Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War. Elizabeth Schmidt

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ Islamic State is also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).²¹ In contrast to local Salafi jihadist groups that focus on establishing or purifying a Muslim state in a single country, the Islamic State aims to establish a caliphate that would unite Muslims worldwide in one political entity—a phenomenon last achieved in the eighth century. The origins of the modern Islamic State can be traced to the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, which precipitated the Second Gulf War (2003–11). The invasion and occupation sparked a Sunni insurgency led by the Jordanian-Palestinian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who transformed his organization, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad), into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which targeted US military and international coalition forces as well as local collaborators. After Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, his successors began to refer to the al-Qaeda branch and associated organizations as the Islamic State in Iraq. When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, the Islamic State expanded its reach into that country, and by 2013 it was calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who honed his ideas and mobilizing skills in an US internment camp, the Islamic State recruited followers from among the Sunni minority that had been favored under Saddam Hussein but was marginalized politically after his ouster by US and coalition forces. In February 2014, al-Qaeda severed its ties to the Islamic State, criticizing its persistent aggression against Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, as well as its brutal treatment and indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians, particularly Shi’as.²² Noted for its ruthless methods, the Islamic State attracted international jihadis who felt that al-Qaeda was too moderate. However, both Muslims and non-Muslims widely condemned the organization for its harsh practices and attacks on civilians.

      A number of African entities have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader. Like those that developed links to al-Qaeda, these groups emerged from local conditions and only later established ties to the international jihadist organization.

       AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISLAMIC STATE

      Algeria: Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Algeria split from AQIM in 2014 and pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.

      Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, established in 2011, was influenced by al-Qaeda ideology but was not a formal affiliate. The organization fractured in 2014 when many Nile Valley members retained links to al-Qaeda, while others in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State and named their faction Wilayat Sinai (Province of Sinai) or Islamic State–Sinai Province.

      Libya: A brigade of fighters from eastern Libya, who had fought on behalf of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, returned home in 2014 and reconstituted themselves as the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna. They declared eastern Libya to be a province of the Islamic State, which they called Cyrenaica Province. Two other Islamic State provinces were established in Libya in 2015: Tripolitania Province in the west and Fezzan Province in the south. In early 2015, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte split into two factions, with some members retaining ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.

      Mali: Although most Malian jihadist organizations retained their ties to al-Qaeda, some al-Mourabitoun members left the organization in 2015 to form the Islamic State in Mali, subsequently renamed the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (sometimes translated as the Islamic State in the Sahel).

      Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram, switched its allegiance from AQIM to the Islamic State in 2015 and adopted the name Islamic State in West Africa Province.

      Somalia: Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia), based in Puntland, broke from al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab in 2015. Another al-Shabaab splinter, Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (also known as Jahba East Africa or the East African Front) emerged in early 2016.

      Tunisia: Following a government crackdown, some remnants of Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, previously associated with al-Qaeda, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2014. Some members of the AQIM-linked Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade also switched allegiances in 2014 and established a new organization, Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia, which aligned with the Islamic State. The Tunisian jihadist group Mujahidin of Kairouan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2015.

       Conclusion

      Sustaining a pattern established during decolonization and the Cold War, foreign governments and other entities intervened in African affairs in the decades that followed. Although individual states continued to intercede unilaterally, multilateral intervention by organized groups of states and by nonstate actors became more frequent than previously. In some cases, the presence of nonstate actors associated with international terrorist networks provoked intervention by foreign states or institutions. In other cases, intrusion by foreign entities stimulated local insurgencies that in turn attracted international terrorist support. State-based actors justified their involvement as a response to instability, an effort to protect civilian lives, and a necessity for advancing the war on terror. However, they also promoted their own more parochial interests. Conflicting agendas often weakened multilateral efforts, and the priorities of the most powerful countries generally took precedence. While African political and military leaders participated in war-making and peace-building processes, African civil society representatives remained in the background. These deficiencies undermined the prospects for a lasting peace, as the following case studies demonstrate.

      Chapter 4, which focuses on Somalia, is the first of two chapters that explore post–Cold War intervention in East Africa. When foreign powers withdrew their support for the Somali government after the Cold War, insurgent forces overthrew the authoritarian regime. Concerned about the humanitarian crisis inside the country as well as the potential for regional destabilization, multilateral organizations, extracontinental powers, and neighboring countries intervened. Their motivations were varied, often at odds, and subject to change over time. Although some of the initial outcomes were positive, the long-term effects were largely negative, contributing to increased human suffering and instability.

       Suggested Reading

      African international relations are explored in a number of recent works. Two recommended volumes investigate the role of extracontinental powers in Africa after the Cold War, including the major Western powers along with Russia, China, Japan, India, the UN, the EU, and international financial institutions. See Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds., Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (New York: Routledge, 2004); and Ian Taylor, The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: Continuum, 2010). John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: Engaging a Changing World Order, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), explores interstate conflict, the impact of outside investment and externally induced political reforms, and the role of international peacekeeping forces. Errol A. Henderson, African Realism? International Relations Theory and Africa’s Wars in the Postcolonial Era (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little-field, 2015), challenges the applicability of Eurocentric international relations theories to African cases and explores the relationship between Africa’s domestic and international conflicts.

      Several books examine the role of the UN in the post–World War II international order. Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), argues that the UN was created to protect the interests of empire but was reshaped by formerly colonized states and transformed into an instrument for ending СКАЧАТЬ