Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 6. Charles S. Peirce

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СКАЧАТЬ vulgar.” Not having what it takes to “captivate the vulgar” was James’s usual criticism of Peirce’s writing. He closed by asking when Peirce’s own “radical evolutionary speculations” would see the light.

      A 17 March letter from Miller to Peirce serves to illustrate the nature of their collaboration and how the Spencer series was organized.

      I wanted to hold the Spencer article until I could be assured of something in reply to or in support of it for the following Sunday Prof. Marsh and Prof. Dana … are both too busy to take a hand, but Prof. Sumner is coming in, probably for a week from next Sunday, that is a week after we print the article. Won’t you stir up Powell and Cope or any of the other combatants you may have in mind and get them to send in their contributions promptly? It is a good thing to have King’s article appear on the same day with Sumner’s by way of ballast, can you get him? For Sunday, the 30th. None of them need sign the articles unless they wish, though we should prefer signatures.

      William Graham Sumner, a Yale sociologist, was probably the leading exponent of Social Darwinism in the U.S., and could be counted on to give strong support to the mechanistic principles that Spencer preached—but apparently Sumner never came through with a contribution. The Powell that Miller wanted was Peirce’s friend John W. Powell, Director of the U.S. Geological Survey, but he did not enter the debate either. He wrote to Peirce that he would like to join in but did not have the time. King must have been Clarence King, the geologist who advanced the theory that catastrophes and cataclysms are important factors in evolution, particularly with respect to rapid evolutionary developments. King may have contributed as “Kappa.”

      The debate opened on 23 March with an introductory editorial and a piece by Peirce, “Herbert Spencer’s Philosophy. Is it Unscientific and Unsound?” (sel. 45), and was framed as a set of questions, but the tone was such as to raise the temperature of Spencer supporters. For example, Peirce took Spencer’s recommendation that a good way to make intellectual progress was to compare competing opinions and settle on those that survive mutual cancellation, as an occasion to ask: “Are thinkers ever really obliged to give all opinions equal votes … ?” He pointed out that there are some things—matter, space, time, law—which Spencer’s “somewhat clumsy conception of evolution has left him no room to explain in any evolutionary sense.” Spencer claimed that these “inexplicables spring directly from the Unknowable” but, Peirce asked, is this resort to the Unknowable really “thoroughgoing evolutionism”? Finally Peirce explained that since Spencer’s intention was to produce “a great scientific theory, a philosophy worthy to form the crown of modern science”—Spencer’s own “guess at the riddle”—it should be evaluated by “the recognized touchstone of a scientific theory”: successful prediction. What scientific discoveries, Peirce wanted to know, can be attributed to Spencer’s synthetic philosophy? Almost at once, after his opening article appeared, Peirce wrote to Miller asking to be paid. Miller replied that “checks for contributions to The Times are made out on Fridays” and he added: “I hope you will stir up as many combatants as possible and promptly.”

      Peirce stayed on the sidelines for the following two Sundays while the first seven respondents weighed in, but he contributed a second article on 13 April: “‘Outsider’ Wants More Light” (sel. 47). Claiming once again that he was only seeking light—“an attack would be veiy different”—he replied to all seven respondents, but principally to three who had tried to answer from the standpoint of science. Henry Osborn, a well-known paleontologist, received Peirce’s most serious and polite reply. Peirce drew support from Osborn for his “doubt” that Spencer’s work would have permanent value. He treated Hiram Messenger and Edgar Dawson much less respectfully, essentially ridiculing them; his intent throughout was to stir up interest and emotions to keep the series going. Peirce did raise two or three interesting points that he would develop more fully in later years. In response to Messengers claim that he could find no mathematical errors in Spencer’s extensive writings, Peirce gave a single example. Spencer claimed that all phenomena are “necessary results of the persistence of force.” Peirce pointed out that it would be perfectly consistent with the principle of the persistence of force if at any given moment all the molecules in the universe were assumed to be in their actual positions but with reversed velocities. From that moment on, history would run in reverse. But “eggs grow into birds, not birds back to eggs,” so clearly not all the phenomena of evolution can be mathematical consequences of the persistence of force. In response to “Kappa,” Peirce outlined the seven tasks that have to be performed by a good critic of philosophy. That was a subject that would interest Peirce for the rest of his days. In response to “R.G.E.” he made the interesting observation that his dissatisfaction with Spencer “is not that he is evolutionist, but that he is not evolutionist enough.”

      Peirce’s use of the pseudonym “Outsider” for his contributions to this debate may have been partly a ploy to add an air of mystery to the proceedings but it was also intended to situate Peirce outside the prevailing ethos of Social Darwinism. When Miller introduced the debate he indicated that the pseudonym allowed “Outsider” to “stand apart from the adepts whom he calls upon to speak their minds.” He added, however, that the name, “Outsider,” was really too modest for “he is himself eminent for his attainments in science and might speak with some authority upon the questions he raises.” But it may be that Peirce’s use of a pseudonym was not so much to set himself apart from his respondents as it was a prudent decision based on his understanding that he could no longer pretend not to be standing apart and that his own name might keep some interested parties from participating. That he chose the pseudonym “Outsider” may have been Peirce’s wry way of stating an unpleasant truth.

      Around the same time Peirce took up the cause against Spencer, perhaps a few weeks before, he arranged with Lorettus Sutton Metcalf to contribute to a series of articles on spiritualism Metcalf was organizing for his journal, The Forum. Peirce was known to be a skeptic concerning such matters, especially because of his recent dispute with Gurney, and Metcalf had engaged him to present a case against spiritualism. It is not known whether Peirce sought out Metcalf to offer his services, or whether Metcalf had become aware that Peirce was looking for magazine work, but it is likely that it was not until after the first article in the series had appeared that Peirce struck his deal with Metcalf. The first in the series was a piece by Mary J. Savage entitled “Experiences with Spiritualism,” which appeared in the December 1889 issue. The second, “Truth and Fraud in Spiritualism,” by Richard Hodgson, appeared in April 1890. Peirce’s article was to follow. It was never given a title by Peirce, but for the present volume the editors have entitled it “Logic and Spiritualism” (sel. 44). It could also have been called “The Case against Spiritualism.”

      Initially Peirce must have thought he would make an easy go of this assignment, for he had worked through the arguments quite thoroughly during the Gurney controversy. But by the end of March he had run into a snag. His first draft ran to 6700 words and Metcalf had set a limit of 5000. Metcalf would not budge and Peirce was equally determined to say everything he wanted to say, so there ensued a curious battle of wills. Peirce finally conceded to Metcalf’s word limit, probably because he was in such great need of the remuneration, but Metcalf had to agree to Peirce’s peculiar way of cutting his article down to size. Peirce simply struck out hundreds of articles and pronouns transforming his paper into something not quite a poem but not really prose either. Peirce’s paper was set in galleys on 7 April, but he continued making revisions. He could not make it work and asked if he could start over. Metcalf agreed but asked Peirce to hurry it up and “please remember not to exceed 5000 words” (21 June 1890). Peirce never rewrote the paper.⁵⁷ Back in Quicktown, after Juliette’s return from Europe, other priorities had taken center stage.

      Peirce began his essay by admitting that he was a man of science—a scientific specialist—and made it plain that he believed that “no mind with which man can communicate can act or feel otherwise than through its residential nerve-matter.” But he did not doubt that “unrecognized avenues of sense may exist” and he believed that telepathy was not an impossibility. Nevertheless, he thought that science СКАЧАТЬ