Lineages of the Absolutist State. Perry Anderson

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СКАЧАТЬ by Henry III’s assassination of Guise. While the ducal lords of the Guise clan – Mayenne, Aumale, Elbeuf, Mercoeur – detached Lorraine, Brittany, Normandy and Burgundy in the name of Catholicism, and Spanish armies invaded from Flanders and Catalonia to aid the League, municipal revolutions exploded in the Northern cities. Power was seized in Paris by a dictatorial committee of discontented lawyers and clerics, backed by the famished plebeian masses and a fanatical phalanx of friars and preachers.¹⁰ Orléans, Bourges, Dijon, Lyon followed suit. Once the Protestant Henry of Navarre became the legal successor to the monarchy, the ideology of these urban revolts started to veer towards republicanism. At the same time, the tremendous devastation of the countryside by the constant military campaigns of these decades pushed the South-Central peasantry of Limousin, Périgord, Quercy, Poitou and Saintonge into menacingly non-religious risings in the 1590’s. It was this dual radicalization in town and country that finally reunited the ruling class: the nobility started to close ranks as soon as there was a real danger of an upheaval from below. Henry IV tactically accepted Catholicism, rallied the aristocratic patrons of the League, isolated the Committees, and suppressed the peasant revolts. The Religious Wars ended in a reaffirmed royal state.

      French Absolutism now came relatively rapidly of age, although there was still to be one radical setback before it was definitively established. Its great administrative architects in the 17th century were, of course, Sully, Richelieu and Colbert. The size and diversity of the country were still largely unconquered when they began their work. Royal princes remained jealous rivals of the monarch, often in possession of hereditary governorships. Provincial parlements composed of a combination of rural gentry and lawyers represented bastions of traditional particularism. A commercial bourgeoisie was growing in Paris and other cities, and controlled municipal power. The French masses had been aroused by the civil wars of the previous century, when both sides had at different times appealed to them for support, and retained memories of popular insurgency.¹¹ The specific character of the French Absolutist state which emerged in the grand siècle was designed to fit, and master, this complex of forces. Henry IV fixed royal presence and power centrally in Paris for the first time, rebuilding the city and making it into the permanent capital of the kingdom. Civic pacification was accompanied by official care for agricultural recovery and promotion of export trades. The popular prestige of the monarchy was restored by the personal magnetism of the founder of the new Bourbon dynasty himself. The Edict of Nantes and its supplementary articles contained the problem of Protestantism, by conceding it limited regional autonomy. No Estates-General was summoned, despite promises to do so made during the civil war. External peace was maintained, and with it administrative economy. Sully, the Huguenot Chancellor, doubled the net revenues of the State, mainly by shifting to indirect taxes, rationalizing tax-farms and cutting expenses. The most important institutional development of the reign was the introduction of the paulette in 1604: sale of offices in the state apparatus, which had existed for over a century, was stabilized by Paulet’s device of rendering them inheritable, in exchange for payment of a small annual percentage on their purchase value – a measure designed not only to increase the income of the monarchy, but also to insulate the bureaucracy from magnate influence. Under the frugal regime of Sully, sale of offices still represented only some 8 per cent of budget receipts.¹² But from the minority of Louis XIII onwards, this proportion rapidly altered. A recrudescence of noble factionalism and religious unrest, marked by the last and ineffectual session of the Estates-General (1614–15) before the French Revolution, and the first aggressive intervention of the Parlement of Paris against a royal government, led to the brief dominance of the Due de Luynes. Pensions to buy off captious grandees and resumption of war against the Huguenots in the South increased state expenditures greatly. Henceforward, the bureaucracy and judiciary was to pullulate with the largest single volume of venal transactions in Europe. France became the classical land of sale of offices, as an ever-growing number of sinecures and prebends were created by the monarchy for revenue purposes. By 1620–4, the traffic in these provided some 38 per cent of royal revenues.¹³ Tax-farms, furthermore, were now regularly auctioned to large financiers, whose collecting systems might tap up to two-thirds of fiscal receipts on their way to the State. The steeply rising costs of foreign and domestic policy in the new international conjuncture of the Thirty Years’ War, moreover, were such that the monarchy had constantly to resort to forced loans at high interest rates from the syndicates of its own tax-farmers, who were themselves at the same time officiers who had bought positions in the treasury section of the State apparatus.¹⁴ This vicious circle of financial improvisation inevitably maximized confusion and corruption. The multiplication of venal offices, in which a new noblesse de robe now became lodged, impeded any firm dynastic hold over major agencies of public justice and finance, and dispersed bureaucratic power both centrally and locally.

      Yet it was in the same epoch that, curiously interlaced with this system, Richelieu and his successors started to build a rationalized administrative machine capable for the first time of direct royal control and intervention throughout France. De facto ruler of the country from 1624 onwards, the Cardinal proceeded promptly to liquidate the remaining Huguenot fortresses in the South-West, with the siege and capture of La Rochelle; crushed successive aristocratic conspiracies with summary executions; abolished the highest mediaeval military dignities; levelled noble castles and banned duelling; and suppressed Estates where local resistance permitted (Normandy). Above all, Richelieu effectively created the intendant system. The Intendants de Justice, de Police et de Finances were functionaries dispatched with omnibus powers into the provinces, at first on temporary and ad hoc missions, who later became permanent commissioners of the central government throughout France. Appointed directly by the monarchy, their offices were revocable and non-purchasable: normally recruited from the earlier maîtres de rêquites and themselves small or medium nobles in the 17th century, they represented the new power of the Absolutist State in the farthest reaches of the realm. Extremely unpopular with the officier stratum, on whose local prerogatives they infringed, they were used with caution at first, and coexisted with the traditional governorships of the provinces. But Richelieu broke the quasi-hereditary character of these regional lordships, long the peculiar prey of the highest aristocratic magnates, so that by the end of his rule, only a quarter were still held by men who predated his accession to power. There was thus a simultaneous and contradictory development of both officier and commissaire groups within the overall structure of the State during this period. While the role of the intendants grew progressively more prominent and authoritarian, the magistrature of the various parlements of the land, champions of legalism and particularism, became the most vocal spokesmen of officier resistance to them, intermittently hemming the initiatives of the royal government.

      The compositional form of the French monarchy thus came, both in theory and practice, to acquire an extreme, ornate complexity. Kossmann has described its contours for the consciousness of the possessing classes of the time, in a striking passage: ‘Contemporaries felt that Absolutism in no way excluded that tension which seemed to them inherent in the State and altered none of their ideas of government. For them, the State was like a baroque church in which a great number of different conceptions mingle, clash and are finally absorbed into a single magnificent system. Architects had recently discovered the oval, and space came alive in their ingenious arrangements of it: everywhere the splendour of oval forms, gleaming from their corners, projected onto the construction as a whole the supple energy and swaying, uncertain rhythms cherished by the new style.’¹⁵ These ‘aesthetic’ principles of French Absolutism, nevertheless, corresponded to functional purposes. The relationship between taxes and dues in the traditional epoch, as has been seen, has been termed a tension between ‘centralized’ and ‘local’ feudal rent. This ‘economic’ duplication was in a sense reproduced in the ‘political’ structures of French Absolutism. For it was the very complexity of the architecture of the State which permitted a slow yet relentless unification of the noble class itself, which was gradually adapted into a new centralized mould, subject to the public control of the intendants, while still occupying privately owned positions within the officier system and local authority in the provincial parlements. Simultaneously, moreover, it achieved the feat of integrating the nascent French bourgeoisie into the circuit of the feudal state. For the purchase of offices СКАЧАТЬ