Название: Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity
Автор: Tariq Ramadan
Издательство: Ingram
Жанр: Культурология
isbn: 9780860374398
isbn:
At first sight, the constant reference to the Qur’ān and the Prophet (peace be upon him) might seem as an obstacle and as a negation to change, and this is manifested by the will to see applied today a legislation which is 14 centuries old. What we have just said, however, is proof that this understanding is too reductionist and corresponds neither to the teachings of Muḥammad (peace be upon him) nor to the attitude of the ‘ulamā’ (scholars) of the first era. The establishment of general principles is a fact which is proved in the modalities of juridical readings of the Qur’ān and the traditions, and confirms, if there was need for confirmation, the requirement of “the effort of personal reflection” (ijtihād) in situations which neither the Qur’ ā n nor the Sunna mention. 12
II. Ijtihād: Between the Absoluteness of Sources and the Relativity of History
When he had to pronounce a ruling, the first Caliph, Abū Bakr, referred firstly to the Qur’ān, trying to find whether there was an applicable text. If he did not find one there, he would take into consideration the life of the Prophet – according to his memory or that of his Companions – in order to discover a similar situation for which the Prophet (peace be upon him) might have pronounced a specific ruling. If at the end of his enquiry the two sources remained silent on the case in question, he would gather for consultation the representatives of the people and agree with them on a new decision. One which was rationally independent but respectful of the spirit of the first two sources.
This step-by-step procedure received the approbation of Muḥammad (peace be upon him) himself when he sent Mu‘ādh ibn Jabal to the Yemen to assume the office of Judge. On the eve of his departure, the Prophet (peace be upon him) asked him: “According to what are you going to judge?” “According to the Book of Allah”, answered Mu‘ādh. “And if you don’t find the ruling therein.” “According to the tradition (Sunna) of the Prophet of God.” “And if you don’t find the ruling therein.” “Then I will exert my effort to formulate my own ruling.” Upon hearing Mu‘ādh’s answer, the Prophet (peace be upon him) concluded: “Praise be to Allah Who has guided the messenger of the Prophet to what is acceptable to the Prophet.”
In fact, things are very clear in legislative matters. Islamic law, which is so much talked about today, is in the first place all the general rules stipulated by the Qur’ān and the Sunna. Within a short space of time, as many complex issues and challenges emerged, jurists developed a method and established principles of research in the subject of law. Just as in the example of Mu‘ādh, they put “all their energies into formulating their own rulings”. This duty of reflection is known in Islamic law by the name of ijtihād, an Arabic term whose literal meaning is “exerting all one’s energy”, “making an effort”. In the absence of textual references, it is for the jurist to rationally harness a regulation in tune with the time and place but one which does not betray the teachings and spirit of the two fundamental sources. 13 In other words, the answers were adapted to the context. They were themselves, by the force of things, diverse and plural but always “Islamic” when they did not contradict those general principles which are unanimously accepted. Jurists ought to respond to the questions of their time by taking into account the social, economic, and political realities then pertaining. Just as did Imām al-Shāfi‘ī when he modified the content of his jurisprudence (fiqh), following a journey which led him from Baghdad to Cairo. When he was asked about the reason for such modification when Islam is but one, his reply was such that the realities of Baghdad were different to those of Cairo, and that laws which were valid in one place were not necessarily so in the other. In other words, he conveyed the fact that if the letter of the Qur’ān and the Sunna are one, their concrete application is plural and supposes an adaptation.
This job of adaptation, which is the work of jurists and is known by the name fiqh, regroups the whole of Islamic jurisprudence, as much for that which deals with aspects of worship as for that dealing with social affairs. If the rules which codify worship are never modified, it is not so when it comes to the treatment of social affairs. In the case of the latter, realities fluctuate and fiqh, when well understood, is a given answer made in a given moment of history, by a jurist who has “made an effort” to formulate an Islamic legislation. We should salute such a job, but we do not have to sanctify the jurist’s decisions or propositions. The issue of resolving the problems of modern life is one of the major problems facing Muslims today. 14 Often, they either mistake the spirit of the Qur’ānic injunctions with the sense that such or such a jurist had given to them in the first period of Islam, or find it very hard to think out a legislation which is drawn from the fundamental sources but which is at the same time really in tune with our time.
We can see explicitly, from the beginning and up to the present time, that Islam has always required its faithful to concretely and rationally think their relation with the world and with society. Many Orientalists have pointed out that one of the specificities of Islam is the priority given, from the beginning, to juridical reflection rather than to theological consideration, and this because Islam, in its essence, blended together the private and public spheres and, consequently, the search for concrete answers was imposed. This blending reveals a particular conception of man and the universe.
We have tried to show that nothing in Islam is opposed to the fact of apprehending change or to accepting progress, but it still remains that we have to put in evidence the specificities of the Islamic conception of the human being and of the universe. This is a question, in fact, of analysing some of the most general and absolute principles, which we have spoken about earlier, in order to measure how they can convey a certain idea of modernity, and which will not, nevertheless, be assimilated to its Western actualisation.
III. God, Creation and Men
1. The Creator and gerency
The existence of the One, Creator God is the dogma of Islam. The principle deriving from this is that the whole universe belongs to God Who is, by essence, the Owner. We find often reported in the Qur’ān, the expression:
To God belongs all that is in the heavens and earth. (Qur’ān, 2:284)
It is indeed the idea conveyed in these verses which associates the Divine ownership of the heavens and earth, the sacred dimension of beings and the elements of Creation, and lastly, the recall of the destiny of men:
Hast thou not seen how that whatsoever is in the heavens and in the earth extols God, and the birds spreading their wings? Each – He knows its prayer and extolling; and God knows the thing they do. To God belongs the Kingdom of the heavens and earth, and to Him is the homecoming. Hast thou not seen how God drives the clouds, then composes them, then converts them into a mass, then thou seest the rain issuing out of the midst of them? And He sends down out of heaven mountains, wherein is hail, so that He smites whom He will with it, and turns it aside from whom He will; well-nigh the gleam of His lightning snatches away the sight. God turns about the day and the night; surely in СКАЧАТЬ