From World to God?. Richard L. Sturch

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СКАЧАТЬ say “If there is a Big Bang, then a universe of such-and-such a sort will emerge.” Every state of affairs that could emerge from the Bang is as likely as any other; there is no “B”—and therefore no explanation for the beginning of things.

      leslie

      Hold it there! There is no fully specific “B,” perhaps. But there could be a set of possible “Bs.” After all, there is a universe of some sort! As a matter of fact, if God created the universe, He presumably could and did specify what sort it was going to be. But even setting that aside, we have a perfectly good “if, then”: “If there is a divine act of creation, there is a universe.”

      geoffrey

      That isn’t much of an explanation, is it? We have, after all, no access to this “divine act of creation.” We have never seen such a thing; and my case is that we can’t infer it from what we have seen, either. And I’d like to make another point, please. This “Big Bang” sort of argument seems to assume that if the world did not have a beginning in time, it might after all exist without a God. That is, it could be considered as a self-sufficient whole. But exactly the same can be said of a world that does have a beginning. (and, for that matter, an end). You can treat it as a whole, and ask “Does this expanse of space-time (whether finite or infinite, bounded or unbounded) need a God?” If one form, the infinite one, and probably another, the finite but unbounded one that Hawking favors, do not require a God, then the third, the finite and bounded universe, doesn’t either.

      leslie

      But of course there is no reason to suppose that an infinite universe, or an unbounded one, could exist without a God. All the form of cosmological argument we’re looking at did was try to make it particularly obvious that this universe couldn’t. If I show you that one particular horse, or one particular kind of horse, has vestiges of other toes, I should not expect to be taken as implying that other kinds don’t.

      And in fact I distrust talk of a “self-sufficient” universe. The mere fact (if it be a fact) that the universe did not have a specific beginning a finite time ago does not mean that it has somehow become self-explanatory. In fact, people like Maimonides and Aquinas, whom you mentioned just now, argued that such a universe wasn’t self-explanatory in the least. (They were thinking of one that had no beginning in time, not of a finite but unbounded one, but that makes no difference.) It was just that if the world did have a beginning in time, the argument for a God was even stronger; but it was quite strong enough even if the world had no beginning.

      geoffrey

      Maybe so; but this means that we are moving on to your second kind of cosmological argument—“sub-group” I think was your expression.

      The Quest for a “First Cause”

      leslie

      Yes, I think that’s right. The second sub-group may be described, roughly, as the quest for a “First Cause.” Not necessarily first in time; more the starting-point of all causal series. The idea is that there are such things as causes and effects in the world; that causes explain their effects; and that there cannot be an infinite series of cause-and-effect with no beginning, because then, if there is no First Cause of all, there is no explanation for anything at all. What have you to say to this form?

      geoffrey

      That it is no better than the first. Probably worse. It tries to argue to a First Cause behind all causes. But this is based on a false way of looking at things.

      Firstly, because there is no reason why the series shouldn’t go back for ever. Advocates of this argument have admitted that as far as philosophy can tell the world might have had no beginning in time. But in that case at least one series of causes and effects—that of events in this world—actually could go back for ever. It is not easy to see that there is any other series of causes and effects. And if there were, the same might apply to it; it too could go back indefinitely.

      leslie

      Unless the members of the series had to co-exist. Duns Scotus thought that was the case with what he called “essentially ordered” causes—causes which were responsible not for the existence of their effects but for their causative powers.

      geoffrey

      And William of Ockham pointed out that there was no reason why an essentially ordered cause should not cease to exist before its effect did; so that we were no further on than before. And even if Ockham were wrong, which he wasn’t, why might not this series, or any other you may name, go back for ever?

      leslie

      It has usually been answered that this would mean an infinity of co-existing things, and that this is impossible.

      geoffrey

      I do not see why it should be impossible. And the way you phrased your point suggests that you aren’t very sure of it yourself. The point I made earlier still holds good: if God is infinite and almighty, why couldn’t he create an infinity of things all existing together?

      And I have another problem for you. We have been talking of “causes” and “effects” for convenience’s sake. But isn’t such talk very misleading?

      leslie

      Come, come! We talk about them every day. You are not, surely, trying to say that it is very misleading to talk about the “causes” of the First World War, or to say that lung cancer is a distressingly common “effect” of smoking?

      geoffrey

      No, I’m not. In such cases we are interested in questions like “How might the First World War have been averted?” or “How can we reduce the incidence of lung cancer?” That way, we can single out particular factors which are of special interest or usefulness and call them (for convenience’s sake, as I said) “causes.” But the truth of the matter is that wars and cancers (and more pleasant things too) are the result of enormously complicated states of affairs, linked to one another by the laws of nature. And it is no good trying to move by way of the laws of nature to a First Cause which is not part of nature at all.

      myra

      I’m not very happy about that, even though I am unsure about attempts to prove the existence of the Lord. You seem to be saying that God could not be the First Cause of the universe, not just that we can’t prove that He is. And this is ridiculous. Moreover, isn’t the will of God in itself a “law of nature”—indeed a more profound one than any other?

      geoffrey

      Yes, I suppose you are right, or rather would be right if there were a God. If there were, it would be possible to speak of him (or his creative will) as the cause of the universe in much the same way as one might speak of Anglo-German naval rivalry as one of the causes of the First World War. For it would be by his creative will’s being altered that the world could have been prevented from coming into existence. But it certainly isn’t possible to prove the reality of any such will, or of a God to exercise it.

      “Contingent” and “Necessary” Beings

      myra

      What about the idea Leslie mentioned, near the start of our dialogue, of distinguishing between “contingent” and “necessary” beings—beings that exist but might not have, and beings that couldn’t not-exist?

      geoffrey

      It СКАЧАТЬ