New South African Review 2. Paul Hoffman

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      NOTES

1 An earlier period of conflict in the ANC and the Alliance occurred over its adoption of Gear in 1996 and the effects of the implementation of its policies from 1997 onwards. This involved the expulsion of several members from alliance formations, and the formation of new social and community movements, such as the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF), the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC), the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the Landless People’s Movement (LPM). While these movements were responsible for a period of heightened censure of the ANC and its adoption of neoliberalism until about 2006, as well as some significant policy changes with regard to the delivery of basic services, many of them no longer exist today, or face internal conflicts. Those that have survived also exhibit a rhythm, routine and predictability with regard to struggle that makes them less threatening to the ANC-led government and less successful in making and winning demands.

2 It should, however, be noted that these conflicts within the alliance have also highlighted levels of intolerance and authoritarianism among its members, and that the very existence of a culture of caucusing, cliques and cabals demonstrates undemocratic practices dominating the functioning of the ANC and the broader congress tradition.

3 Residents of Bokfontein come from two different experiences of forced removals – from evictions from farms in the Hartebeespoort dam area, and from forced removals from land they were occupying illegally in Meloding.

4 Langa and Von Holdt note that the number of sites expanded rapidly, from four pilots to fifty-six, in the space of eighteen months.

5 It should be remembered here that the constitutional protection of the right to private property (a concession by left forces within the ANC and its alliance partners) meant that any conceptualisation of BEE or B-BBEE could not enforce any redistributive measures with regard to racialised patterns of ownership entrenched by apartheid that did not rely on market mechanisms and business rationalities.

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      PART 1: POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL

      INTRODUCTION

      The Zuma presidency: The politics of paralysis?

      John Daniel and Roger Southall

      That the ANC will become another ZANU is possible, but by no means certain, even if the entrenchment of a one-party dominant system is likely to continue generating a range of democratic deficits in South Africa.

      (James Hamill and John Hoffman in Chapter 2 in this volume)

      The intent of the Zuma presidency, according to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), both of which played vital roles in bringing about its political ascendancy, was to create a government that would be less remote, more responsive and closer to the people, and which would, above all, implement a shift in economic policy that would create more jobs and be more pro-poor. In short, we were led to believe that Thabo Mbeki’s conservative macroeconomic policies would give way to Zuma’s more activist, interventionist ‘developmental state’. The reality, however, has fallen dismally short of such expectations. Popular anger has been stirred by the personal extravagance of countless government officials, including members of the cabinet. Corruption appears rampant. Key agencies of the state, notably the police, seem unaccountable, if not out of control – an entity as in apartheid days, more to be feared than relied upon. The capacity of local governments in numerous ANC-run councils seems on the verge of collapse. The global recession has bit deeply, causing continuing job losses and spreading indebtedness while a high rand is stimulating higher prices, notably of food. Although some movement towards a significantly different, perhaps employment-creating, industrial path has been presaged by the government’s New Growth Path, official policy seems as largely beholden to the market as ever – except insofar as its penchant for ramping up regulations and controls in areas such as mining seems designed to discourage rather than facilitate foreign investment.

      Amid this evidence of stasis and looming crisis, Zuma himself appears indecisive and weak. Brought to power by a coalition of those at odds with Mbeki rather than merely of the left, he has seemed to devote more effort to shoring up his position (and promoting the material interests of his family, his friends and his home village) within the ANC than to meeting the challenges of government; he seems so beholden to the diverse constituents of the alliance that enabled him to unseat Mbeki that he seems СКАЧАТЬ