The New Old World. Perry Anderson

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ in the Community—in particular, the currently impenetrable recesses of comitology in Brussels—would be posted on the internet for the inspection of citizens, above all the younger generations for whom the Web will be like print of old. A Constitutional Council, in turn, would arbitrate issues of juridical competence, a continual bone of contention, within the Union. Finally, the EU should be able to raise a small income tax directly from its citizens to bind the two together with one of the classic ties of democratic representation.

      The ideas themselves are uneven. Weiler thinks his internet scheme—Lexcalibur, as he would call it—the most important and far-reaching, whereas to a sceptical eye it looks the flakiest: as if future teenagers will be eagerly scanning the 97,000 pages of Community directives or the hydra-headed minutes of Coreper for their political caffeine. The suggestion that a Constitutional Council be modelled on the tame French version is not much of a recommendation. But the Legislative Ballot is at once a highly imaginative and perfectly feasible proposition, one that would sow panic in European establishments. The idea of a direct fiscal tie between the Union and its citizens is not quite so original, but no less relevant and radical for that. The essential point is that with proposals like these, the discursive terrain has shifted. We have left the establishment consensus that the European constitutional order inhabits the best of all possible worlds, namely that of the second-best, for any other is impossible.

      On this alternative terrain, one distinguished mind has envisaged a far more sweeping reconstruction of the Union. Philippe Schmitter, originally a pupil of Haas at Berkeley, later teacher at Chicago and Stanford, first made his name as a Latin Americanist, before becoming one of the world’s most inventive and wide-ranging comparatists, writing extensively on corporatism, regional integration and—perhaps in particular—the problems of transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, in South America and Southern Europe. Stationed at the European University Institute in Florence at the turn of the century, he published in 2000 what remains in many ways the most remarkable single reflection on the EU to date, How to Democratize the European Union . . . and Why Bother? Typically, although a shorter early draft exists in Italian, this arresting work has never been translated into any other language of the Union, testimony enough to the provincial indifference with which it has abandoned thought of itself. As a systematic set of proposals for political change of visionary scope and detail, the text recalls another age, as if written by a latter-day Condorcet. An exercise of this kind normally belongs to a utopian style of thought, indifferent to constraints of reality. But a more worldly temperament, in every sense, than Schmitter’s would be hard to find. The second part of his title expresses the spirit of the other side of his intelligence, an ironic detachment worthier of a descendant of Talleyrand. The crossing of two such antithetical strains makes for a work unique in the literature on the Union.

      Schmitter begins by noting that the EU is neither a state nor a nation. Although it has irrevocably crossed the threshold of any mere inter-governmental arrangement, it displays neither the coincidence of territorial and functional authority that defines a state, nor the collective identity that marks a nation. Few of those subject to its jurisdiction understand it, and with good reason. ‘The EU is already the most complex polity that human agency . . . has ever devised’.⁸⁵ It is plainly far from anything that could be described as an accountable structure under popular control. What would it take to democratize it? Little less than a reinvention of three key institutions of modern democracy: citizenship, representation and decision-making. Schmitter coolly specifies an agenda for the transformation of each. Of the resulting sixteen, sardonically designated ‘modest proposals’, it is sufficient to indicate the following.

      Citizenship? To promote a more active liberty in the Union: direct referenda to coincide with elections to the European Parliament, themselves to be held electronically over an entire week, with voters having the right to determine the terms of office of their favoured candidates. To make for the first time a reality of universal suffrage: multiple votes for adults with children. To foster social solidarity: denizen rights for immigrants; conversion of the total monies now spent on the CAP and Structural Funds into a ‘Euro-stipendium’ to be paid to all citizens of the Union with an income less than a third of the European average.

      Representation? To create a more effective legislature—capping the size of the European Parliament, seating MEPs proportionate to the logarithm of the population of each member state, and assigning all other than symbolic work of the assembly to commissions, as in Italy. To encourage more Union-wide political organization: half of the EU electoral funds now allocated to national parties in member-states to be switched to party formations in the EP, vested with the right of nominating half the candidates on their respective national lists.

      Decision-making? To manage equitably the complexities of a Europe with so many member-states, of vastly differing sizes—division of the Union into three ‘colleges’ of states by ascending number of citizens, votes weighted within each by logged value. Three simultaneous presidencies of the European Council, one from each college, nominating a president of the Commission to be approved by a majority in each college and of the EP; decisions in the Council of Ministers likewise to require a concurrent majority of the weighted votes in all three colleges.

      Schmitter, like Weiler, is not necessarily the best judge of which of his own proposals are the most significant. He argues that it is the alterations in the Union’s decision-making rules he outlines that have the greatest potential for democratizing it—changes in Euro-citizenship and Euro-representation having less immediate payoffs. This seems implausible, as his ‘collegiate’ orders appear least close to the tangible experience of ordinary voters, as a structure not only of considerable technical alembication, but operational at the remotest peak of European power. Ground-level changes in citizenship look much more explosive and swiftly transformative.

      Schmitter rightly underlines the importance of the ‘symbolic novelty’ of his suggestions for these, designed to have a benign shock effect to bring home the value-added of being a European as well as a national citizen. To engage people, indeed, politics must become more fun. As the American Founders, thinking it impossible to stop the causes of factions—regarded at the time as the worst of evils afflicting a republic—devised instead institutions to control their effects, so if there is no hope of doing away with today’s equivalent—the trivialization of politics by the media—the antidote can only lie, inter alia, in making politics more entertaining.⁸⁶ The contrast with Moravscik’s prescriptions for a popular sedative—the more boring, the better—could hardly be more pointed. Later suggestions include voter lotteries for funding of good causes, electronic balloting, and participatory budgets. But these are trimmings. The boldest and most substantial single idea in Schmitter’s arsenal is certainly the proposal for a Euro-stipendium financed out of the abolition of the common agricultural and regional funds. As bien-pensant critics have not failed to point out, this would be bound to unleash redistributive struggles in the Union—the appalling prospect, in other words, of social conflicts that might engage the passions and interests of its citizens. In short, the worst of all possible dangers, the intrusion of politics into the antiseptic affairs of the Union.

      How does Schmitter himself view the social context in which he offers his reforms? Not through the lens of the philosophe, but the lorgnette of the Congress of Vienna. There is, and for the foreseeable future will be, no popular demand or spontaneous pressure from below to democratize the Union. So why bother with schemes to render it more accountable? The reasons can only lie in underlying structural trends, which could eventually erode the legitimacy of the whole European enterprise. Among these are ‘symptoms of morbidity’—Gramsci’s phrase—in national political systems themselves: distrust of politicians, shrinkage of parties, drop in voter turnout, spread of belief in corruption, growing tax evasion. Another is decline in the permissive consensus that the process of integration once enjoyed, as Europeans have become increasingly bemused and restive at secretive decisions reached in Brussels that affect more and more aspects of their existence. National leaderships lose credibility when major policies issue from bureaucratic transactions in Brussels, without Union institutions themselves gaining СКАЧАТЬ