that both paid for the purchase of Indian goods that could then be sold by the colonizers at considerable profit, and for the ‘home charges’ – payments to Britain for the government of India and for the maintenance of the Indian army (which was deployed to extend and to police other parts of the British empire). Some historians have emphasized, too, both the impoverishment of Indian cultivators by the high levels of tax that they paid on the land (land revenue payments), and the ‘deindustrialization’ of India by the British, in the interests especially of the British cotton mill industry (and resistance to the purchase of British-made cotton textiles was one of the rallying cries of the struggle for independence from colonial rule). Roy, however, argues that the long-standing focus of scholars of world history on why India fell behind has led them to miss the central paradox of Indian economic history, which he thinks was the coexistence of robust capitalism and stagnant agriculture.

This was the argument, too, of the historian David Washbrook, writing thirty years before Roy (Washbrook 1988). Indians who owned capital, Washbrook thought, had ‘never had it so good’, because in the context of colonial rule they were able to make very high profits without taking on the risks of entrepreneurship, thanks to the control that they were able to exercise over labour. Roy, however, reckons that capital was generally in short supply in India, likely because of the monsoon climate which caused seasonal boom and slack in the economy ‘on a scale not visible in other societies’, and that led to large fluctuations in the demand for money and in interest rates within the year. Thus it was that ‘The attraction of earning a windfall income in the short-term money market was so great that money was kept idle in the slack season rather than being lent long term’ (2018: 12). But Indian capitalism flourished in the colonial period, at least in part because of knowledge and capital that came in from Britain.

      Debate will continue about the economic impact of colonialism in India. There is no room for doubt, however, about India’s declining share in the global economy in the nineteenth century, and the increasing divergence between India and other countries in Asia and the West. At the same time, as Roy argues, there was a successful Indian capitalist class, and successful Indian-owned industries – cotton mills in Bombay (now Mumbai), for example, and the first steelworks established in Asia, set up in eastern India by the Parsi entrepreneur Jamsetji Tata, founder of the company that now owns such an important share of British manufacturing industry. Roy’s argument, too, about ‘stagnant agriculture’ in colonial India is incontrovertible. Evidence collected by Myrdal for his classic work, Asian Drama (1968), shows how poor agricultural productivity was in India, by comparison with much of the rest of Asia, around the time of independence in 1947. Independent India faced a very significant ‘agrarian question’ – what to do about the productivity of agriculture and the poverty of the mass of the people who continued to live in the villages.

The most significant commercial and industrial development in colonial India took place in and around the colonial port cities – Bombay, Calcutta (now Kolkata), and Madras (now Chennai) – establishing an economic geography that has persisted into the present century. As the economist Bharadwaj noted (1982), the initial advantages of ‘Bombay’ (the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat) and of ‘Madras’ (present day Tamil Nadu and the coastal districts of Andhra Pradesh), in regard both to overall economic growth and industrial development have generally been maintained, though those of ‘Calcutta’ (West Bengal) have not, or at least not to the same extent. Another significant way in which the experience of colonialism may have contributed to the regional disparities that have become ever more pronounced in post-independence India has to do with the long-run effects of the different revenue collection systems used by the British. It has been shown that ‘Areas in which proprietary rights were given to landlords [sometimes described as areas of ‘zamindari settlement’ from the name often given to these taxcollecting landlords] have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period than areas where these rights were given to the cultivators [areas of ‘ryotwari’ settlement]’ (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Abstract; though see also Iversen et al. 2013, for criticism). These differences may have contributed to the disparities in levels of development between northern and eastern India, on the one hand, and the south and the west on the other, that have become increasingly sharp. On most criteria of both economic and social development, the south and west are distinctly more advanced than the north and east (excepting the contemporary states of the north-west – Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh – which generally compare quite well with the south and west).

      But though there was industrialization in colonial India, СКАЧАТЬ