Restless Nation. William Gumede
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Название: Restless Nation

Автор: William Gumede

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Зарубежная публицистика

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isbn: 9780624055938

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СКАЧАТЬ not the interests of the ANC leadership, which do not always coincide. In summary, if a critical mass of individuals, institutions and communities with struggle credentials from within the ANC family are assertive in their dissent when the ANC acts against the public interest, the organisation’s leadership is likely to become more accountable and responsive to criticism. At the same time, consistent dismissal of such criticism on the grounds that it is counter-revolutionary will become increasingly difficult to sustain.

      In Mauritius (one of the two most successful post-independence African societies with Botswana) the independence movement split in half a decade after independence. The split went right through the middle, not only of the party, but also of the trade unions and civil society groups that were aligned to the movement. Both the old and the breakaway movement had ‘struggle’ credentials, which meant that the electorate could now choose between two ‘legitimate’ progressive movements. The problem with the Congress of the People (COPE), which broke away from the ANC, is that, although its members have struggle legitimacy, it has been unable to shake off the perception that it represents the rejected leadership elite of the ANC. Now off course, COPE is engulfed in leadership struggles similar to those that caused the PAC and the BCM to implode.

      The mistake that the Democratic Alliance (DA) made in the past is that it did not position itself as a liberation movement, albeit a ‘liberal’ one. Its policy and leadership positioning in the past reinforced the perception among the black majority that it defended the interests of a white minority or the apartheid order. Now in power in the Western Cape, the DA has the opportunity to show that it can be an alternative but relevant party which can not only govern better but also more inclusively. It must be able to show that service delivery to the black communities in the Western Cape will in five years be better at all levels than in provinces run by the ANC.

      COPE can build on its struggle legitimacy if it repositions itself as a party for the black poor rather than the middle class, and if it uses the next five years to build a real presence in poor, working-class black communities.

      The mandate President Jacob Zuma received is not ironclad: South African society is restless, and the credibility of the ANC may be wearing thin in the face of increasing delivery deficits, dashed expectations and an inability to communicate the reasons behind this state of affairs. These factors, combined with increasing economic hardships relating to the effects of the global financial crisis, could yet threaten the ANC’s struggle legitimacy, the main reason for its electoral success.

      SA Reconciliation Barometer, Vol. 7, Issue 2, August 2009

      The ANC has much to be proud of on its birthday, but little to celebrate

      As the ANC celebrates its centenary, the party has much to look back on with pride. Compared with other African liberation movements, the ANC had the unique ability to unite diverse groups. The others were formed on the basis of one ethnic or regional group, and could never transcend this; the ANC created a broad alliance that spanned the ideological spectrum, from shopkeepers to communists. It became what was called a ‘multi-class’ organisation.

      Furthermore, the ANC turned the struggle against apartheid into a moral struggle – and a global one. By the 1980s the ANC had formed links with groups ranging from churches and youth groups in the West and developing world, to ruling powers in the Eastern bloc. The ANC also produced pragmatic and visionary leaders with global appeal, such as Nelson Mandela and Albert Luthuli (the first African to receive the Nobel prize for peace).

      The ANC’s armed struggle did not dominate every aspect of the movement, as it did in Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF or Angola’s MPLA. In the ANC there were democratic forces that opposed the domination of a violent guerrilla culture. In the main, the ANC’s operation ethos, whether in exile or in prisons such as Robben Island, genuinely attempted to emphasise internal democracy – consultation, inclusiveness, freedom of expression and the right to dissent – even if there were some appalling incidents to the contrary.

      But as the ANC reaches its 100th birthday, antidemocratic groups appear to have a stranglehold on the party. Key ANC leaders wrote South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution – which set out a clear democratic, human rights and values framework for a new South Africa. Today, incredibly, some leaders are saying that the Constitution, particularly its freedom of expression provisions, ‘undermines’ development.

      The intelligence and security forces, as well as the police, are routinely used in ANC leadership battles to trip up political rivals. Even corruption appears to be sometimes selectively prosecuted to sideline opponents. The cloak-and-dagger style of operations of the rogue elements of the ANC’s military and intelligence wings has now become dominant within the party.

      One of the fundamental clauses in the ANC’s guiding ‘strategy and tactics’ document says members ‘must be informed by the values of honesty, hard work, humility, service to the people and respect for the laws of the land’. The current reality is embarrassingly opposite. This is illustrated in the contrast between the moral authority of a Mandela, an Oliver Tambo or a Luthuli – all former presidents of the ANC – and the murkiness of a Jacob Zuma, who is seeking re-election as party leader this year.

      In his 2007 campaign to become leader, many Zuma supporters were 100% Zulu in their support for the man from KwaZulu-Natal. Out of the window went the inclusive, non-tribal and nonracial ethos of the ANC’s long struggle. The ANC Women’s League backed Zuma’s leadership bid even after he claimed he knew a woman wanted sex with him because she didn’t cross her legs.

      Increasingly, top leaders in the ANC are chosen by small cliques – selected for how best they can balance factional and patronage interests. ANC leaders talk about efforts to tackle poverty, yet wastage of public resources and conspicuous consumption by elected officials have rocketed. The ANC in government runs the risk of making the same mistake as other failed African liberation movements – enriching the few, mostly those who are politically connected, rather than the poor masses.

      Despite all this, the ANC is likely to be in power for some time. Opposition parties at the moment are perceived to be largely irrelevant, too disorganised or too white. There is, of course, the possibility that disillusioned sections of the ANC can break away. However, most supporters will be reluctant to do so given the miserable performance of the most recent splinter group, COPE.

      The lack of a credible challenger encourages complacency in the ANC – with leaders perceiving no reason to shape up. However, with the party seemingly assured of victory in elections for the foreseeable future, largely paying lip service to the values that sustained it for a century, South Africa will struggle to reach its full potential – of becoming a global example for genuine democracy, equitable economic development and peaceful racial integration – unless truly democratic groups quickly take control of the ANC and steer it back to its roots.

      The Guardian, 6 January 2012

      ANC leadership battles should be open and democratic

      Much of the infighting in the ANC, which is paralysing both government and the party, is the result of outdated codes, traditions and rituals governing the elections of leaders of the party, especially the president.

      The opacity in internal ANC elections opens the system to manipulation, corruption and the abuse of state institutions such as the intelligence services, the police and the judiciary, and also raises the possibility of selective prosecutions to sideline rivals. Because of this opacity, incumbents and dominant factions can rewrite and manipulate the rules to favour their leadership campaigns and to undermine opponents.

      The problem faced by many African liberation movements is that the top leadership is usually selected by very small cliques and presented to branches and national conferences for rubber-stamping. The leadership candidates are usually presented as one slate of СКАЧАТЬ