Anarchy and Apocalypse. Ronald E. Osborn

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СКАЧАТЬ from their burst temples and their insides from the soft parts under their ribs. How terribly must these people have died. The smallest children lay like fried eels on the pavement. Even in death they showed signs of how they must have suffered—their hands and arms stretched out as if to protect themselves from the pitiless heat.4

      That single raid on Hamburg killed approximately forty thousand civilians, including both of Schmidt’s parents. In total, it is estimated that more than half a million German civilians were killed as a direct result of British and American bombing. What must be absolutely clear about these deaths is the well-documented but largely ignored fact that they were absolutely intentional. These were not unfortunate casualties in a campaign against German military targets: from as early as July, 1943, on, they were the targets. The saturation bombing of German cities did not include the burning of children as an unavoidable “double effect” of “Just War”; burning noncombatant men, women, and children was the precise strategy of Allied planners.

      It did not begin this way. At the start of the Battle of Britain in 1939, leaders on both sides declared that they would not target civilian populations. It was understood that bombing military factories and installations would result in unavoidable civilian casualties. But the policy of minimizing deaths among noncombatants was widely supported by both politicians and the public on religious and ethical grounds. This course continued until August 24, 1940, when Luftwaffe bombs, intended for an oil storage depot, fell on London’s East End. Winston Churchill, overruling the Royal Air Force, ordered a bombing raid on Berlin the next day. Germany responded by unleashing the blitz over London. Still, for some months the RAF insisted that the ban against killing civilians was still in effect. There was a lingering sense of moral compunction among the Allied forces that the dynamics of violence had not yet fully eroded. This would change.

      First, because it was too risky to bomb by day, the Allies decided that bombing should be done only at night. This, however, made precision bombing impossible and proved militarily unsuccessful since targets were often missed. Realizing that their efforts to strike only military targets by cover of darkness were not working, the RAF therefore shifted to a policy of “area bombing.” The destruction of whole neighborhoods was now permitted, providing there was a single military target within a given neighborhood. But by 1942, with the war dragging on and casualties mounting, the Allies decided that even this was not enough. Abandoning any pretense of ethical standards, they adopted a more “realistic” policy once and for all: indiscriminate “obliteration bombing” of entire cities. The explanation given for the new phase in the Allied campaign was twofold: first, it would ensure absolute success against military targets; more importantly and explicitly, it would “break enemy morale.” Chivalric distinctions between civilians and combatants were no longer practicable. The morality of “total war” was tautologically justified by the necessity of “victory at any cost.”

      So began the routine bombardment of noncombatants. Yet soon Churchill was calling for still greater innovations in violence. “I should be prepared to do anything that might hit the Germans in a murderous place,” he wrote to his Chiefs of Staff in July, 1944:

I may certainly have to ask you to support me in using poison gas. We could drench the cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany in such a way that most of the population would require constant medical attention . . . It is absurd to consider morality on this topic when everybody used it in the last war without a word of complaint from the moralists or the Church. On the other hand, in the last war the bombing of open cities was regarded as forbidden. Now everybody does it as a matter of course. It is simply a question of fashion changing, as she does between long and short skirts for women.5

In the end, the Allies were unable to devise a feasible plan for chemical war, but not for lack of will or trying. They were hampered, in Churchill’s words, by “that particular set of psalm-singing uniformed defeatists,” and by logistical considerations within the military. “I cannot make headway against the parsons and the warriors at the same time,” he lamented.6 The aerial campaign against civilian populations meanwhile proceeded without dissent. What feeble resistance there was to the policy of “total war” was kept to a minimum through pressure tactics and facile slogans. This will end the war sooner. This will save lives. We must take retribution. We must punish the aggressor. There were, it should be noted, a surprisingly high number of RAF pilots and crews who objected to the terroristic annihilation of defenseless noncombatants now required of them. But the military took severe disciplinary action against these individuals, court-martialing and imprisoning them to prevent their strange ideas from spreading through the ranks. The official reason given for their punishment was “LMF”—lack of moral fiber.

      In the Pacific arena, however, moral fiber was in abundant supply. On the night of March 9, 1945, the United States set the entire city of Tokyo ablaze with napalm bombs. The heat was so intense it boiled the water in the canals. More than 100,000 civilians died in the attack. Bomber crews in the last waves could smell the burning flesh. The same was done to more than fifty other Japanese cities, leading to a befuddling dilemma for Allied strategists: by May and June there were few “untouched” cities left for the ultimate demonstration of Allied “resolve.” At last a list of cities, including the religious center of Kyoto, was compiled and submitted to the American High Command. None were proposed for primarily military reasons. What was critical in each case was that the target included a massive unspoiled population that could be annihilated without warning in a single moment. Civilian morale and psychological considerations—terrorism to be precise—dictated where the atomic bombs would fall.

      The strategy was a spectacular “success.” More than 350,000 civilians were killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a litany of unspeakable horror, some instantly in the inferno that consumed the cities at the speed of two miles a second; some more slowly, their skin hanging from their bodies like rags; some vomiting and convulsing from radiation sickness days later; some bleeding out of the retina, the mouth, the rectum, and respiratory passages from decay of internal organs; others later still from cancer and unknown diseases. For years afterward thousands of children conceived in the two cities were born with chromosomal and genetic disorders—a multigenerational reminder of American power and so added insurance policy against recalcitrant Japanese nationalism.

In five short years between 1940 and 1945 the cycle of violence had come full circle. The Allies began the war vowing that they would not use the techniques of their enemies, but in the end the logic of violence proved irresistible. Their cause was just. Their motives were pure. But the initial cause of war proved immaterial to the way in which the war was finally waged. Once violence was accepted as a means to an end, violence became its own end. Traditional morality was discarded as so much intellectual and spiritual deadweight. “If [the Japanese] do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth,” said President Harry S. Truman in his radio broadcast to the nation.7 The nation applauded. A poll in Fortune magazine suggested that the only regret of nearly a quarter of the American public was that more atomic bombs had not been used. Truman, for his part, insisted that after ordering the bombings he went to bed and slept soundly.

      The point is not that Allied soldiers lacked moral principles, goodwill, or noble intentions. It is that war has its own will and its own intentions: it refuses to be contained or controlled by mere humanity. Whatever vestiges of decency and restraint America and England possessed at the start of the war gave way to more pragmatic calculations as the war progressed. Sentimental images of American GIs dispensing chocolate bars to German and Japanese children prevents us from seeing the staggering slaughter inflicted by the Allies, with absolute calculation, on hundreds of thousands of civilians.

      All of the arguments dredged up from medieval scholastic theology to vindicate violence for “a just cause”—and particularly СКАЧАТЬ