The Third Pillar. Raghuram Rajan

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ AND THE CHURCH’S ATTACK ON USURY

      In Europe, from the early Middle Ages till about the eleventh century CE, the Church frowned upon the charging of interest on loans but did not prosecute moneylending as a sin.3 However, from about the middle of the eleventh century, the Church moved aggressively to curb usury, regarding any interest as a sin, prohibited by the Bible. The usurer had to repay all interest received during his life in full before he could aspire for salvation. The attempts to suppress usury reached their apex in the Church Councils of Lyon in 1274 and Vienna in 1312. The punishment for moneylenders included refusal of confession, absolution, or burial in hallowed ground—terrible penalties in those times of deep faith. These were reinforced by popular beliefs. The economic historian Richard Tawney writes about “innumerable fables of the usurer who was prematurely carried to hell, or whose money turned to withered leaves in his strong box or who . . . on entering a church to be married, was crushed by a stone figure falling from a porch, which proved by the grace of God, to be a carving of another usurer and his money-bags being carried off by the devil . . .” 4

      What accounted for the Church’s greater zeal in enforcing the ban on usury from the eleventh century onward? And why did it become far less passionate about rooting out the usurer from the late fourteenth century onward? An understanding of these shifts will give us a better sense of why attitudes toward markets change. First, though, we need to understand the quintessential community in those times in Europe: the feudal manor.

      The Feudal Community

      Under feudalism, everyone except the king held his share of land in trust from his overlord. Because land, the principal source of value, was not freely saleable, it was allocated to trusted supporters. In return for the use of the land and the overlord’s protection, the vassal swore fealty to the overlord and paid him in kind. If the vassal was capable of fighting, payment was through military service; if he was a peasant, payment was through produce from the land or labor. In a sense, feudal obligations and relationships arose from the land and the produce it generated, neither of which could be marketed.

      Feudalism in Europe reached its zenith as the Muslim expansion from the seventh century onward shut off Europe’s access to traditional overseas markets. The proliferation of little principalities as well as banditry reduced the size of markets and increased the cost of transporting goods for trade.5 With little to buy, market transactions and the use of money diminished, and feudal relationships proliferated.

      The feudal manor was thus a closed, hierarchical community, producing much of what it consumed. The peasant’s land holdings were typically in the form of strips in two or three large open fields, intermingled with those of his neighbors. Each peasant followed the same rotation of crops as the others, and had free access to common pastures and woods where each peasant had grazing rights for a certain number of cattle, sheep, or pigs, as well as the right to collect firewood. All this required a fair amount of coordination and give-and-take (the strips were not separated by fences and the commons were open to all in the manor), which required building consensus in the community.

      Each peasant had enough to ensure a subsistence existence. There was little incentive to produce more, since there was not much of a market to sell the surplus in.6 Because the peasant was tied to the land, though, the feudal community was stable, albeit poor. As one historian noted, “Most men have never seen more than a hundred separate individuals in the course of their whole lives, where most households live by tilling their great-grandfather’s fields with their great-grandfather’s plough.”7

      The Commercial Revolution

      The feudal economy did relatively well when there were few trading opportunities. Over time, though, Europe learned to trade with, and through, the Muslim lands. Moreover, demand for agricultural products from the growing towns, as well as travel routes that were safer from brigands, helped the revival of trade and commerce. Feudal lords now not only had the opportunity to convert the manor’s produce into money, the money could buy an increasing variety of goods. The growing attraction of producing for, and consuming from, the market did not sit well with traditional feudal practice.

      For key to the feudal system was that the individual did not own the land outright; instead, the peasant managed it while he was able-bodied and passed the management on to his kin when he could no longer manage.8 Everyone in the family had customary rights to the land, which made those rights difficult to sell. In turn, this ensured that a long-lived community built around that land, but productivity was generally low, since a farmer’s kin were not necessarily good farmers. In fact, the absence of a market protected the peasant—his low productivity hurt his household’s production, but did not jeopardize his right to farm land.

      As feudal lords became more attracted to monetary income, and as land became easier to sell, this changed. In order to enhance production, the feudal lord had to be able to transfer land to more productive tenants or owners. In England, soon after the turn of the millennium, the courts started overlooking the customary rights of kin, making freehold land easier to bequeath or sell.9 Even tenancy that was tied in with feudal obligations, known as copyhold tenancy, became better defined and easier to transfer over time.10 Scholars argue over whether there was a dramatic change in the legal treatment of property, or whether England was intrinsically more favorable to sales. Whatever the reason, the interests of the Church also lay in freeing property from customary entanglements. If the rights of inheritance, for example, narrowed to direct relatives rather than residing with all kin, land would be easier to bequeath to third parties or to sell. And a primary beneficiary of bequests to third parties was the Church. An elderly childless widow or widower could easily be persuaded that their route to salvation lay in willing the bulk of their property to the Church. Even if they were not persuadable, often the only one who could write down a will or hear last orders was the not entirely disinterested parish priest.11

      The net effect of a freer land market was that less-productive peasants had an incentive to sell land or were strong-armed into doing so, often to larger landowners who had surplus cash, and who could farm the combined land more profitably. Land holdings became more concentrated in fewer hands but agriculture also became more productive. Unfortunately, a number of peasants were forced into marginal holdings or entirely out of the manorial community as they sold, or were evicted from, the land that tied them to it. At the bottom, holdings became smaller as the size of the peasant family grew. As the small peasant’s holdings were subdivided and average incomes fell, a growing number of second and third sons had to fend for themselves outside the feudal manor. The expansion of the market, as is sometimes its wont, resulted in growing inequality.

      These were therefore extremely difficult times for many European peasants, especially those who no longer had the protection of the manorial community. Average incomes were not only barely above the level needed for subsistence but also were highly variable over time.12 The failure of a harvest or the death of livestock were not infrequent events. One estimate suggests that even the relatively wealthy English peasant could expect to face serious calamity every thirteen years.13 Some work did open up outside farming, especially in the growing towns where merchants and artisans prospered, but it was rarely enough.

      Despite their low and highly variable incomes, death by starvation was surprisingly rare among the peasantry. The reason was simple: Informal community support within the manor for those who still belonged to one, and formal charitable institutions run by the Church, such as almshouses, leper houses, pilgrim centers, educational institutions, and monastic hospitals, for those outside the manor, constituted a social safety net. Harder times for the poor explain why the Church became more aggressive in its fight against usury.14

      Usury prohibitions limited the profits that anyone with excess wealth could make by lending to those in difficulty. At the same time, a lender faced a loss of social status and even excommunication if he was condemned as a usurer. Perhaps the businessman was willing to take this risk when young. As he grew older and came closer to the feared inevitable СКАЧАТЬ