The Crisis of the Dictatorships. Nicos Poulantzas

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СКАЧАТЬ of forces in the world, i.e. to prevent these changes from escaping the controlled readjustment of this balance.

      As far as the attitude of the USSR and the Soviet-bloc countries towards the dictatorial regimes in Portugal, Spain and Greece is concerned, this has certainly been critical and negative, but this does not mean that the Soviet Union and its allies adopted, as states, a policy that effectively challenged these regimes. (This indeed is the least that one can say.) From Greece, where trade and diplomatic exchange with the Soviet bloc experienced a new upswing under the colonels’ junta, through to Spain where a major development in economic relations is now under way, the score is clear enough.

      All this, however, simply concerns the first aspect of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and is sufficiently well-known not to need any emphasis here. The second aspect is far more important – this equilibrium in the balance of forces is a dynamic one, and highly unstable, as it in no way excludes considerable contradictions between the United States and the USSR. In point of fact, there is a permanent readjustment of this balance by way of the policy failures produced by these contradictions. The important factor in this respect is the direct presence of the USSR in the last few years, by way of the Israel-Arab conflict, as a power of the first order in a region that was previously a reserved domain of the United States. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean is a constituent element of the new readjustment in the balance of forces, and it has major effects for the countries in this region. While provoking attempts by the United States to reinforce control of the NATO countries, it also makes massive and open American intervention in this region far more risky than this was previously, and this can undoubtedly have in Spain, as it already has had in Greece, highly positive effects on the circumstances in which the dictatorships are overthrown. We may say that the popular masses of these countries have been able to take advantage, or will be able to do so, of the contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though their path lies along a razor’s edge, on account of the intensified efforts at control on the part of the United States. This situation could be seen at work in Greece in the Cyprus conflict, with the spectacular about-turns of the United States due among other things to the firm though cautious attitude of the Soviet Union, an attitude which made a massive American intervention in favour of the military junta altogether too risky.

       III

       The Dominant Classes

      The fundamental question regarding the overthrow of the dictatorships in Portugal and Greece, and the changes impending in Spain, is the exact role played by the internal factors. More precisely, in what way have the so-called ‘external’ factors, the changes involved in the present phase of imperialism, been reproduced and internalized actually within the socio-economic and political structures of these countries?

      The first point to consider here is that of the changes within the dominant classes of these countries. We must recall once again the points made as regards the new forms of dependence characterizing the relationships that certain dependent countries have with the imperialist centres: on the one hand, the rapid destruction of pre-capitalist modes and forms of production, on account of the forms assumed by the present imports of foreign capital in these countries; on the other hand, the process of dependent industrialization, due to the tendency of foreign capital to invest in the directly productive sectors of industrial capital, in the current context of internationalization of production and capital.

      This permits the emergence or development of a new fraction of the bourgeoisie in these countries, which is very clear in the cases of Greece and Spain, and to a somewhat lesser extent also in Portugal: a fraction which I have referred to elsewhere as the domestic bourgeoisie. As this industrialization gets under way, there develop nuclei of an autochtonic bourgeoisie with a chiefly industrial character (directly productive capital), grafting itself onto this process in the domain of light industry in the consumer goods field, more occasionally in heavy industry (consumer durables, textiles, engineering, as well as steel and chemicals), and finally in the construction industries (cement, etc.). This is particularly the case, in Greece, with the domestic bourgeoisie organized in the Union of Greek Industrialists; in Portugal, with certain autochtonous capitals of the Lisbon/Setubal/Porto industrial belt, these capitals promoting the change in economic policy that was attempted, but failed, under Caetano, by R. Martins and his Fomento Industrial plan of 1972. In Spain, finally, the domestic bourgeoisie encompasses a large part of the autochtonic bourgeoisie, with the Catalan and Basque bourgeoisies in its lead, but also including a section of public capital under the control of the INI (National Industrialization Institute). These bourgeoisies are not simply confined to the industrial domain, but also extend to fields directly dependent on the industrialization process, such as transport, distribution (commercial capital), and even services of various kinds (particularly tourism). They are distinguished from earlier fractions of the bourgeoisie by the new complexity of their relationships with foreign capital.

      Above all, they are distinguished from the comprador bourgeoisie, which is still very important in these countries. This comprador bourgeoisie (sometimes referred to as the ‘oligarchy’) can be defined as that fraction whose interests are entirely subordinated to those of foreign capital, and which functions as a kind of staging-post and direct intermediary for the implantation and reproduction of foreign capital in the countries concerned. The activity of this comprador bourgeoisie often assumes a speculative character, being concentrated in the financial, banking and commercial sectors, but it can also be found in the industrial sector, in those branches wholly dependent on and subordinated to foreign capital. In Greece, a typical case is that of shipping (Onassis, Niarchos, etc.), and capital invested in marine construction, petrol refineries, etc. In Portugal, the small number of big comprador groups (CUF, Espirito Santo, Borges e Irmao, Portugues do Atlantico, etc.) centre around banking, and while controlling a large part of autochtonic production, they are at the same time oriented to the exploitation of the African colonies – being closely tied to foreign capital both in Portugal and in its colonies. In Spain, finally, there is the characteristic case of a very substantial banking and financial comprador sector (industrial banks in particular), and industries that directly depend on it. From the political point of view, this bourgeoisie is the true support and agent of foreign imperialist capital.

      The domestic bourgeoisie on the other hand, although dependent on foreign capital, also has significant contradictions with it. This is principally because it is cheated in its share of the cake, as far as the exploitation of the masses is concerned; the lion’s share of the surplus-value goes to foreign capital and its agents the comprador bourgeoisie, at the domestic bourgeoisie’s expense. There is also the fact that since the domestic bourgeoisie is concentrated chiefly in the industrial sector, it is interested in an industrial development less polarized towards the exploitation of the country by foreign capital, and in a state intervention which would guarantee it its protected markets at home, while also making it more competitive vis-à-vis foreign capital. It seeks an extension and development of the home market by a certain increase in the purchasing power and consumption of the masses, which would supply it with a greater market outlet, and also seeks state aid to help it develop its exports.

      It must still be made clear – and this is very important as far as this domestic bourgeoisie’s policy towards the dictatorships is concerned- that it is not a genuine national bourgeoisie, i.e. a bourgeoisie that is really independent of foreign capital and which could take part in an anti-imperialist struggle for effective national independence, such as sometimes did exist in these countries in the past (in Spain above all), during the earlier phases of imperialism. The development of this domestic bourgeoisie coincides with the internationalization of labour processes and production, and with the internationalization of capital, in other words with the induced reproduction of the dominant relations of production actually within these various social formations. By this fact alone, while its existence involves certain contradictions with foreign capital, this domestic bourgeoisie is to a certain extent СКАЧАТЬ