The Debt Delusion. John F. Weeks
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Название: The Debt Delusion

Автор: John F. Weeks

Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited

Жанр: Экономика

Серия:

isbn: 9781509532964

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СКАЧАТЬ “deficit” and “debt,” whose meanings, measurement and policy significance are distorted by mutually reinforcing misrepresentations.

      In Dutch and German the word for “debt” also means “guilt,” which provides insight into the decades-old austerity policies of the German Ministry of Finance, as well as the deficit and debt rules in the treaties of the European Union. In English, “debt” and “guilt” are different words. Nonetheless, many English-speaking politicians, not least the former UK Chancellor George Osborne and former Republican Congressman Paul Ryan, use the former to imply a heavy dose of the latter. In some cases the transubstantiation of meaning brings memories of “Newspeak” in George Orwell’s 1984. A clear example is the use of the benign “savings” for the malign “cuts in public services” and the pejorative “black hole” for the neutral “revenue shortfall.”

      One of the most important messages spun off from “living within our means” is that governments should “balance their books” (Myth 2). The balancing metaphor is powerful and easily captures the mind, contrasting balance, a good thing, with imbalance and skewedness, which in the mind’s eye cry out for correction just as a picture hanging crookedly offends the eye and demands adjustment.

      The conventional narrative applies this metaphor of balance to the public budget because of its alleged validity for households. What reasonable person would challenge that households should balance their accounts? If we do not, “we must tighten our belts” (Myth 3). It is a mystery how this parable, “households must balance their books, so government should also,” ever left the starting blocks, much less gained general acceptance. A bit of reflection and a few statistics lead unambiguously to quite a different parable.

      Because we must live within our means (Myth 1) and our government must do the same (Myth 2), we and our government must tighten our belts (Myth 3) and stay out of debt (Myth 4) by reducing expenditure, not raising taxes (Myth 5). We string the five myths together and come to the super-conclusion: there is “no alternative to austerity” (Myth 6).

      All five of the building blocks used to construct the necessity of fiscal austerity are false (each is a myth). When we replace the myths with logic and reality, we reach the opposite conclusion, that “there is always an alternative.” The closing chapter presents an alternative approach based on previous myth-busting. Reversing the rhetoric of the first myth, in the conclusion I show that, when we abandon the myths of austerity, our government can indeed “live within its means” while funding a just society. We have the means to foster hope over despair, infuse optimism in place of pessimism, imagine a brighter future and achieve it.

      As noted, in almost every country economic policy is more about politics than economics, though policy makers frequently employ technical economic arguments when justifying their political predilections. The use of esoteric technical language to convey political messages is not confided to economics. We frequently find it in discussions of public transport, education and health services. Somewhat unique to the politics of economic policy is the use of “common-sense” parables to convey political messages as if they were self-evident. The necessity of national governments to cover expenditure with tax revenue frequently stars as the central message of these parables.

      Parables and myths have a long and analytically undistinguished history. In developed countries their influence and frequency declined substantially in the first three decades after World War II. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the subsequent need for a major government role in war-time economies made the limitations of “budget-balancing” metaphors obvious. After the war, both in the United States and in Europe, progressive parties favored a larger role for government, including a substantial spending share, while conservative parties preferred a more restricted and smaller public sector. The political preference for a small public sector tended not to place primary justification in arguments based on the necessity to match public spending with public revenue.

      Figure 0.1 Public revenue minus spending for the United States, 1950–2018, percentage of gross domestic product

      Source: Annual Economic Report of the President, historical tables.

      Figure 0.2 Public revenue minus spending for the United Kingdom, 1950–2017, percentage of gross domestic product

      Source: UK Office for National Statistics.