A Great Grievance. Laurence A.B. Whitley

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СКАЧАТЬ solution was to make obtrusion the central issue. If the Westminster Assembly could be persuaded specifically to outlaw settlements renitente et contradicente ecclesia [the church being in opposition], then he felt it would be a suitable compromise: “for the prelates are for obtrusion, the Separation [separatists] for a popular voting: ergo let us go in a medium.”20 When it came to the vote on the 22 March, however, the motion which finally passed still withheld an unrestricted veto: “No man shall be ordained a minister for a particular congregation, if they can shew (any) just cause of exception against him.”21 Despite the rearrangement of words, the Scots had, in the end, made little impact on the original proposition. According to Robert Paul, the reason for this was that the basic instinct of the conservative majority in the Westminster Assembly was to see the authority and status of presbyteries as being equivalent to that of the earlier bishops. Far from seeking popular empowerment, it was instead clear that for these men, “new Presbyter certainly was but ‘old Priest writ large.’”22 Nevertheless, thanks to discretionary powers which allowed the Kirk freedom to revise the details of the section on calling of ministers, the propositions on ordination were approved, despite their shortcomings, by the General Assembly on the 10 February 1645.

      Before finishing with the Westminster Assembly, however, two questions remain to be asked, namely, did all the arguments surrounding election presuppose that presentations by patrons were to be repudiated and, secondly, if the Scots had been granted a free hand to regulate the admission of ministers to vacancies, what would their preference have been?

The answer to the first question is that, although patrons and presentations are very rarely mentioned in the minutes,23 or in the notes of observers like Gillespie or John Lightfoot, master of Catharine Hall, Cambridge, there is no indication that all discussion was to be founded upon the principle that they were unacceptable. An example can be seen in the unexceptionable tone with which patrons are mentioned in a debate on the 21 March: “Mr Vines: The recommending by the presbytery heals all, for do either the patron or the people choose, yet is he to be recommended by the presbytery.”24 Again, all minutes appear carefully worded so that nothing obstructs the possibility of a presbytery receiving presentations. Thus, the procedure for the admission of ministers, approved on the 18 April, simply says: “He that is to be ordained must address himself to the presbytery, with a testimony . . . especially of his life: and then the presbytery to examine him: being approved, to be sent to the church where he is to be, and preach three days; and, on the last, notice to be given, that some of the congregation go to the presbytery to see him admitted or excepted.”25 Furthermore, it is recorded for the day before, that the meeting considered what legal action might befall a presbytery should “they stop a man presented, if they find him unworthy.”26 The word presented need not necessarily infer the use of a patron’s presentation, yet it is clear that the possibility is not discounted.

As for the question of Scottish preferences on election, a prevailing viewpoint is not immediately obvious. That the Kirk was itself unable to make up its mind is evidenced by the great debate which arose on the issue when the Westminster Directory came up for discussion at the 1645 General Assembly.27 Encouraged by a recent Act of the Convention of Estates, which virtually handed all crown presentations to presbyteries,28 Calderwood’s inclination was to stay with the traditional view that a presbytery’s authority was central and that the initiative in all vacancies should remain in its hands. By way of concession, however, he was prepared to allow a congregation its choice, provided the selection was from a list provided by the presbytery. On the other side of the argument, there were those, like Rutherford, who saw no reason why the people’s freedom to choose should be restricted at all. It therefore comes as no surprise to find that even five years later, opinion on the matter was as divided as ever:

. . . some ascrybeis this power [of election] to the multitude of professouris promiscuouslie within the flock or congregatione; some to the particulaire eldershipe within the congregatione quhairunto thei require att least a tacite or prerogative conseil of the wholl people; some ascrybe it unto the most eminent for light and lyf of religione in the congregatione, neglecting otheris altho never so eminent in other respectis and concerned in that place; some ascrybe it to the presbyterie onlie without any concurrence of the people; some ascrybe this power to the presbyterie and people joyntlie, everyone acting their owne part distinctly - whose judgement seems to approach nearest unto divine truth.29

      Out of the confusion, it was a version of the system espoused by George Gillespie which won approval after the Scotish Parliament ultimately abolished patronage in 1649. This placed the power of election with the kirk session rather than the congregation and it is possible that it would have been the compromise choice of the Scots representatives at Westminster. However, before considering Gillespie’s preferences further, it is important to move on from the Westminster Assembly to look at the circumstances which led to the abolition of patronage and then return to how the Kirk coped with the far from straightforward task of agreeing upon an alternative.

      The Abolition of Lay Patronage in 1649

      The Political Background

      The Scottish decision to provide military support for the Parliamentarians against the king in 1644, provoked deep divisions north of the border. A Scottish pro-royalist party emerged, although not all of its adherents were prepared to go to the violent lengths of the Marquis of Montrose, whose military campaign on the king’s behalf got underway in August 1644. Despite the defeat of Charles at Naseby in June, and Montrose at Philiphaugh in September 1645, support for the king deepened and spread when, in the following year, he surrendered to the Scots forces, only to be handed over to the English Parliament on 8 January 1647. The fact was, most presbyterians had no liking for the churchmanship of the Independents, now gaining ascendancy in England, and when, in addition, the king was seized by the army during June 1647, there was general alarm for his safety. As a result, a group of nobles were emboldened to enter into an “Engagement” with Charles, whereby they would endeavor to restore his authority in return for concessions which included his (qualified) support for the Solemn League and Covenant and presbyterianism. Although the Estates came out in favor of the Engagement, the General Assembly remained suspicious of royal intentions, and resolved to oppose it. In the event, the Estates sent an army south, only to see it heavily defeated by Oliver Cromwell at Preston, in August 1648.

      In the tide of recrimination which followed the debacle at Preston, an anti-Engager grouping, led in particular by Archibald, eighth Earl and first Marquis of Argyll, came to power. Encouraged by the Church, it immediately set about purging all public offices of “malignants,” as those tainted by any association with Montrose or the Engagement were styled. Since the nobility’s presence in the Estates was thus drastically reduced, it seemed that the opportunity had at last arrived for the hardline remnant within the Kirk to do something about the burden of patronage.

      Ecclesiastical Influence upon the Scottish Parliament

If, as Walter Makey has suggested, the purged Parliament was now obedient30 to the ministers, then the realization of cherished goals like the abolition of presentations would indeed have become all but inevitable. However, it would be mistaken to conclude that the political situation had simply been transformed into a sacerdotal dictatorship. The work of John R. Young has shown that although the executive bodies of СКАЧАТЬ