The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell
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Название: The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts

Автор: James R. McConnell

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Религия: прочее

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isbn: 9781630873639

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СКАЧАТЬ and ye openly declare that the games have been desecrated” (Har. resp. 25). A second example is found in Cicero’s charge that the prodigy is a warning that the gods are angry over the neglect of sacrificial rites. He quotes the soothsayers’ report in this regard: “Ancient and secret sacrifices have been performed with laxity, and have been desecrated” (Har. resp. 37). His comment on this is in the form of a rhetorical question which links this statement to testimony from the gods themselves: “Is it the soothsayers who utter these words, or the gods of our ancestors and of our households?” (Har. resp. 37). He then goes on to associate Clodius with this matter. In this same section, Cicero claims that Clodius is deranged, and that this is so due to the punishment of the gods.191

      A final example from Cicero comes from De legibus, his treatise on the law. Here Cicero is arguing for the divine origin of Rome’s laws. In an argument quite similar to the one already seen above in his defense of Milo, Cicero argues that the people must understand that “the gods are the lords and rulers of all things, and that what is done, is done by their will and authority; that they are likewise great benefactors of man” (Leg. 2.7.15). He goes on to say that the observation of nature should motivate humanity to thank the gods for their goodness and that nature gives evidence of a greater reason which governs it (Leg. 2.7.16). Finally, this same reason is the basis for Rome’s legal system. Cicero concludes this section by stating:

      Who will deny that such beliefs are useful when he remembers how often oaths are used to confirm agreements, how important to our well-being is the sanctity of treaties, how many persons are deterred from crime by the fear of divine punishment, and how sacred an association of citizens becomes when the immortal gods are made members of it, either as judges or as witnesses [quamque sancta sit societas civium inter ipsos diis immortalibus interpositis tum iudicibus, tum testibus]. (Leg. 2.7.15)

      Thus Cicero associates the goodness of Rome’s laws with the gods who are active participants in the legal system through their testimony and judgment.

      The examples above demonstrate that the topos of divine testimony was used abundantly as proof or evidence in ancient speeches and philosophical treatises. The examples also show the breadth of situations in which ancient rhetors were able to apply the topos in forensic and deliberative cases involving law, politics, and even in philosophical works. The method of the present study, as explained in chapter one, is to consider how the topos of divine testimony would have been heard and understood by an ancient audience, especially in the case of Luke-Acts. Therefore, it is appropriate at this time to consider, albeit briefly, the question of the persuasiveness of this particular topos in the ancient world. It is to this question I now turn.

      The Persuasiveness of the topos of Divine Testimony

      First, I have already discussed the significance for the rhetorician of persuasion and adapting one’s case to the audience. Thus, the important question for the rhetor is not, “What do I believe?” Rather, the more significant question is, “What proofs and evidence will convince my audience?”202 Thus, Cicero can write,

      Now nothing in oratory, Catulus, is more important than to win for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgement or deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute [quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus]. (De or. 2.42.178)

      For the present discussion, it is important to note that Cicero places a higher value on convincing his audience by emotional appeal than “reality” (veritas).203 Quintilian makes a similar statement; in the context of the appeal to emotions within a speech, he says, “But where force has to be brought to bear on the judges’ feelings and their minds distracted from the truth, there the orator’s true work begins” (Inst. 6.2.5). Therefore, given this emphasis on conviction at all costs, Cicero’s personal views concerning augury and divination are not significant.204 What is significant is the judge’s (or audience’s) opinion of the evidence, and it is this second point noted above that I now address.

      In the first chapter of this study I explained in the section describing the proposed methodology that I would focus on the implied audience of Luke-Acts СКАЧАТЬ