The Myth of Self-Reliance. Naohiko Omata

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СКАЧАТЬ and welfare of residual refugees in Ghana. For instance, according to the director of one of the UNHCR implementing partners (IPs) operating in Buduburam, his NGO had previously provided a micro-loan programme for refugee entrepreneurs, designed to help refugees start new businesses in Ghana. But as the repatriation of refugees had to be prioritized in its assistance programmes after 2004, the organization had to close down its micro-finance project. Instead, the NGO focused on the provision of vocational skills such as carpentry and masonry to assist repatriates in contributing to Liberia’s reconstruction process upon their return.

      Ambiguous Legal Status: ‘Are We Really Refugees?’

      Despite more than a decade of exile, the legal status of Liberian refugees in Ghana remained unclear, and this had a profound impact on many aspects of their lives. At the inception of my fieldwork in 2008, in addition to around 18,000 refugees who were formally ‘registered’ with UNHCR, there was an unknown but considerable number of non-registered Liberians living both in and outside the camp. Whilst there were no official statistics, UNHCR had previously estimated that there were over 4,000 of them (UNHCR 2004c: 161).

      The large number of ‘invisible’ Liberian refugees emanated from UNHCR’s sloppy registration exercises (see Omata 2011a). In August 2003, UNHCR and the GRB conducted a one-off comprehensive registration exercise for all refugees in Buduburam camp (UNHCR and WFP 2006: 11). Liberian refugees who had arrived in Ghana before the registration exercise and who managed to show up for it were granted prima facie refugee status and given a UNHCR ID card. After the registration exercise there was no update of new arrivals, meaning that those who arrived after it or who missed it never had an opportunity to receive an ID card.

      Unregistered refugees without an ID card were excluded from any forms of protection and assistance provided by UNHCR. For instance, they were denied access to the UNHCR/WFP free food ration for vulnerable refugees, even if they met the vulnerability criteria. Unregistered refugees did not benefit from the subsidized medical services for refugees in the camp. They were unable to access vocational training programmes organized by UNHCR’s IPs to learn new livelihood skills. Even if they decided to resume a new life in Liberia out of desperation, only the formally registered ID cardholders were able to access the UNHCR repatriation package to assist them in returning to Liberia.

      Although UNHCR ID cardholders were formally granted refugee status in Ghana, even then they were perplexed about their legal status because of statements on their ID cards. The front of the card contained the refugee’s picture and a serial number, and their name, date of birth, date of issue, sex and nationality. But the reverse contained the following contradictory statement with the signatures of both GRB and UNHCR officials: ‘This card is for registration of asylum seekers. The card neither confers nor implies recognition of refugee status under international or domestic law. This card does not entitle the holder to any individual benefit from either UNHCR or the Government of the Republic of Ghana’.

In Ghana, even formally registered refugees were unable to prove or claim their refugee status by presenting any kind of document, since the UNHCR ID card was the only official item given to individual refugees. In fact, the unclear refugee status was a long-standing concern for Liberian refugees in Ghana, and was one of the major reasons why they adamantly resisted the local integration plan. Andrew, a Liberian refugee who had been living in Ghana since the early 1990s, expressed his view on his ambiguous refugee status: ‘I think the reason why UNHCR and the Ghanaian government refuse to give us full refugee status is that if it is given to us, it will entail rights to better welfare for us. Then they will have more responsibilities for us. I believe this is what these stakeholders are afraid of’.9

      UNHCR’s Withdrawal Strategy

With the unsatisfactory results of the repatriation programme and very limited availability of resettlement opportunities for Liberian refugees, in about 2007 UNHCR shifted its focus to the local integration of the residual Liberian refugees in Ghana (Salducci 2008: 6). Nevertheless, the refugees strongly resisted local integration when they learned of UNHCR’s intentions, leading to a series of refugee protests in Buduburam refugee camp, as explained in the previous chapter.10

      Nonetheless, the series of refugee protests had little impact on UNHCR’s integration plan. During my fieldwork between 2008 and 2009, UNHCR was quietly but gradually moving towards withdrawing from this long-term refugee population in Ghana. UNHCR’s scenario for withdrawal envisaged two phases: first, reduce the number of Liberian refugees as much as possible by means of ongoing repatriation; second, bring in a local integration scheme for the remaining refugees in Ghana. In an interview with UNHCR’s senior programme officer in August 2008, he explained frankly to me that:

UNHCR cannot maintain the status quo of the care and maintenance stage of Liberian refugees any more. What UNHCR can do for them is to encourage and support their repatriation to Liberia … Now the new stage of repatriation is ongoing. Four thousand refugees repatriated since this April [2008]. Our plan is to reduce the number of Liberian refugees to the level at which local integration would be more effective. The current number of refugees is too large for the Ghanaian government to feel comfortable to accept local integration.11

      Given this exit strategy, between 2008 and 2009, UNHCR continued to put pressure on the remaining refugees in Ghana to repatriate, at times appearing almost threatening in their attempts. After extending the original deadline of the repatriation scheme from August 2008 to November 2008 and then to March 2009, UNHCR posted an announcement on bulletin boards inside the camp that it would terminate its food rations for vulnerable groups at the end of June 2009. The statement concluded: ‘Refugees are therefore encouraged to make informed decisions about their future, including opting for voluntary repatriation before the deadline of 31 March 2009’. UNHCR’s strategy appeared to work well, as the Buduburam refugee population was reduced by 40 per cent through the repatriation of more than 9,000 Liberians under this ‘voluntary’ programme.

Whereas the first part of UNHCR’s scenario for withdrawal generally succeeded, by decreasing the number of refugees in Ghana, the second part did not. Not only the Liberian refugees, but also the government of Ghana – the key stakeholder in the local integration of refugees – expressed strong resistance to UNHCR’s integration scheme and subsequent exit plan. In many refugee-receiving countries in the Global South, local integration is often a ‘forbidden or evaded solution’ due to the potential cost of integrating refugees (Hovil 2014). Similarly, the Ghanaian government saw that local integration of Liberian refugees would likely impose an increased burden on the government. In an interview with the secretary of the GRB, he described UNHCR’s plan for local integration without detailed follow-up strategies as ‘wholesale local integration for residual Liberians’.12 The tone of the secretary’s comments was ironic but acrimonious, corroborating the existence of acute tension, or at least major disagreements, between UNHCR and the host government over the issue of the residual refugees.

      Despite resistance from both the Ghanaian government and the refugees, UNHCR completed its exit strategy in 2012. At the very beginning of 2012, UNHCR announced the cessation of refugee status of remaining Liberian refugees globally, given restored peace and stability in Liberia. The Liberian refugees in Ghana were left with two options: either repatriate before the invocation of the Cessation Clause by the end of June 2012, or remain in Ghana to be locally integrated as citizens of member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Chapter 6 provides more details of this significant moment, and specifically highlights refugees’ diverse responses to the end of their ‘formal’ refugee life.

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