Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 6. Charles S. Peirce
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Название: Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 6

Автор: Charles S. Peirce

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Языкознание

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isbn: 9780253016690

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СКАЧАТЬ or where questions might have been asked which would have brought the matter to a test, and have not been asked. Thus, in Case 231 the date is quite doubtful; but it could have been verified by means of the letter which the percipient wrote that day to a newspaper. In Case 236, whatever the story possesses is due to the statements of a second witness, who does not seem to have been cross-examined at all. In Cases 237, 240, 298, 300, 355, 695, and an unnumbered case, the story is so excessively meagre as to be worthless.

      18th. After all, the reader, who cannot cross-examine the witnesses, and search out new testimony, must necessarily rely upon Messrs. Gurney, Myers, and Podmore having on the whole performed this task well; and we cannot accept any case at all at their hands, unless, as far as we can see, they have proved themselves cautious men, shrewd observers, and severe logicians.

      Although there is not a single one of the thirty-one cases considered which can be accepted for the purpose of the argument, yet some of them may be genuine for all that. It can only be guess-work to say how many; but in my opinion not more than two or three.

      Let us now glance at the other numerical data used in the argument. The ratio of frequency of hallucinations without coincidences has been ascertained by inquiries addressed to a large number of persons, going back for twelve years. The authors have thus assumed that a hallucination with coincidence of the death of the person represented is no more likely to be remembered for a period of twelve years than one which is unaccompanied by such a coincidence. Yet there are numerous cases in their book in which, the death not having been heard of, the vision had been totally forgotten after the lapse of a few months, and was only brought to mind again by the news of the death. I think it would be fair to assume that, in considering so long a period as twelve years, a coincidental apparition would be four times as likely to be remembered as one without coincidence. I also strongly dissent from the authors’ estimate that their coincidences have been drawn from a population of only 300,000. I should reckon the matter, for my part, in this way: every case of an apparition simultaneous with the death of the person represented, or nearly so, becomes known to a circle of 200 to 300 persons, on the average. If any one of this circle of persons, some of whom have had an interest in apparitions excited by the story, learn and are interested in the advertisement of Messrs. Gurney, Myers, and Podmore, these gentlemen would learn of the case. Now, I suppose that the advertisement, being of a very peculiar and sensational character, interests one person for every hundred copies of the newspaper printed. On this assumption, since a million and a half is given as the circulation of the newspapers, the instances obtained would really have been drawn from a population of three to four millions. Adopting these figures, they ought to have heard, on the doctrine of chances, of three or four purely fortuitous cases of visual hallucination with coincidence of death. In view of the utter uncertainty of all the data, it would be very rash to draw any conclusion at all. But the evidence so far as it goes, seems to be rather unfavorable to the telepathic character of the phenomena. The argument might, certainly, have been constructed more skillfully; but I do not think that there is much prospect of establishing any scientific fact on the basis of such a collection as that of the Phantasms of the Living.

      

17

      Remarks on Professor Peirce’s Paper

December 1887 Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research

      BY EDMUND GURNEY

      The foregoing review has been to me a source of genuine pleasure and profit; not so much in respect of the special points which the writer raises,—though my pleasure is not diminished by the sense that on most of these his objections can be fairly met,—as on account of the business-like and thorough spirit in which he has gone to work. Criticism, as my colleagues and I should allow, and even insist, is what the exponents of every new doctrine must expect; and in the case of a doctrine so new to science as telepathy, the criticism cannot be too searching. But, on this subject, searching criticism is as rare as loose and hasty comment is the reverse. The world is roughly divided into two parties,—those who will not so much as look seriously at any of the alleged facts, and those who swallow them all wholesale. Thus the evidence is either wholly neglected, or is admitted without due warrant, and discredited by being mixed up with all sorts of baseless rumors and uncritical fancies. One person recognizes no difference between the strongest case that can be adduced and some anonymous “ghost-story,” and would accept telepathy or any other marvel on the score of a few third-hand reports or vague personal experiences. Another turns away from the facts in whatever strength accumulated, on the ground that they are à priori impossible or unprovable. Both are equally remote from the rational scepticism which alone is the proper attitude for approaching psychical investigation. Apart from such an attitude of mind, no treatment of the subject, whether constructive or critical, can be of any value; and here Mr. Peirce and I are wholly at one. But, in an inquiry so novel and difficult, it is likely that two persons, even though they both begin as rational sceptics, will develop differences of opinion; and it is at least equally likely that they will both make mistakes. Thus, some of Mr. Peirce’s strictures depend (as I shall hope to show) on distinct errors and misconceptions, while others appear to me to be unreasonable and overstrained. On the other hand, he has pointed out some errors on my part; and in so doing, and generally in enabling me to make the present apologia, he has done me a valuable service.

      Mr. Peirce prefaces his detailed criticisms with a more general remark which cannot be quite passed over. Referring to Phantasms of the Living, Chap. XIII, he objects to the “enormous odds ciphered out in favor of the hypothesis of ghosts,”—more correctly, to the enormous improbability that a certain series of coincidences were due to chance alone—as calculated to “captivate the ignorant,” but to “repel thinking men, who know that no human certitude reaches such figures as trillions or even billions to one.” It is as well to be accurate, even at the risk of repelling “thinking men.” But most thinking men, whose thoughts have been directed to the subject of probabilities, will, I imagine, support me in dissenting from Mr. Peirce’s view. There are many cases of practically absolute certitude, where the actual degree of certitude can be measured. For instance, if dice turned up sixes a hundred times running, which could any day be made to happen, the mathematical probability that the dice were not both evenly weighted and honestly thrown would reach a figure higher than those which have offended Mr. Peirce.

      To proceed now at once to his numbered list of objections.

      1st. Case 199. The discovery that this incident occurred as long ago as April, 1873, was only made after the work was printed off. (That it was made so late was partly due to a very rare accident—a misspelling of a name in the Register of Deaths at Somerset House. Much time was wasted in the search there, before it occurred to me to apply to the Coroner.) The date has been rectified in the “Additions and Corrections”; and it was careless of me not to remember, when this was done, that the case had been included in the list in Chap. XIII, so as to have added a warning in reference to that list. But, of course, the limitation of the list to cases occurring in a period of twelve years, starting from Jan. 1, 1874, was purely arbitrary. Had a period of thirteen years, starting from Jan. 1, 1873, been selected instead, the numerical argument would not have suffered appreciably, if at all.

      Case 355. The inclusion of this case was a bad blunder, for which I take the fullest blame. My eye was misled by the date in the first line of the account; but that, of course, is no excuse.

      2nd. This objection seems to me fallacious. We can scarcely doubt that our number of cases would have been increased had we prosecuted our search СКАЧАТЬ