Michael Walzer. J. Toby Reiner

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СКАЧАТЬ – prefer. While self-determination is a core part of Walzer’s political thought (see especially Walzer 1981), it is, as Orend notes, extremely difficult to imagine how any army intervening in a war might map out a strategy of maintaining a balance of forces rather than winning the war (Orend 2013: 90). Once battle is joined, it seems impossible to do anything but try to win. A strategy of containment would inevitably be a losing one. Walzer is of course a political theorist, not a military strategist, but if Orend’s claim is true, as seems likely, it would appear that counter-interventionists have to decide between allowing the original intervention to alter the course of the war and winning the war themselves; they simply cannot ensure local forces prevail. This is especially so because of difficulty determining to what extent forces depend on external intervention. In the Syrian civil war, for example, how can Americans determine precisely the extent to which the Assad regime relies on Russian weaponry? (On Syria, see Walzer 2018: 6–7, 71–3.)

      Walzer’s defense of pre-emption again follows the logic of maintaining international pluralism. He is at pains to distinguish pre-emption from “preventive” war, such as that later waged by the USA against Iraq in 2003 (on which, see the Preface to the fourth edition of Wars, Walzer 2006c), which he deems unjust. On Walzer’s account, preventive war responds to a threat that is somewhat distant, which means that it is freely chosen by the side waging war, even if it dubs itself the defender. By contrast, legitimate pre-emptive strikes occur when a state faces serious and imminent risks to its territorial integrity or political sovereignty. Walzer’s classic example is of the Israeli strike that launched the Six-Day War in 1967. Walzer argues that Israel was justified in pre-emptively attacking Egypt, because Egypt had deployed forces on the border and intended to place Israel in danger by doing so (Walzer 2015a: 80–5). Egypt did not accept Israel’s right to exist, so Walzer endorses Abba Eban’s suggestion that the destruction of an independent state be named the crime of “policide” in international law (52).

However, this argument has proven controversial, because Walzer accepts that although Egypt mobilized against Israel, it probably did not intend to start a war (83). For if pre-emptive strikes do not have to pre-empt an imminent attack, it is hard to see how they are genuinely defensive. Walzer has received severe criticism for his account of pre-emption, with critics arguing that he tailored the doctrine to Israel’s security needs when he would not otherwise have endorsed it (see most importantly Said 1986). As a Labor Zionist since his youth, Walzer had long sought to defend the legitimacy of the state of Israel, succeeding in converting many of the older generation on Dissent to Zionism despite initial disinterest (for discussion, see Reiner 2017a: 458–60).⁶ One of his earliest interventions was to argue at the time of the Six-Day War – at the height of his opposition to Vietnam – that Israel’s critics were wrong to see in the Middle East the sort of neo-colonial project that Walzer agreed was taking place in Vietnam (Walzer and Peretz 1967; see also Walzer 1970b).

      Yet the crucial issue in assessing Walzer’s argument on pre-emption is not his intention but, rather, how it conforms to his theory. I think we must come to a mixed conclusion. By Walzer’s admission, the argument marks “a major revision of the legalist paradigm” because it means that war can occur without an “immediate intention to launch such an attack” (Walzer 2015a: 84). This makes the argument seem inconsistent with Walzer’s insistence that just-war theory base itself on the war convention. However, Walzer’s adherence to the convention is not uncritical: he holds that its judgments must form the starting point for thinking about war, but not the conclusion. That is why exceptions that are in keeping with its spirit are warranted. Here Walzer is on somewhat solid ground, for he notes that if Israel could do nothing to resist Egypt mobilizing on its borders, then Israel would have been vulnerable to attack at any time, and its territorial integrity permanently eroded (83). It does seem intolerable to anyone committed to the survival of a system of independent states that a state should have to tolerate the permanent massing of hostile troops on its borders, and so that some sort of Israeli action must be considered justifiable. On the other hand, that does not mean that any Israeli gambit would be legitimate, nor that the Israeli attack that all-but-destroyed the Egyptian air force necessarily was. Israel might have followed the prescription Walzer would, decades later, suggest the US adopt with regard to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq: a “small war” consisting of enforcement of a no-fly zone someway from the border, with threats to attack if the no-fly zone were not respected (Walzer 2006c). One of the important developments in the theory of just war since 1977 relates to jus ad vim, or when it is legitimate to use force short of full-scale war. As a general principle, nations invoking Walzer’s doctrine of pre-emption would enhance their legitimacy were they to do their utmost to ensure use of the minimum force required as a gesture toward their defensive purposes.

Humanitarian Intervention

The most important and controversial exception to the theory of aggression is humanitarian intervention, in which a country uses force across an international boundary in order to protect the human rights of citizens against their own government or some domestic threat. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is probably the paradigmatic case of intra-state violence against which humanitarian intervention would be warranted. While such a use of force would seem to constitute aggression by the standards of the war convention, because it interferes with the political sovereignty of a state, that norm can, Walzer argues, be set aside in cases of enslavement or massacre. This is because self-determination “has to do with the freedom of the community as a whole; it has no force when what is at stake is the bare survival or the minimal liberty of (some substantial number of) its members” (Walzer 2015a: 101). In such cases, protection must come from outside, because there may well not be a political community that can govern itself and protect its putative citizens. Walzer notes that the number of cases that could qualify as oppressive is “frighteningly long” (101) and has since come to accept that cases of brutality are, if not more common, at least more “shocking” (Walzer 2007: 237–8). Recently, he published a chapter entitled “In Defense of Humanitarian Intervention” (Walzer 2018: 53–76). However, both in 1977 and more recently, a core aspect of his just-war theory has been that only extreme cases of rights-violation such as ethnic cleansing warrant humanitarian intervention because such cases “shock the moral conscience” of humanity (Walzer 2015a: 107, 2007: 238–40). More routine rights-violations, and run-of-the-mill oppressors, must be dealt with locally if pluralist international society is to survive. The norm, then, is non-intervention (Walzer 1980a: 220, 2018: 55).

Although Walzer reports having expected his account to be judged too permissive of intervention (1980a: 220), the major immediate critics of Wars suggested that restricting humanitarian intervention to exceptional cases protects illiberal regimes that commit aggression against their own people. This makes it impossible to argue that the rights of such states are founded on the rights of their own citizens (Luban 1980a: 169–70, Wasserstrom 1978: 540–3, Beitz 1979: 412–13, Doppelt 1978: 8–9). Moreover, Walzer’s domestic analogy does more to explain the foundation of state rights than to justify them. Indeed, Walzer’s invocation of a domestic analogy is odd in light of his insistence that just-war theory that proceeds by analogy with the norms appropriate to civil society misses the distinctiveness of war as a human activity (Walzer 2015a: 335–46, 2013a). As Walzer notes, humanitarian intervention is a form of international “law enforcement and police work” (Walzer 2015a: 106), yet it is integral to his recent work that theorists who think of just wars in this way (McMahan 2009, Rodin 2002) err by making such an analogy.

      The issue revolves around two competing approaches to military ethics. The emerging orthodoxy in the field is cosmopolitan: it seeks to rethink just wars as rights-protection on a global scale by establishing a world order comprised of “legitimate states” that are “minimally just” because they do their utmost to protect the human rights of their constituents (Orend 2013: 35–43). Thus, David Luban argues that just wars are not fought in defense of the sovereignty of states but of “socially basic human rights” (Luban 1980a: 175; see Shue 1980 for an account of basic rights). Cosmopolitan just-war theorists tend to criticize Walzer for using the legalist paradigm, which grants states’ rights to non-interference by analogy with СКАЧАТЬ