Crisis in the Eurozone. Costas Lapavitsas

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СКАЧАТЬ encouraged to improve competitiveness primarily by applying pressure on their workers. But they have faced two major problems in this regard. First, real wages and welfare states are generally worse in the periphery than in the core of the eurozone. The scope for gains in competitiveness through pressure on workers is correspondingly less. Second, Germany has been unrelenting in squeezing its own workers throughout this period. During the last two decades, the most powerful economy of the eurozone has produced the lowest increases in nominal labour costs, while its workers have systematically lost share of output. EMU has been an ordeal for German workers.

      German competitiveness has thus risen further within the eurozone. The result has been a structural current account surplus for Germany, mirrored by current account deficits for peripheral countries. This surplus has been the only source of dynamism for the German economy throughout the 2000s. In terms of output, employment, productivity, investment, consumption, and so on, German performance has been mediocre. At the core of the eurozone lies an economy that delivers growth through current account surpluses deriving in large part from the arrangements of the euro. German surpluses, meanwhile, have been translated into capital exports – primarily bank lending and foreign direct investment – the main recipient of which has been the eurozone, including the periphery.

      This is not to imply that workers in peripheral countries have avoided pressures on pay and conditions. Indeed, the share of labour in output has declined across the periphery. It is true that the remuneration of labour has increased in nominal and real terms in the periphery, but productivity has risen by more – and generally faster than in Germany. But conditions within the eurozone have not encouraged rapid and sustained productivity growth in peripheral countries – partly due to middling levels of technology – with the exception of Ireland. Peripheral countries have thus lost competitiveness as the nominal compensation of German workers has remained practically stagnant throughout the period.

      Confronted with a sluggish but competitive Germany, peripheral countries have opted for growth strategies that have reflected their own history, politics and social structure. Greece and Portugal have sustained high levels of consumption, while Ireland and Spain have had investment booms that involved real estate speculation. Across the periphery, household debt has risen as interest rates fell. The financial system has expanded its weight and presence across the economy. But in 2009–10 it became apparent that these strategies were incapable of producing positive long-term growth results.

      The integration of peripheral countries in the eurozone has been precarious as well as rebounding in favour of Germany. The sovereign debt crisis has its roots in this underlying reality rather than in public profligacy in peripheral countries. When the crisis of 2007–9 hit the eurozone, the structural weaknesses of monetary union emerged violently, taking the form of a public debt crisis for Greece, and potentially for other peripheral countries.

The impact of the crisis of 2007–9 and the role of finance

      The immediate causes of the crisis of 2007–9 lay in the US mortgage bubble which became global due to securitisation of subprime assets. European banks began to face liquidity problems after August 2007, and German banks in particular found that they were heavily exposed to problematic, subprime-related securities. During the first phase of the crisis, core eurozone banks continued to lend heavily to peripheral borrowers in the mistaken belief that peripheral countries were a safe outlet. Net exposure rose substantially in 2008.

      But reality gradually changed for banks as liquidity became increasingly scarce in 2008, particularly after the ‘rescue’ of Bear Stearns in early 2008 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers six months later. To rescue banks, the ECB has engaged in extensive liquidity provision, accepting many and debatable types of paper as collateral for secure debt. ECB actions have allowed banks to begin to adjust their balance sheet, thus engaging in deleveraging. By late 2008 banks were already reducing their lending, including to the periphery. Banks also stopped buying long-term securities preferring to hold short-term instruments – backed by the ECB – with a view to improving liquidity. The result was credit shortage and accelerated recession across the eurozone, including the periphery.

      These were the conditions under which states – both core and periphery of the eurozone but also the UK and other states – began to seek additional loanable funds in financial markets. A major cause of rising state borrowing was the decline of public revenue as recession lowered the tax intake. State expenditure also rose in several countries after 2007 as the rescuing of banks proved expensive, and to a lesser extent as states attempted to support aggregate demand. Accelerated public borrowing in 2009 was induced by the crisis, and hence by the earlier speculations of the financial system. In this respect, the Greek state was typical of several others, including the USA and the UK.

      In the conditions of financial markets in 2009, with the banks reluctant to lend, the rising supply of state paper put upward pressure on yields. Speculators found this environment conducive to their activities. In the past, similar pressures in financial markets would have led to speculative attacks on currencies and collapsing exchange rates for the heavy borrowers. But this was obviously impossible within the eurozone, and hence speculative pressures appeared as falling prices of sovereign debt.

      Speculators focused on Greek public debt on account of the country’s large and entrenched current account deficit as well as because of the small size of the market in Greek public bonds. Credibility was also lost by the Greek government because of systematic fiddling of national statistics to reduce the size of budget deficits. But the broader significance of the Greek crisis was not due to the inherent importance of the country. Rather, Greece represented potentially the start of speculative attacks on other peripheral countries – and even on countries beyond the eurozone, such as the UK – that faced expanding public debt.

      The Greek crisis, therefore, is symptomatic of a wider malaise. It is notable that the institutions of the eurozone, above all the central bank, have performed badly in this context. For the ECB private banks were obviously ‘too big to fail’ in 2007–9, meriting extraordinary provision of liquidity. But there was no similar sensitivity toward peripheral countries that found themselves in dire straits. It made little difference that the problems of public debt were largely caused by the crisis as well as by the very actions of the ECB in providing banks with liquidity.

      To be sure the ECB has been hamstrung by its statutes which prevent it from directly acquiring public debt. But this is yet more evidence of the ill-conceived and biased nature of European Monetary Union. A well-functioning central bank would not have simply sat and watched while speculators played destabilising games in financial markets. At the very least, it would have deployed some of its ingenuity to constrain speculation, and the ECB has demonstrated considerably ingenuity in generously supplying private banks with liquidity in 2007–9. Not least, a well-functioning central bank would not have decided what types of paper to accept as collateral on the basis of ratings provided by the discredited private organisations that were instrumental to the bubble of 2001–7.

Policy options for peripheral countries

      The crisis is so severe that there are neither soft options, nor easy compromises for peripheral countries. The choices are stark, similar to those of developing countries confronted with repeated crises during the last three decades.

      The first alternative is to adopt austerity by cutting wages, reducing public spending and raising taxes, in the hope of reducing public borrowing requirements. Austerity would probably have to be accompanied by bridging loans, or guarantees by core countries to bring down commercial borrowing rates. It is likely that there would also be ‘structural reform’, including further labour market flexibility, tougher pension conditions, privatisation of remaining public enterprises, privatisation of education, and so on. The aim of such liberalisation would presumably be to raise the productivity of labour, thus improving competitiveness.

      This is the preferred alternative of ruling elites across peripheral and core countries, since it shifts the burden СКАЧАТЬ