Remediation in Rwanda. Kristin Conner Doughty

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ legitimize (though not justify) some of the anti-Tutsi sentiment and the ease with which people could be mobilized by fear to violence. By extension, the national focus ignored how postgenocide governmental actions within and outside Rwanda could have similar ongoing effects on regional instability today. Erasure of regional dynamics in the dominant narrative allowed the RPF to prioritize national resocialization policies rather than macro-political and economic factors. It also continued to locate the solution at the national level, rather than opening the door to international or regional solutions that might promote corrective action in Rwanda’s foreign and domestic policies.

      Focusing on ethnicity within natural national borders—which were not coterminous with the Rwandan kingdom over the previous three centuries¹⁹—disregarded the broader entanglement of regional and international sociopolitical dynamics, particularly the waves of violence and genocide against Hutu in Burundi and ongoing war in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa (Autesserre 2010; Lemarchand 2009; Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009). These regional dynamics contributed to the pregenocide situation—and arguably to postgenocide dynamics as well—by enflaming fears of ethnic violence, adding fodder for political manipulation, and creating massive movements of refugee populations who were particularly receptive to ethnic-based ideologies (Lemarchand 2009:20; Malkki 1995; C. Newbury and D. Newbury 1999).

      Specifically, the dominant narrative ignored the 1972 killings of Hutu by Tutsi in Burundi, massacres that sank into “near oblivion” in broader global memory (Lemarchand 2009:71). In the wake of an aborted Hutu-instigated uprising that caused the death of hundreds or perhaps thousands of Tutsi civilians in Burundi, the ensuing (Tutsi) government-backed repression from April to November 1972 resulted in the deaths of one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Hutu, specifically primary and secondary school children, university students, teachers, and civil servants (Lemarchand 2009:71). This helps contextualize the anti-Tutsi backlash in Rwanda that paved the way for Habyarimana’s coup in 1973 (Lemarchand 2009).

      Ignoring the 1972 events, as well as the October 1993 assassination of the Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, at the hands of the all-Tutsi army, erased the idea that there was any legitimacy to Hutu fears of power sharing or of Tutsi-generated violence. Ndadaye was the first Hutu president in the history of Burundi, and his election brought to a close twenty-eight years of Tutsi hegemony. His assassination three months after he took office unleashed violence in Burundi on both sides, with Hutu civilians killing up to twenty thousand Tutsi in October and November 1993, and the Tutsi army killing as many Hutu in retaliation. Further, the violence caused some two hundred thousand to four hundred thousand Hutu to seek refuge in Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 (Lemarchand 2009; C. Newbury and D. Newbury 1999:85). In the context of the uneasy truce between the RPF and the Habyarimana government, these events contributed to the Rwandan Hutu-power regime’s anti-Tutsi propaganda and were part of the undoing of any compromise contained in the Arusha Accords.

      The national focus of the RPF’s master narrative obscured Rwanda’s problematic role in neighboring countries, only publicizing international interventions when they were consistent with the dominant narrative—for example, claiming that incursions into the DRC were solely driven by efforts to oust génocidaires who remained intent on killing Tutsi, not by desire to control mineral resources or expand territorial sovereignty (Lemarchand 2009:17–19). Yet, Kagame faced accusations of atrocities—crimes against humanity and even possibly genocide—for events in the mid-to-late 1990s in Rwanda and in the DRC where Rwanda “exported” its war (Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009). Scholars, human rights activists, and a 2010 U.N. report accused Kagame and his army (the RPA) of the deaths of as many as two hundred thousand civilian refugees during the destruction of refugee camps in the DRC in October 1996, as part of a broader Rwandan desire to overthrow Mobutu and support Kabila (Brauman et al. 2000; Lemarchand 2009:26; Pillay 2010; Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009:80–102). Overlooking the fact that four times as many people died in the eastern DRC between 1998 and 2006 as in the genocide, in a war in which Rwanda was heavily involved (Lemarchand 2009:5), maintained the uniqueness of the Rwandan situation to strengthen the RPF’s genocide credit.

      Masking Past and Present Divisions

      The dominant master narrative emphasized externally produced ethnicity, and how a rogue political regime misused it, to the exclusion of recognizing other kinds of social identities, divisions, and misuses of political power in the past and present. In his speech, President Kagame explained:

      Genocide in Rwanda was not an uncontrollable outburst of rage by people consumed by ancient tribal hatreds as has been suggested by some western anthropologists and sociologists and even espoused by some in African scholarship. It was deliberate, calculated, premeditated, and cold blooded as a result of a distorted ideology that preached death and extermination of a section of Rwandan society.… We know that they [killers] were responding to the vicious campaign of hate by the architects of the genocide, men and women who held the highest offices in the land. This elite, which had for a long time misappropriated and controlled the government army, radio and television stations, was most instrumental in fomenting ethnic division and hatred, a strategy they subsequently transformed into genocide.

      Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.

      Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».

      Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.

      Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.

/9j/4SsvRXhpZgAATU0AKgAAAAgADgEAAAMAAAABF3AAAAEBAAMAAAABC94AAAECAAMAAAADAAAA tgEDAAMAAAABAAEAAAEGAAMAAAABAAIAAAESAAMAAAABAAEAAAEVAAMAAAABAAMAAAEaAAUAAAAB AAAAvAEbAAUAAAABAAAAxAEcAAMAAAABAAEAAAEoAAMAAAABAAIAAAExAAIAAAAgAAAAzAEyAAIA AAAUAAAA7IdpAAQAAAABAAABAAAAATgACAAIAAgALcbAAAAnEAAtxsAAACcQQWRvYmUgUGhvdG9z aG9wIENTNS4xIE1hY2ludG9zaAAyMDE1OjEyOjE3IDEwOjE4OjU1AAAEkAAABwAAAAQwMjIxoAEA AwAAAAH//wAAoAIABAAAAAEAAAN5oAMABAAAAAEAAAVGAAAAAAAAAAYBAwADAAAAAQAGAAABGgAF AAAAAQAAAYYBGwAFAAAAAQAAAY4BKAADAAAAAQACAAACAQAEAAAAAQAAAZYCAgAEAAAAAQAAKZEA AAAAAAAASAAAAAEAAABIAAAAAf/Y/+IMWElDQ19QUk9GSUxFAAEBAAAMSExpbm8CEAAAbW50clJH QiBYWVogB84AAgAJAAYAMQAAYWNzcE1TRlQAAAAASUVDIHNSR0IAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPbWAAEA AAAA0y1IUCAgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAR Y3BydAAAAVAAAAAzZGVzYwAAAYQAAABsd3RwdAAAAfAAAAAUYmtwdAAAAgQAAAAUclhZWgAAAhgA AAAUZ1hZWgAAAiwAAAAUYlhZWgAAAkAAAAAUZG1uZAAAAlQAAABwZG1kZAAAAsQAAACIdnVlZAAA A0wAAACGdmlldwAAA9QAAAAkbHVtaQAAA/gAAAAUbWVhcwAABAwAAAAkdGVjaAAABDAAAAAMclRS QwAABDwAAAgMZ1RSQwAABDwAAAgMYlRSQwAABDwAAAgMdGV4dAAAAABDb3B5cmlnaHQgKGMpIDE5 OTggSGV3bGV0dC1QYWNrYXJkIENvbXBhbnkAAGRlc2MAAAAAAAAAEnNSR0IgSUVDNjE5NjYtMi4x AAAAAAAAAAAAAAASc1JHQiBJRUM2MTk2Ni0yLjEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAFhZWiAAAAAAAADzUQABAAAAARbMWFlaIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAABYWVogAAAAAAAAb6IAADj1AAADkFhZWiAAAAAAAABimQAAt4UAABjaWFlaIAAAAAAAACSg AAAPhAAAts9kZXNjAAAAAAAAABZJRUMgaHR0cDovL3d3dy5pZWMuY2gAAAAAAAAAAAAAABZJRUMg aHR0cDovL3d3dy5pZWMuY2gAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAZGVzYwAAAAAAAAAuSUVDIDYxOTY2LTIuMSBEZWZhdWx0IFJHQiBjb СКАЧАТЬ